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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the "Patti.mura" Revolt 
which broke out at the end of the British Interregnum, in 
1818, when the Moluccas were handed back to the Dutch. 
The dissatisfaction that led to the revolt was in part 
religious and in part economic. The thesis traces the causes 
of this dissatisfaction to the Christianisation of the 
islands and the consequent neglect of the Ambonese church by 
the Dutch rulers particularly in the 18th century_ This 
affected the position of, in particular, the schoolmaster/ 
pastors who, with the Regents, constituted the highest 
indigenous leaders of the community. Many of the leaders of 
the revolt came from this group. 
Oppression may have been part of the system - but this 
was not realised till the British came along. The British 
relaxation of the rule of the previous Dutch regime resulted 
in apprehension when it became known that the Dutch were 
returning. This,combined with the incompetence of the 
officials who took over from the British, plus the agitation 
of the disgruntled members of the disbanded native battalion, 
founded by the departing British government, led to the 
bloody revolt of 1817. The course of this revolt is traced 
in some detail, from the earlier successes of Matulesia to 
the final defeat of the revolutionaries. Finally the 
immediate and long range consequences are explored. 
The conclusion arrived at is that the revolt, which is 
seen as something of an abe~ation after three hundred years 
t" 
of contact ~ symbiosis perhaps describes it better than 
co-operation or collaboration -, with the Europeans, had the 
iii. 
seemingly controversial effect of strengthening the bond 
between the Dutch and the South Moluccans. It is argued that 
the population, hereafter, began to realise that there was not 
much prospect for them in the cultivation of spices for 
European markets, but that close co-operation with the Dutch 
government in military and civil services, would give them 
the scope they felt their special position as a Christian 
minority in an overwhelmingly Muslim Indonesian archipelago 
warranted. 
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Adat: 
v. 
GLOSSA..~Y 
A number of meanings hide behind this word. It 
is used in the sense of culture in the general 
sense, but it is also used in the more limited 
sense of rule of law, a less formal "code of 
(good) behaviour". Adat is very clearly 
pre-Christian and certainly in contention with 
Christian (and surely Calvinistic) theology. 
This, however, does not seem to be a problem 
for most Ambonese. Protestantism of a 
Calvinist/fundamentalist nature is simply 
fitted together with ancient pre-Christian 
notions. It can, in many aspects, be compared 
with the Maori tapu. 
Atap: Woven split bamboo mats used for external house 
walls. 
Dendeng: Sun-dried meat. 
Doits: The smallest coin in circulation in nineteenth 
century Ambon. 
Dusun Dati: Communal land holdings. 
Gaba-gaba: Mats woven of the mid-ribs of palm leaves used 
for interior house walls. 
Hongi: 
Kepala Soa: 
Kora Kora: 
Negory: 
Orangkaya: 
Fleet. 
Head of a neighbourhood. 
Large (usually war) prahu. 
Village. The word is derived from the Malay 
word Negara - District. 
One of the titles for a village Head. The 
word literally means "rich man". 
Orembaai: 
Patti: 
Picul: 
Raja: 
Tua Agama: 
Tuangku: 
Large prahu, smaller than the Kora-kora. 
Title of village headman. More important 
than Orangkaya. 
Load = 60 lbs. 
vi. 
Highest title of village heads. Collectively 
village heads are referred to as Regents. 
Religious leader. 
Muslim religious leader. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The archives in Indonesia and especially in The Hague 
are literally bulging with documents and collections pertain-
ing to Ambon. Much research has been done on those of the 
first hundred and fifty years of Portuguese and Dutch 
supremacy in these Spice Islands, but the archives from the 
period from about 1650 to about 1770, or even 1800, are still 
awaiting the attention of historians. The very extent of 
this project is too daunting and few, even they had the 
inclination, would have the time available. There is enough 
material available there to keep ten researchers busy for a 
lifetime. The period from about 1800 has been rather better 
covered, but there still room for an archivally based 
study of the 1817 revolt in the Moluccas, known as the 
Pattimura Revolt. 
This rebellion flared up during a relatively short 
period, from 14 May until 26 November 1817. Thomas 
Matulesial , who had been a sergeant major in the Ambon Corps 
during the period of British rule in the Moluccas, was 
elected as leader, or Kapitan, of this revolt. The revolt 
There is some confusion about the name Pattimura. 
Thomas Matulesia does not seem to have used it personally. 
In the author's discussion with Moluccan historians the 
matter did not become much clearer. Richard Leirissa, of 
the Universitas Indonesia, maintains that the name an 
honorary title derived from the words Patti = Leader or 
Chief, and Murah = cheap or easy - thus indicating a natural 
leader. Dr Manusama, author of a Ph. D. thesis on the 
Hikayat Tanah Hitu, maintains that it was simply his middle 
name, as it appears on his baptismal certificate. Although 
the name Pattimura is now in common use, the name Matulesia 
will generally be used hereafter in this study to avoid 
confusion, since all historical documents relating to him use 
the latter name. 
2 
was fierce. Matulesia, who had military skills and expertise, 
won the first battles, but plans were not co-ordinated. Once 
the Dutch brought in reinforcements they put the revolt down 
ruthlessly and Pattimura and his chief lieutenants paid for 
it with their lives. 
The social ferment which preceded the outbreak of 
this rebellion had its roots well into the past - the 
immediate "British" past as well as the more distant "Dutch" 
past. The writer had the good fortune to be able to study 
a number of documents especially on the revolt itself, in the 
Rijksarchief in The Hague. These form the basis of this 
study. Both Ambon Commissioners, Van Middelkoop and Engelhard, 
wrote extensive Reports on their role in the revolt. There 
are also several reports by Commissioner Buyskes, \vho was 
sent to Ambon to quell the uprising. These reports help to 
put the reports of Van Middelkoop and Engelhard in per spec-
tive. From the side of the rebels, not much written material 
has survived (probably not a great deal ever existed); but 
the "Porto Report", generally thought to have been written by 
the schoolmaster of Porto or Haria, describes events from the 
viewpoint of the islanders and a document written by 
Matulesia and signed by 21 Chiefs, Rajas, Pattis .and 
Orangkayas, sets out the Fourteen Points of complaint of the 
population. The author has also spent some time in the India 
Office Records in London, attempting to trace the "British" 
background to the revolt. A brief visit to Indonesia yielded 
a certain amount of printed material, but the author was 
unable, in the time available to him, to gain access to the 
Arsip Nasional in Jakarta. 2 He has been assured, however, 
2 By Richard Leirissa of the Universitas Indonesia. 
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that copies of most of the relevant material - certainly 
quite enough for the writer of an M.A. thesis to cope with 
- are to be found in The Hague. 
To what extent maya student of the 1817 Ambon 
rebellion obtain an understanding of that revolt through 
comparing it with other colonial revolts? 
The nineteenth century saw a number of revolts and 
wars throughout Indonesia. It can be seen, in fact, as one 
long period of social unrest3 • Until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century Indonesia had been the domain of the 
Dutch East India Company, a trading company that was content, 
by and large, to leave princes, rajas and sultans to run 
their own states. The Company's interest was in trade and as 
long as native rulers delivered the goods they were generally 
left alone. The situation in Ambon was different. Because 
of the Clove-monopoly that the Company was prepared to defend 
against all comers, these islands were actively governed by 
the Company since 1605. The collapse of the Dutch East India 
Company changed all this. On 1 January 1800 the Dutch 
Government took over, establishing a Colonial Government and 
the growing impact of the West resulted in extensive social 
change. 
Many of the conflicts in the Dutch Indies in the 
nineteenth century had common characteristics. They were 
The numerous rebellions in Java during the period 
1840-1875 are listed by J.de Waal, Onze Indische Financien 
Vol. I, pp. 228-229. In only six years of this period did 
no uprisings occur. 
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generally short-lived and lacked modern features, such as 
planned organisation, modern ideologies and nationwide 
agitation4 The leaders generally lacked the understanding 
of politics to make realistic plans in the event of success 
and these risings were therefore doomed to failure and the 
tragic sequel of repression that followed all these outbreaks. 
The Pattimura Revolt in the Moluccas exhibited many -
but by no means all - of the features of peasant revolts 
5 
elsewhere in Indonesia and beyond. The villagers did not 
know what they were fighting fori they had a vague desire to 
overthrow the government but did not feel consciously that 
they were taking part in a social revolutionary movement. 
Economic, social, religious and political grievances played 
their role. 
Yet the Ambonese revolt differed greatly from the 
disturbances in other parts of nineteenth century Indonesia 
and elsewhere in many other respects. Whilst in the context 
of contact between Western and Indonesian cultures peasant 
risings may be seen as protest movements against intruding 
Western economic and political control, which were undermining 
the fabric of traditional society, the situation in the South 
Moluccas was different. There the impact colonisation, and 
of the Christianisation that was an integral part of it, 
eventually totally destroyed Moluccan traditional society. 
Whatever else the Ambonese fought for in 1817, was not for 
a return of the pre-European past. In some ways the Ambonese 
were in a position comparable to the New Zealand Maori in the 
later years of the nineteenth century. By this time the 
4 S.Kartodirdjo, The Peasant Revolt in Banten in 1888 
p.2. See also S.Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java, 
which, however, deals mainly with twentieth century revolts. 
5'b'd 11. 
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Maori's en bloc acceptance of Christianity and the European 
economy had effectively destroyed their pre-colonial society. 
Such a point can be made even more emphatically about the 
Ambonese. Three centuries separated them from their pre-
colonial past. 
There seems to be a tendency for writers on nineteenth 
century Indonesia not to differentiate between wars of 
conquest between states and popular revolts against estab-
lished governments. While it is possible, to some degree, to 
compare Pattimura's revolt with that of Tuanku Iman Bondjol, 
the leader of the Padri revolt in Sumatra, in that both rose 
against their colonial rulers and both rebellions had strong 
religious overtones, there are no parallels between these 
uprisings and,say, the Java War of Dipo Negoro or the war of 
Sultan Hasanudin of Macassar. But even the similarities 
between the Padri War and the Matulesia Revolt are feeble. 
The Minangkabau district in Sumatra, where the Padri War broke 
out, always remained mutiny-inclined and developed into a 
strong nationalistic and independence minded area6 .The 
history the South Moluccas in the following century and a 
half took an entirely different course. 
The Ambon revolt of 1817, then, while it may be seen 
to some extent in a wider Indonesian context, and in the 
context of anti-colonial revolts in general, has a distinct 
autonomy, a uniqueness, of its own. 
6 See Christina Dobbin: Islamic revivalism in a changing 
economy: Central Sumatra (1784-1847) and p.136 of the present 
work. 
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One further problem of interpretation must be dealt 
with here. Modern Indonesia represents Pattimura as one of 
its national heroes, as the freedom fighter who set Indonesia 
on the first steps of the road to eventual independence. 
Even an historian of Dutch origin has argued that Matulesia's 
revolt was lIa potential conduit that would have connected the 
aspirations and development of his own people with those of 
the broader Indonesian world around them ll • 7 There can of 
course be little question that Pattimura represented something 
of Moluccan consciousness, whether articulate and sharply 
formulated or not. But Pattimura was essentially a regional 
or ethnic hero. The writer believes that it is wrong to see 
him as imbued with strong IIAll Indonesian ll nationalist 
sentiments. 
Pattimura lost his revolution and the Moluccas remained, 
for several decades, subjected to monopolies and compulsory 
deliveries. The continued financial straits the Dutch 
colonial administration found itself in did not allow for an 
easing up on the system. As a result the Moluccan economy 
continued to be stunted and the steady disorganisation of its 
society in the following decades was a reflection of the 
ongoing weakness and disintegration of its economy_ In the 
later decades of the nineteenth century the comparatively 
infertile Moluccan islands saw their inhabitants drift away; 
increasingly they sought employment in the Dutch colonial 
army or entered the lower ranks of the civil service. As 
mercenaries and junior administrators whose plodding devotion 
to the Dutch overlords in campaigns and outposts, from one 
end of Indonesia to the other, earned the Moluccas the name 
7 J.M. van der Kroef. IITwo forerunners of Modern 
Indonesian Independence ll The AustraliartJournalof Politics 
and History. Vol.VIII, No.1, May 1961, p.160. 
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of being Holland's "Twelfth Province",they became an element 
apart in the developing nationally conscious world of the 
twentieth century. They came to regard their Christian faith 
as a mark of superiority over other, Muslim, Indonesians. 
A natural consequence of this development was the 
refusal of the Ambonese and the other South ~101uccans, to be 
incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia when it came into 
being in December 1949. 
The seeming paradox of the Ambonese, suppressed for 
centuries, who yet became loyal supporters of the Dutch is 
part of the background, and indeed one of the themes, of this 
study. 
There are writers like B.van Kaam8 who argue that the 
Ambonese loyalty was a myth, fostered by Dutch propaganda 
during their colonial rule and believed by the inhabitants of 
other parts of the archipelago, who mostly came into contact 
with Moluccans who had served in the colonial army or civil 
service. But such writers have set themselves a very diffi-
cult task. 
From this introduction it will be clear that the 
purpose of this study is not only to describe what happened 
and when, but also how and why. There are obvious questions 
of causation and conditional factors. Our first aim must be 
to uncover the various lines of development and to disclose 
the mounting tendency towards rebellion. It is to this 
matter that we now turn. 
8 B. van Kaam, Ambon door de Eeuwen. (1977) p.3. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SETTING 
The island of Amboina has an area only 761 square 
kilometres while each of the other three islands in the 
Uliasan group is even smaller. In 1855 Amboina's population 
numbered nearly 28 000, Saparua just over 10 000, Haruka 
slightly over 7 000 and Nusa Laut almost 3 500. Thus the 
1 islands were thinly populated Most of the people lived in 
the beach villages, partly because earlier the Dutch East 
India Company (V.D.C.) had forcibly compelled a large part of 
the population to move from the interior to the coast, in 
order to facilitate the exercise of stricter control over the 
growing of the cloves. 
The island of Amboina consists of a smaller southern 
peninsula called Leitimor and a larger northern one called 
Hitu, joined by a narrow isthmus known as the Baguala Pass. 
This pass is a mere one kilometre long and light boats were 
often man-handled across, to shorten the sea route from Ambon 
to the other islands in the group very considerably. The Bay 
of Ambon penetrates deeply between the two parts and it is on 
the shores of this bay that the principal town, Ambon, was 
located. 
Although the climate is favourable, the condition of 
the soil is unsuitable for the more intensive varieties of 
agriculture or for horticulture. The soil consists mainly of 
coral sand; the volcanic soil that constitutes the wealth of 
1 H.Kroeskamp, Early Schoolmasters in a Developing 
Country. p. 49. 
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the Indies is almost completely absent here. The land is 
most suitable for forestry; hence the extensive sago groves 
which, even today, supply the staple food for many of the 
population2 . This throws perhaps a different light on the 
complaint so often made by government officials, that the 
"laziness and indolence" of the natives was to blame for the 
poor results achieved with the introduction of new crops such 
as coffee, pepper or indigo, by the V.O.C. or the later East 
Indian Government. The report of an agricultural scientist 
in 1929 confirms that the ground is not capable of producing 
3 
much beyond sago and cassava. Although sago is usually 
considered a poor diet, Olivier4, who visited the Moluccas 
in 1824, argued that contrary to popular belief, he could not 
agree that sago is the poorest of all cereals (sic) since he 
found the health of the inhabitants to be robust. 
Land belonging to the ordinary people in the Moluccas 
had always been held communally. This applied to the sago 
groves as well as the waste lands. The village was divided 
into a fixed number of dati or family groups, each of which 
had the hereditary usufruct of certain lands, the so called 
dusun dati. Usually these were planted with sago trees to 
provide the main food crop. The village, however, retained 
the right of ownership of the dusun dati in the same way as 
exercised this right in respect of its wastelands where 
villagers could assert an equal and joint right of use. As 
A.J.Beversluis & A.H.Gieben. Het Gouvernement der 
Molukken. pp. 79-80. 
3 A.J.Koens in Soerabaiaans Handelsblad, 28 Jan. 1929. 
The author is indebted to Drs G.Knaap of Leiden for drawing 
his attention to this. 
4 J.Olivier Jnz. Land- en Zeetochten in Nederlansch 
Indie. (1830) p.46. 
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the islands in the Ambon or Uliasan group themselves did not 
supply sufficient sago to meet the requirements of the 
population, each year numerous families, sometimes even whole 
villages, crossed over to their dusuns on Ceram, "the country 
overflowing with sago", to beat sago to supplement their 
5 
stocks. Rice had been imported into the Moluccas for 
centuries, mainly from Java, but it had always been a luxury 
item, never a staple. 
The Burger class, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter, stood outside the village communities and had 
therefore no claim on the product of the communal land. 
The name "Moluccas" is generally accepted to refer to 
the entire island world between Celebes and New Guinea with 
the Banda islands as the southern boundary. The concept 
"Moluccas" has since time immemorial been identified with the 
concept "Spice Islands" i.e. the islands which of old were 
the sole producers of cloves, nutmeg and mace. These were 
Ternate, Tidore and Bachan and later the Ambon or Uliasan 
islands and the Banda group. Because of its valuable produce, 
traders from all parts of Indonesia, and well beyond, have 
always been attracted to the Moluccas. Plinius Major in 75 
A.D. mentions cloves, thus proving that trade links between 
the Moluccas and the more "civilised" western part of the 
Indonesian Archipelago, which had trade links with Persia, 
are at least two thousand years old. 
Over the centuries in spite of a long history of 
Christianization and Islamization, there has been rivalry 
between the ancient tribal divisions of the Ulisiwa, or 
League of Nine, and the Ulilima or League of Five. This 
5 Kroeskamp (1974) p.5l. 
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division in two groups conforms to the ancient Arnbonese 
cosmology with its classification system. It divides the 
cosmos into contrasts which have to be balanced because 
violation of the harmony causes harmful consequences for 
. 6 
soclety This has been presented as a kind of unity in 
diversity but in reality unity was completely absent. The 
inhabitants of Hitu belonged to the Ulilima while those of 
Leitimor belonged to the Ulisiwa. The Sultan of Ternate 
considered himself and his subjects Ulilima, which gave him 
the overlordship of Hitu; The Dutch East India Company 
(hereafter V.D.C.), as an ally of the people of Leitimor, was 
considered to be Ulisiwa. The fact that the Ulilima embraced 
Islam while the Ulisiwa became Christians did nothing to 
alleviate the old tensions. While the Christians of Leitimor, 
in due course, formed a strong attachment to the Dutch royal 
house, the memory of the Kingship of the Sultan of Ternate 
never died completely in Hitu7 . 
Islam had corne to Indonesia with Arab and Indian traders 
in the period from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. 
In the Moluccas it was gradually accepted by the coast 
dwellers but the mountain tribes and the inland regions 
generally remained aloof. The influence of Islam affected 
the entire Moluccan society; for one thing, it was now 
governed by laws of a more stable nature than had hitherto 
existed. 
The clove tree originally was native only to Ternate, 
Tidore and Batchan. As yet untrammeled by monopolies, the 
people of the Ceram peninsula of Haomoal, realizing its 
6 Z.J • Manusama , "Hikayat Tanah Hitu ", Unpublished Ph. D. 
thesis, Leiden University (1977) p.I (Summary). 
7 See P.3S. 
12 
value, transplanted the clove culture to their land and from 
there it spread rapidly to Ambon and the rest of the Uliasan 
islands, which now contained their share in the general 
growth of prosperity of the area. 
The Portuguese, under Vasco de Gama, reached India in 
1498, established their headquarters at Goa in 1510 and took 
and settled Malacca in 1511. Realizing that spice prices in 
the Moluccas were considerably cheaper they soon put in an 
appearance there. At first relations with the local people 
were harmonious; the Portuguese paid reasonable prices for 
cloves and nutmeg and trading did not lead to any trouble. 
Before long, though, religion did. 
When Pope Alexander VI in 1493 partitioned the known 
world "with all its gold, spices and all manner of precious 
things" between Portugal and Spain, he imposed the condition 
that they should "exert all diligence in converting people 
of their new territories and ..• institute them in the 
catholic faith and good manners".8 
The Portuguese took this very seriously and estab-
lished contact with indigenous people through the work of 
their missionaries. This contact was closest in the case of 
tribes with "primitive" religions or, in India, with lower 
caste Hindus. With the passing of time, the efforts by the 
missionaries to obtain converts became marked by excesses 
which not only defeated the original purpose, but also 
assumed greater significance as Portuguese pestige waned. 
The Papal Bull of 4 May, 1493. 
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On the Leitimor peninsula, on which Ambon town is situated, 
the population, whose religion was animistic, accepted 
Christianity readily, but the Muslim population of Hitu 
peninsula strongly opposed Christianity which became the prime 
cause of their alienation from the Portuguese. 
The missionary zeal of the Portuguese was not 
exclusively Had majorem Dei gloriam ll , but, from their point of 
view, it was also good politics~ Christian natives almost 
automatically became enemies of the Muslims, the most feared 
opponents of the Portuguese, and thus automatic allies. 
In order to have a ready made Christian Colony on hand 
when they established themselves on Ambon, a colony which wouJd 
act as a bulwark against the Muslims and perhaps as a catalyst 
for the Ambonese to adopt Christianity themselves, the 
Portuguese had brought with them seven Ternatese Catholic 
families. These were granted many privileges; they did not 
have to render compulsory labour services, they were allowed 
to ply a trade, own businesses and slaves and they were 
granted a plot of land near the Portuguese fort on which to 
build houses and establish gardens. Their settlement became 
Kampong Mardika (from the Sanskrit Mardaheka = from 
servitude) and until the present day the Mardika district 
t 'll 't' b 9 s 1 eXls s ln Am on • 
The Portuguese now had a virtual monopoly in the spice 
trade, but this did not last into the seventeenth century_ 
Shortages of man-power and shipping, widespread corruption 
and private trading by officers of the crown and clergy 
9 G.P. de Bruyn Kops, Eenige Greepen uit de 
Geschiedenis der Atnbonsche Schuttery. Aroboyna (1895) 
pp. 8-13. 
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l "k 10 ale , but most of all the political and economic develop-
ments in Europe, were the reasons. 
When Philip II succeeded to the Portuguese throne in 
1580, he drew that country into his wars against England and 
France as well as his own rebellious subjects in the 
Netherlands, and this made its coveted spice trade a legit-
imate war-price for these powers, because of their supremacy 
at sea. 
As the power of the Dutch in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth century increased, they gained their independence from 
Spain and at the same time replaced the Portuguese in the 
Malayo-Indonesian part of Asia, establishing forts and 
factories in Java and Malacca and founding Batavia as the 
centre point of their Asian affairs. 
The first Dutch fleet to reach the Moluccas, under the 
command of Jacob van Heemskerk, dropped anchor off Hitu on 3 
March 1599. The Vizier of the Sultan of Ternate, the ancient 
Kapitan Hitu Tepil, was under direct threat from the 
Portuguese and therefore welcomed van Heemskerk enthusiastic-
ally, but it was the next fleet in 1600 under Steven van der 
Hagen - Istewen ~varhage the Hituese called him - that made 
the link that led to close co-operation. The Hituese asked 
him for assistance against the Portuguese at Leitimor, and 
although the admiral had only one single ship available, he 
10 Francis Xavier, the great missionary of Asia, who 
worked for a year in Ambon, later reported that their 
knowledge was restricted to the conjugation of the verb 
"rapio" - to steal - in which they showed an "amazing 
capacity for inventing new tenses and participles" in his 
letter to Father Rodrigues dated 27th January, 1545. Quoted 
by B.H.M.Vlekke "Nusantara, A History of Ihdohesia", 
The Hague (1965). p. 96. 
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fell in with their request and for eight weeks tried to 
dislodge the Portuguese from their fort. The hoped for 
result was not achieved, but the friendship of the Hituese 
had been won with this proof that the emnity between the 
Dutch and the Portuguese was real. This led to a Dutch-
Hituese treaty in which it was agreed to fight, as allies, 
the mutual Portuguese enemy. To facilitate this a fort was 
built and twenty seven volunteers remained behind. For their 
part, the Hituese agreed that all spices were to be sold to 
the Dutch at prices to be fixed later. 
But now the Portuguese staged a final all-out effort 
to regain their authority in the Moluccas with a fleet of 
eleven ships and 2700 men under the command of Andrew Furtado 
de Mendoza, which sailed into Ambon Bay on 10 February 1602. 
The Dutch garrison of the Fort at Hitu had been taken off in 
time and the fort itself was razed to the ground. Furtado's 
strength was now spent, his men refused to continue fighting 
and he 'li'laS forced to retreat. His violent action, however, 
had driven all the enemies of the Portuguese together. 
A delegation of three young Hituese from the 
traditional ruling families were secretly sent to Banten,to 
remind the Dutch of their earlier promises. Furtado had 
driven the Ambonese into the arms of the Dutch. For the 
South Moluccas this was the start of an era that was to last 
for three and a half centuriesll . 
On 21 February 1605 the Dutch fleet arrived off Hitu. 
Kapitan Hitu, whose son was one of the three delegates, 
immediately added twenty Kora-koras to Van der Hagen's fleet 
H.J.de 
zuid Molukken. 
, De Geschiedenis van Ambon en de 
(1977) pp. 43-44. 
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and the sight of this armada was enough for the Portuguese 
who hoisted the white flag and with guarantees of safe 
conduct, they handed over their fort12 . 
With the gradual decline of Portuguese power, 
Christianity had also declined in the Moluccas, but when the 
Company took over there were still 16,000 Christians in the 
islands, mainly in Leitimor, Saparua and South Ceram. 
Initially the Christian Ambonese and the "Moradores" 
(Portuguese, often of mixed race, who had wished to stay 
behind in the Moluccas) were allowed to practise their 
catholic religion, but this was not to last long. Despite 
promises made by Van der Hagen, sailors set out on an icono~ 
clastic orgy, smashing all "papist" statues; all Portuguese, 
including the priests, were now expelled from the Moluccas, 
given an old boat and left to make their way, as best they 
could, to the Philippines, the nearest Spanish territory. 
The Christian Moluccans were at first hostile to the 
Dutch, but when the hoped for return of the Portuguese did 
not eventuate, they gradually transferred their loyalty from 
the king of Portugal to the States General of the Netherlands 
and the Prince of Orange., This transfer of loyalty had also 
religious consequences as it brought with it a change from 
Catholicism to Reformed Protestantism. After the departure 
of the mission fathers there was no option - if the islands 
were to remain Christian - but to accept not only the new 
rulers but also their reformed religion. The Portuguese, it 
should be remembered, had not differentiated between church 
and state. without this State-Church linkage it would 
probably have been much more difficult to win the Ambonese 
Vlekke op. cit. p.118. 
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over to the Reformed Protestant V.D.C. 
The Muslims or "Moors" had a hard time in the early 
days of Dutch settlement in Ambon. To be sure, Steven van der 
Hagen had made common cause with the Hitu Muslims under their 
famed "Kapitan Hitu" and with their help had ousted the 
Portuguese in 1605, but thereafter they were unwanted and 
left to bewail the fact that the Dutch were more formidable 
foes than the Portuguese had ever been. The hatred of Muslims 
in general is obvious from a letter from the Governor General 
in Council to the Governor of Banda, dated 21 November 1625: 13 
"We strongly recommend the extirpation of the accursed 
Moorish secti no public or private Moorish religious services 
are to be allowed and in particular no Moorish papists (sic) 
are to be allowed in the land. 1I After 1605 the Muslims were 
either treated as slaves or enemies, and it was not until many 
years later, when most of the Ambonese had been christianised, 
that the fear of Muslim influence lessened and they were 
accorded milder treatment. After that the governors generally 
considered them reliable subjects, even though they did not 
belong to the ultra-loyalists such as the inhabitants of 
Leitimor who, after alI, were joined to the Gentlemen of the 
Company by bonds of religion. 
It was not difficult to understand why the Hituese 
Muslims should look for wider bonds which would replace the 
lost VIi ties; for these they looked to Islam. The notion of 
being part of the world-wide Muslim community had more appeal 
than the knowledge that they were subjects of the Company 
which they had resisted so fiercely and so long. This is why 
the feeling of affinity with the Muslim sultanate of Ternate 
De Graaf OPe cit. p.l02. 
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remained, in spite of more lenient treatment by the Dutch, and 
why they still saw the Sultan, weak as he was, as their own 
King. This attitude persisted until well into the nineteenth 
century; it was to be important in 1810, when the British took 
over the government of the Moluccas, and again in 1817 when as 
we shall see, it was the Hituese Muslims who rose en bloc to 
support the Pattimura revolt, while the Christians of 
Leitimor remained loyal to the Dutch. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the numbers 
of Muslims in the area increased steadily, principally 
14 through imllligration of free Muslims from Macassar and Ternate • 
Doubtless the newcomers were made aware of the grievances of 
the earlier Muslim inhabitants. 
Apart from the descendants of the Ternatese Christian 
immigrants, the half caste children of Portuguese men and 
native women, as well as emancipated christian slaves were 
counted as orang Merdika and by the time the Dutch replaced 
the Portuguese as masters of Ambon (1605) there was already 
a fairly large class of "free black folks" or mardikers. 
Appreciating the usefulness of this category of 
inhabitants who were favourably disposed towards the 
westerners, the Dutch upheld the privileges granted by their 
predecessors and when sometime later a corps of armed 
townsfolk was formed, the Mardikers were recruited on the 
14 This extra link with Macassar, the main centre of the 
smuggling trade, led to more "illegal spice trading" and thus 
helped to keep government and Muslims in two camps. 
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same basis as their white fellow townsfolk, in a company under 
a captain of their own kind. It is from these Mardikers or 
15 Mixtice Borgers that the Ambonese Burgers are descended . 
The children of masters and slave women, together with 
emancipated Muslim slaves, formed a new category of inhabi-
tants, the "Moorish Burgers". In the eighteenth century these 
were also admitted to the Companies of Christian Burgers. In 
a "Provisional Instruction" of 1803 there is mention of "the 
16 joint companies of Christian and Moorish Burgers" b They 
remained, however, under their own officers. 
The rights and duties of Burgers and Negory folks 
(Negory Village) differed considerably, especially when the 
plantation and other compulsory labour duties were still 
demanded from the latter. 
The Burgers did not have to perform compulsory labour. 
They were entitled to wear european clothes and a hat17 . They 
were enlisted in the "Sc'hutterij " companies of the militia, 
and those who lived too far away from Ambon to do active 
service became contributory members who had to give a yearly 
sum for the upkeep of the companies. Instead of having to 
perform plantation services all Burgers paid an individual tax. 
Many plied a trade, had small businesses or aspired to 
government posts as village chiefs or Regents and they had 
their own Ambonese Burger School. 
Whilst enjoying these privileges they did not share 
de Bruyn Kops. op.cit. p.6. 
16 ibid. p.9. The situation of the Burgers may be fruit-
fully compared, of course, with that of the Burgers in those 
parts of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) which also underwent Portuguese 
and Dutch conquest. 
17 , 'h b l' d f d Slnce Roman tlmes a at sym 0 lse ree om. 
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the rights the negory people had. As mentioned above, they 
could not claim a share in the sago forests or the use of 
the waste lands of the village community. 
The "monopoly" system, from which sprang many of the 
political, social and economic problems of the Jl.1oluccas, 
warrants a closer scrutiny. 
It can be asserted with some justice, that it had its 
origins in pre-Europeans times. Then, the "nobles", besides 
holding a considerable portion of the clove forests, also 
virtually monopolized the sale of the cloves to foreigners. 
(Before the Europeans mostly Javanese.) Most sales went 
through the hands of the "nobility "18. All that the 
Portuguese attempted to do was to put themselves in the place 
of the "nobility" as the top rung in the economic ladder. 
Indeed it could be argued that the Portuguese, the Dutch, and 
(for a while) the English all continued a centuries old 
system in which the leading characters were replaced, without 
the system itself being subject to change. The biblical word 
seemed to come true "there is nothing new under the sun". 
But the Portuguese never really managed to enforce 
their monopoly. The Dutch were different. The maintenance 
of the spice monopoly - the exclusive right to cultivate as 
well as trade in the spices of the Moluccas was a political-
economic dogma from which the Company would not deviate, even 
in trivial matters, as the following example will indicate. 
In 1670 the future Governor General Speelman had planted a 
dozen clove trees from the Moluccas in his garden in Batavia, 
just for the fun of it. When the High Government came to 
19 hear of it, the harmless trees had to be destroyed . 
J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society. p.142. 
19 Olivier. op.cit. Vol. III p.179. 
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The Company grafted its economic exploitative system 
onto the dati system in the Ambon islands. On the strength 
of the jus belli it assumed the sovereign right of ownership 
in respect of all the land of the Ambon Islands. It turned 
the dati into tributary units, whose tribute consisted in 
making available the land appointed by the V.O.C. for the 
cultivation of cloves, in tending the clove plantations and 
in delivering the produce at a fixed (low) price. To ensure 
that the plantations were properly tended, the freedom of 
movement was curtailed; each villager was compelled to remain 
within the boundaries of the village and to work in his 
dusun dati on the cultivation of the clove crop. The producer 
was not able to sell his produce freely to the highest bidder. 
To safeguard their monopoly on the world markets the 
Company proceeded to extirpate all clove trees outside 
Amboina and the Uliasan islands, using hongi expeditions for 
this purpose. This situation continued until ;864, when the 
Minister for the Colonies Fransen van de Putte abolished the 
20 
monopoly . Something must be said about the somewhat 
infamous Hongi expeditions and the system of production with 
which they were associated. Olivier2l describes these 
expeditions as inspection tours made by a large fleet of 
Kora-koras 22 their object was not only to destroy forbidden 
or unwanted plantations but (and this is less well known) to 
concern themselves with matters of justice and government. 
W.B.Martin, the British Resident from 1811 to 1817 had this 
Kroeskamp (1947) p.52. 
21 J.Olivier Jzn. Land ehZeetogten in Nederland's 
Indie. Vol. I (1830) p.136. 
22 Large vessels requiring many rowers. 
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to say about them: "while the Hongi was originally intro-
duced with the benevolent view of listening to complaints and 
redressing grievances and, by periodic visits, to curb the 
tendencies of subordinate Residents to abuse power, it soon 
perverted from the beneficent ends of its establishment and 
became an instrument of governors for extending their 
deprecations and multiplying the abuses.,,23 
Yet it must be said that in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries no serious objection to the "guided" 
clove economy seems to have become mani This was 
basically because the islanders had known no other system; 
provided there was no interference with the so-called 
"Tatanamans" there was little resentment against the V.O.C. 
monopoly. The tatanamans were clove trees planted in the 
house gardens whenever a child was born. The link between 
the well being of a tree and the welfare of a person is woven 
into Ambon's folklore and in 1775 the South Moluccas counted 
22 310 of suchtatanamans, to which no axe could be applied. 
This, has been claimed, is proof that the compulsory clove 
culture was part of Ambonese cU1ture 24 . It had become the 
only cash crop, and such dissatisfaction as there was was with 
the erratic way the government regulated it. Depending on 
the current demand, delivery quotas were increased or super-
f1uous trees cut down. As we shall see later, even Matu1esia 
took a strong stand in favour of the clove culture, when it 
was suggested to him, during the revolution, that all clove 
trees should be destroyed. 
23 W.B.Martin Letter to Bengal dated 29 February, 1812. 
Bengal Proceedings p.167/40 India Office Library and Records, 
London. (Henceforth I.O.L. & R.) 
24 De Graaf (1977) op.cit. p.191. 
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While the native people gained by the clove culture, 
in that it gave them a regular income, so did the Company 
officials fare very well indeed by it and corruption 
flourished, despite efforts by some of the well meaning 
Governors General such as Van Imho (1743-1750), who tried 
to curb it by dismissing offending dignitaries. Merely 
changing personnel, however, was no cure for the problem. It 
25 is also a fairly safe guess that the Orang Kayas 1 who were 
charged with the collection of the clove harvest and the 
payments to the growers, knew how to feather their own nests. 
As far as the negory or village people were concerned, the 
Company rule had the effect of tying the villagers to the 
land. This restricted their movement, but it must be born in 
mind that on small islands, such as those in the Uliasan 
group, there would have been very little demographic mobility 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in any case. On 
the other hand, Company rule reinforced the villagers' right 
to a share in the communal lands and prevented unlawful 
acquisition of neighbouring villages' dusUn dati. 
The or village people were virtually serfs on 
their own land. They had to provide compulsory services which 
were divided in paid and unpaid services. In the first 
category were the services rendered in government stores 
where the cloves and nutmegs were dried, limed and stored; 
in the counting house and civil and military building depart-
mentsi the loading and unloading of government cargoes and 
rice; providing transport for traveling government officials, 
officers of the armed forces and other military personnel in 
See below, p.24. 
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kora-koras or palanquins; the collection and transport of 
government moneys and goods to and from Ambon; the supply of 
timber and building materials for public works, both in Ambon 
and the outer islands and the carrying of mail to and from 
Saparua, Haruku and Hitu. The unpaid services comprised the 
building and upkeep of the regents' and schoolmasters' 
houses, the building of the village orembaais - a smaller 
typ'e of kora-kora - and other communal craft and the building 
and maintenance of roads and bridges. On top of this each 
family had to tend ninety clove trees and provide free 
transport to the plantations for inspectors. It has been 
estimated26 that the villagers had to render annually two 
months of unpaid and four months of paid services, leaving 
them six months in which they were free from forced labour. 
Since clove and nutmeg plantations had been destroyed 
in all but Ambon and the Uliasan islands and the Banda group, 
the Company's interest in the other islands was confined to 
protecting the continuation of its monopoly position. 
The Ulilima of Hitu, also known as the Ulihitu, were 
in frequent conflict with the V.O.C., especially after 
Kaliali, the Viz of the Sultan of Ternate, was imprisoned 
in 1634, and a number of wars were fought between them. The 
main reason for these wars was disagreement over the cloves 
monopoly embodied in the various contracts concluded over the 
years. The inhabitants of Hoamoal and Hitu did not always 
adhere to these contracts because the V.O.C. interpreted the 
26 Kroeskamp op.cit. p.52. 
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monopoly of sale to include a monopoly of price-fixing, while 
other merchants, English as well as Malay and Minangkabau, 
were prepared to pay much higher prices. This led to clan-
destine trading and harsher attitudes from the V.O.C., 
including the destruction of the "illegal" clove trees. 
To break the resistance of the Uli Hitu the V.O.C. took 
far reaching measures. The were abolished and by order 
of Governor van Diemen, dated 25 April 1644 27 each village or 
negory in the Ambon islands had to govern itself. He sent a 
letter to the Sultan of Ternate which stated that "in future 
no Kapitan Hitu nor Heads of Ulis (who have forfeited their 
rights and authority through their rebellion and weapons) will 
be named or appointed, but in their place each negory will be 
ruled by its own Head, and the Dutch Governor shall rule over 
them all". 
From that date each village in Ambon has been, as it 
were, a small independent republic. There was no longer a 
higher traditional Ambonese administrative body ruling over 
these village republics. They were mutually independent and 
only European administrators exercised a co-ordinating 
function. The village was divided in two or more Soas or 
neighbourhoods, each having a name and a kepala soa or Head 
of a neighbourhood, who had to be native-born. Each village 
also had the so-called Tua Agama, leaders of the religious 
community and the school. The Kepala Soas and the Tua Agamas 
elected the Regent who bore the title of Raja, Orang Kaya or 
Pattie and was usually, but not necessarily, from the 
traditionally or adat ruling families. These Regents and 
Kepala Soas were village heads, not government officials and 
Rijks Archief, The Hague. Archive No. 1058 f.158. 
Quoted by Dr Manusama. 
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their remuneration amounted to a levy of four percent on all 
payments for clove supplies, while Regents were also entitled 
to certain unpaid personal services, especially in the fields 
or in their household, to be performed by villagers in turn. 
But the power of the Regents was not unlimited, a degree of 
concensus was the norm in the village. 
In the Moluccas, as elsewhere in the Indies s shrewd 
political use was made of the ancient influence of the 
Regents. Heredity, without being consolidated by law, became 
the custom already during his lifetime, as a reward for zeal 
and faithful service, the Regent received the promise that he 
would be succeeded by his son. It would require a very 
important reason to depart from this rule and where it should 
be the case the successor would, nevertheless, usually be 
chosen from the members of the same family. In Java the 
Regent, who spoke for many thousands was, even in the eyes 
of the government, a much more important person than the 
European official, whose discontent would occasion no 
apprehension; it was not difficult to replace the official 
but a disgruntled Regent might become the germ of disturbance 
or rebellion. Van Diemen's action in 1644 had reduced 
Moluccan Regents to the status of mere village heads and as 
a result they were less important, but Residents were still 
eager to keep the Regents on their side. 
The final subject to be looked at in this chapter is 
the development of the school system, especially since the 
schoolmasters became highly influential figures in Ambonese 
society. 
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The credit for having introduced school education in 
East Indonesia must go to the Portuguese and Spanish mission-
aries. In 1538 the Portuguese military commander at the 
garrison centre of Ternate founded a school there which was 
later taken over by the Jesuit Fathers 28 . It was a simple 
school where a priest gave religious instruction and in 
addition taught his pupils to read and write and perhaps some 
arithmetic. 
The school must have played an important part in the 
work of the steadily progressing christianisation, but the 
whole of the missionary activity was inseparably bound up 
with, and dependent on, the colonial power. The kings of 
Spain and Portugal had been granted the right of patronage in 
the overseas territories by the Pope. In return they had 
to provide for the missionaries and the maintenance of the 
institutions. There was great similarity between this system 
and that of the later V.O.C. system, in which the clergymen 
were simply servants of the trading company and the Company 
exercised supreme control over the school system. Hence, here 
also, church and school were used to support the colonial 
policy. Apart from their religious function, the schools 
undoubtedly also served to tie the people of the Moluccas 
more closely to the Company. The education policy represented 
a mingling of religious intentions and politico-economic 
considerations. One of the essential points of the education 
policy was the right to prescribe the school language. The 
Company in 1607, when its first school was founded in Ambon, 
laid down that Dutch would be the school language. The under-
lying idea of this language policy was that teaching the 
28 Kroeskamp (1947) pp. 8-15. 
Dutch language was an effective means of raising and 
strengthening feelings of loyalty toward the Company. 
28 
The "General Church Order" of 1643 and the "School 
Regulation" of 1684 contained the provision that the Dutch 
language was to be spoken exclusively at the schools. The 
School Regulation of 1778 still enshrined this provision and 
it applied to the children of free men and slaves alike. In 
practice this language regulation soon became a dead letter. 
Whereas in Ambon town, under the very eye of the high 
government officials, the Dutch language was maintained in 
the best possible way for quite a long time, the schools 
beyond the immediate field of vision of the officials soon 
switched to Malay and the government found itself compelled 
to accept Malay as the school language in the Moluccas. The 
schoolmasters usually combined two functions, teaching at the 
school and, in the absence of ordained ministers, the function 
of pastor of the parish. Practically none of these school-
masters had ever received professional training for this dual 
responsibility. Anyone who had been to school was in effect 
a potential teacher. Occasionally a teacher selected by the 
minister received a certain amount of additional training at 
the minister's house, which consisted of learning to sing 
ps.alms, religious instruction and some reading. There was no 
question of pedagogic or didactic training and the education 
amounted to little more than a poor preparation for giving 
religious instruction. The conclusion to be drawn must 
undoubtedly be that schools were staffed with personnel 
poorly equipped for their task and that therefore this school 
system could hardly be expected to make any contribution 
towards promoting the well-being of the community. However, 
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it should be viewed against the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century background, when ideas about education differed 
enormously from those we have today. If it were compared 
with popular education in the Republic of the United Nether-
lands of those days (a country which could certainly not be 
called backward in this respect), the education given to the 
Christian population of the East Indies could be said to be 
neither very different nor greatly inferior 29 . 
In the latter days of the East India Company the 
administration of the school system gradually began to 
slacken. The number of ordained ministers dropped to such a 
low number that it became absolutely impossible to provide the 
necessary guidance to communities and schools. The frequency 
of the visiting tours of the ministers also dropped and in the 
end had to be discontinued altogether. By the end of the 
British interregnum the top layer of the administrative body 
of church and school had disappeared and only the school-
masters remained at their posts, without any support whatso-
ever. Now, in effect, the schoolmasters were the actual 
religious leaders of the Moluccan Christians. This does not 
imply that everything in the Christian communities remained 
as it was before. Once the visiting tours were discontinued, 
parish life languished. Because the celebration of baptisms, 
Holy Communion and marriage services, which had been the 
exclusive prerogative of the ministers, no longer took place 
and what could be taken to be a relapse to earlier religious 
forms began to intrude upon the islanders' Christianity30. 
Yet a complete reversion to earlier forms was virtually 
29 Kroeskamp op.cit. pp. 8-15. 
30 Enklaar pp. 39 and 67. 
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impossible; the islanders had been closely associated with 
Christianity for too long. 
The schoolmasters' influence came second only to that 
of the village Headmen, and, as long as they were paid by the 
government, they were completely independent of the village 
community. When, at the beginning of the nineteenth'century, 
the Dutch government took over the administration from the 
V.O.C. and Daendels, forced through lack of finance, made 
the payment of schoolmasters' salaries the responsibility of 
the villages, with a consequent loss of their prestige, 
they alienated a group of people who could have been their 
most powerful allies in the troubles to come. 
CHAPTER II 1 
THE BRITISH INTERREGNUMS 
In the second half of the eighteenth century the 
importance of the spice trade was waning on a world wide 
basis. The Company - the raison d'etre of which was the 
spice trade - went into a decline which foreshadowed its 
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demise. Corruption, about which more will be said later in 
this chapter, contributed heavily to its fall, but the trade 
itself was seriously affected by changing European tastes 
and eating habits. Under the influence of the more 
sophisticated French cuisine there was a switch from the 
heavily spiced meat meals of the past to much more delicate 
dishes, causing a decrease in the European demand for oriental 
spices. Added to this was the most important cause of all, 
the loss of the monopoly of production combined with trans-
portation difficulties due to the Anglo-French-American wars 
towards the end of the eighteenth century_ Despite the 
extirpation of clandestine trees on neighbouring islands and 
the unwanted ones in the Uliasan' Islands themselves, the 
1 To make the events in this chapter to follow a 
short chronology is given: 
1784 Peace of Paris. British acquire rights of free 
navigation in the Moluccas. 
1795 France occupies Holland. 
15 September Holland at war with Britain. 
1796 Rainier Expedition occupies the Moluccas. 
1796-1803 First British occupation of the Moluccas. 
1799 v.o.C. folds - this is irrelevant in the Indies 
until 1803. 
1802 Peace Amiens, Moluccas to be returned to the 
Netherlands _ 
1803-1810 Moluccas again under Dutch Rule. 
Daendels' period. 
1810-1817 Second British interregnum of the Moluccas. 
Martin's period. 
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situation became untenable in the end. In an effort to 
obstruct further inroads made by foreign traders after 1770, 
the supplying of firewood and water to European ships was 
officially prohibited, but still the number of interlopers 
in the Moluccas increased. In 1769-1770 a French expedition 
under Pierre Poivre - the father of the spice culture in the 
French colonies - entered the Moluccas and acquired clove 
tree seedlings. A protest was lodged by the Company, but by 
now its standing was such that its complaints went unheeded. 
The order to re.fuse assistance and stores to European for-
eigners was stressed once again, but even this was no longer 
effective. Cloves had now been planted at lIe de France and 
Reunion in 1770 and three years later at Cayenne and the 
French Caribbean islands. 
After the Peace of Paris (1784) the British were 
granted the right to cruise anywhere in the archipelago; but 
this, in effect, was only the legalisation of an already 
existing situation. 
When, in January 1795, the French occupied Holland the 
Stadhouder William V went into exile in England, where his 
cousin King George II made Kew palace available to him. The 
British Foreign Minister Grenville persuaded William to sign 
a number of letters on 7 February 1795, in which the 
governors of Dutch colonies were ordered lito admit troops and 
ships directed hence by his Britannic Majesty and to consider 
them troops and ships of a friendly nation sent to prevent 
their invasion by French troopsll. This action was, arguably, 
in line with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1788, which, in case 
of war, allowed the ally to occupy the colonies of the other 
and so keep it out of the hands of a common enemy. Fearing 
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that the colonies would soon corne under the influence and 
possibly rule of French republicans who had already 
entered Holland, the ex-stadhouder preferred the protection 
of England. Britain purported to safeguard the colonies 
until the Prince of Orange was restored to his rightful 
position. Whether they intended to keep their promise is 
difficult to judge, but William obviously believed them2 . 
Walter Lennon, in his Journal of Admiral Rainier's 
expedition against the Moluccans 3 raises doubts about British 
intentions at this time when he repeatedly hints broadly at 
the possibility of the Dutch possessions being retained by 
Britain. For example, he speaks of: 
" •.• suggestions relative to their future better 
management in case (their) being retained in our 
permanent possession ... " (p.253) 
" ..• Should this remain eventually in our possession, 
which is not unlikely ... " (p.264) 
" ••. whatever may be the decision repsecting these 
islands, whether it may be judged consistent with 
the interests of Great Britain, to keep permanent 
possession of them or restore them back to the 
Dutch ... 11 (p.358) 
"On this account therefore it may be presumed that 
it would be not only to dispossess the Dutch of 
those islands but to restore them free to the 
native princes; in doing which the obligation conferred 
on them would readily induce them to enter into such 
terms, as would secure to the British the whole 
advantage of their trade without expense. II (p.359) 
It is of course true that Captain Walter Caulfield 
Lennon was not the British government, but he was also not 
just anybody. He was principal engineer and secretary to the 
expedition and his Journal and opinions are addressed to the 
Directors of the British East India Company which, if the 
Dutch possessions were retained by Britain, would hope to 
2 H.T.C.Colenbrander. Gedenkstukken der Algemeene 
Geschiedenis van Nederland van1795-1840. p.179. 
3 IIJournal of an Expedition to the Moluccas in 1796, 
under the Command of Admiral Rainier". Text of this Journal 
in "Een Engelsche Lezing omtrent de Ver overing van Banda en 
. Ambon in 1796" by P.J.Heeres in: Bydragen Vol.60 (1908) 
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play an important part therein. The question of British 
intention in this matter is importance since, after 1817, 
Dutch claims were made, and denied by the British, that the 
Moluccan population had been influenced to believe that the 
British were there to stay and, once Dutch reoccupation was 
imminent that they (the British) would be back very soon 
afterwards. 
Whatever British intentions were in 1795 and later, it 
has to be recorded that the "Kew letters" in most Dutch 
colonies led to an acceptance of British protection without 
any resistance. The Rainier expedition which we have already 
mentioned sailed in October 1795 from Madras with orders from 
England to secure the Moluccas; "for the purpose of restoring 
these Islands to the ancient Government of Holland, if it 
again should be restoredi or, in case of their rejecting the 
offer of our protection, finally to reduce them by force". 
Force proved unnecessary since Ambon's Governor Alexander 
Cornabe, on the strength of theKew letters, handed town and 
city over without any resistance when Rainier's flotilla 
appeared in Ambon Bay on 17 February 17964 . Not a shot was 
fired from the impregnable (in Dutch opinion) walls of Fort 
Victoria. 
The local Ambonese were amazed and shocked at this 
sudden change of government without any Dutch resistance. 
The townspeople fled, leaving houses and shops unattended. 
4 Lennon records that this day was the 173rd anniversary 
of the infamous "Ambon Massacre" of 1623. He claims mag-
nanimously "not withstanding the recollection of former 
cruelties exercised on our countrymen, now by the return of 
the date made fresh in every person's mind, t~ere was now 
shewn the slightest tendency towards taking vengeance for 
that event." Lennon's Journal, p.277. 
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This led to plunder by both Dutch and British troops of 
private and also of government property, but the British 
authorities put a quick stop to that. Native troops deserted, 
taking their arms with them, to the dismay of the British. 
The European troops, most of whom were Poles or Germans, 
including a company of Wiirttembergers (part of a regiment of 
mercenaries supplied by the Duke of Wiirttemberg) had no 
objection to soldiering under the British flag and took the 
oath of fealty. Most of the Rajas, Pattis and Orang Kayas 
did the same thing. Most of the Dutch officials retained 
their positions; they actually were most essential since very 
few of the British understood either Dutch or Malay. In the 
early days of British rule, therefore, government changed but 
little and the clove monopoly remained in force, even though 
clove plantations had by now been established outside the 
archipelago. But prices were increased, a move which the 
parsimonious Dutch officials could have afforded earlier, as 
is clear from Daendels' calculations5 . 
One group of the population drew its own conclusion 
from this sudden change of government. The Hituese - never, 
it will be remembered, as strongly attached to the Company 
as the Christians of Leitimor - had resigned themselves to 
the tutelage of the Company. But the idea of the "Kingship" 
of the Sultan of Ternate about which the Company had never 
bothered very much, since it kept in the background, was 
still alive. The Hituese still saw the Sultan as their Rajah, 
kept from reigning in his full glory only by the power of the 
Company. It is therefore understandable that, with the 
sudden disappearance of that power, a "royalist" group 
5 See p.47. 
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decided to make itself independent of the British as well. 
They advanced on to Ambon town but the British had been 
alerted and put down the uprising without much trouble. A 
number of rebels, including the new king, were jailed and 
6 
some were executed. As we shall see in the next chapter the 
Hituese were to se once more against an incoming government 
in 1817. 
During the war from 1785 till 1802 not one Dutch ship 
had reached Indonesia. The Dutch position at sea was so weak 
that American ships were used to transport spices to 
Amsterdam. In 1797 twenty Danish and thirty one American 
ships called at Java ports for coffee and spices - coffee 
then already being the more important - totalling 12 million 
pounds in 1797 7 . 
After the Peace of Amiens (25 March 1802) the question 
of the re-organisation of the colonies was made a matter of 
urgency in Holland. A Commission was appointed to draft a 
Charter that would "give the Indies the greatest possible 
welfare, Dutch commerce the greatest benefits and the Dutch 
government's finances the greatest gain.,8. The renewed 
outbreak of war in 1803 was the reason this Charter never 
reached the Indies. 
The Dutch East India Company by this time had ceased 
De Graaf (1977) op.cit. p.198. 
7 Van Houtte op.cit. p.167. 
8 ibid p.166. 
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to exist. In 1796 the Directors surrendered the administra-
tion of the Company to a government committee and its Charter, 
which expired on 31 December 1799, was not renewed. The 
state took over all the possessions and debts of the Company 
and thus, for the sum of 134 million guilders, acquired the 
whole colonial empire, with all its resources. 
Where the Company, as a commercial enterprise had not 
needed to bother with principles of government - for its sole 
purpose was commercial profits - the new state, inspired now 
by the notions of the French Revolution, had to bring the 
colonial administration in line with the liberal principles 
now being so loudly proclaimed in the home country. Their 
enthusiasm, however, did not exceed their business sense. 
They agreed with Batavia that the doctrines of liberty and 
equality, however strongly based on the inalienable rights of 
men, "cannot be transferred, nor applied, to the East Indian 
possessions of the State, as long as the security of these 
possessions depends on the existing and necessary state of 
subordination of the Indonesians and as long as that 
introduction cannot take place without exposing these 
possessions to confusion, the effect of which cannot be 
imagined" . 9 
In 1803 the Moluccas came again under Dutch rule. 
The Kingdom of Holland was now ruled by Napoleon's brother 
Louis, who appointed H.Daendels Governor General of the 
Indies. The latter needed vast amounts of money for the 
9 B.Vlekke, Nusantara The Hague (1943) p.240. 
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defence of the colony. The British navy prevented the import 
specie from the Netherlands, after war had broken out anew, 
and after Daendels had upset the American trade, by refusing 
10 to honour contracts made , he ran desperately short of 
money. He now fell back on the doubtful device of introducing 
unsecured paper money, a measure that was to have serious 
repercussions in the Moluccas. 
As a result of the new outbreak of war in 1803, 
contact with Java had become both difficult and dangerous, 
so that the Moluccas government had to sell 100 000 pounds 
of cloves, which would normally have gone to Batavia, to the 
traders who now could roam freely through the archipelago. 
Daendels, wanting to strengthen the army in Java now 
set into motion a remarkable exchange of manpoweri from Ambon 
he recruited many fit villagers for the Java army, often in 
a most ruthless way, while in their place second rate 
individuals and petty criminals from Java were sent to 
garrison the Moluccas. But there were also well trained 
European troops there. In 1809 there were 1445 men stationed 
in Ambon, not counting the Ambon "Burger Schutterij" or 
Militia. The whole establishment was commanded by Colonel 
Jean Philippe Filz, a Frenchman by birth who had achieved 
rapid promotion in the army, rising from Lieutenant in 1793 
to Colonel by 1809. 
The fortifications of Ambon had been strengthened 
and the fort had been enlarged several times. Although 
undoubtedly a strong bastion, it had one great drawback: due 
10 Stapel F.W. G.~schiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie. 
Amsterdam (1943) p.218. 
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to the growth of the town area it had no longer a field of 
fire, while the town it was within easy reach of fire from 
the surrounding hills. This could not have been foreseen when 
the fort was first built in a time when the range of cannon 
was much more limited. To make up for this, fortifications 
had been built on those hills to protect them, and thus the 
Fort, from an invading enemy_ 
On 16 February 1810, three British ships, under 
Commander Tucker, with a landing force of 404 men, arrived in 
11 Ambon Bay • Captain Court, one of their officers, having 
served on Ambon before, knew the situation very well and 
their first attack was therefore directed at the hill 
fortifications, which fell to them without much trouble. 
The British now opened fire on the fort from there, as well 
as from their ships. 
On 18 February Tucker sent an cer with a flag of 
truce, demanding surrender. Filz, who had plenty of stores 
and ammunition, refused, but kept the negotiations going. 
In his subsequent court martial he claimed that the quality 
of his gunpowder was so poor that the enemy "with their 
six-pounders reached places which we were scarcely able to 
shoot at with a 4 Ib ball ll12 . Two adjutants, sent to 
ascertain the position of the front, reported that the 
British force was greatly superior and, after consultation 
with Governor Heukevlugt, it was decided that Ambon should 
capitulate while it was still possible to negotiate favour-
able conditions. And so, instead of attacking forcefully, 
J.v.Stubenvoll. History of the Island of Celebes 
and the Trial of Colonel Filz, Vol. IV. (1817) passim. 
12 P.J.Heeres op.cit. p.251. 
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lz had the white flag hoisted over the fort. On 19 February 
the surrender took place. When Filz's troops realised that 
they outnumbered their conquerors by over a thousand men they 
were disgusted and wanted to continue the fight, but the 
British made them change their minds. Tucker's forces took 
over no fewer than 218 cannon. 
The garrison was guaranteed free passage to Java, 
after surrendering their arms, but a number of officers 
preferred to remain in the now British territory. Filz 
could have done the same, but preferred to go back to Java. 
"I was weak tl , he stated, "but flight at this stage would 
make me a coward, guilty of treasonfl. 
Daendels was naturally furious and decided to set an 
example. Filz was court martialled, having to answer no 
fewer than 240 charges. The sentence was death by the 
bullet. He died like a gentleman. 
It is obvious what impression this surrender made on 
the Ambonese people; their respect for the Dutch diminished 
enormously. The last years of Dutch rule had not been 
propitious for the Ambonese. Although Daendels had tried 
with all means at his disposal to keep the government of the 
Moluccas going, British domination of the seas had hampered 
shipping links seriously so that business deteriorated and 
pasar prices kept rising. The people had been forced to 
accept paper money, young men had been pressed into the army 
and forcibly taken to Java. The building of fortifications 
had demanded materials and workers on a huge scale. When 
the British arrived this all ended overnight. The sea routes 
were reopened, trade revived, cotton textiles became available 
again at reasonable prices and the retail trade picked up 
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with well paid Bri sh forces spending freely. The new 
13 government abolished pasar. taxes and replaced them with 
an opium tax. The clove culture was no longer restricted, 
the Ambonese could grow as many trees as they liked, as long 
as they sold their entire crop to the British government. 
The second departure of the Dutch from their islands 
had done nothing to improve the Company's image and when 
in 1811 it became known that Java too had fallen into British 
hands, the Dutch seemed to have disappeared over the horizon 
permanently. 
Ambon, after it was taken on 19 February 1810, was 
placed not under Raffles at Batavia but under the direct 
control of the Supreme Government of Bengal, Captain Court 
was formally vested with the powers of Civil Governor. It 
was decided, however, at Minto's suggestion, that William 
Byam Martin should be appointed the regular Resident. 
With Martinis appointment there begun an era in the 
Moluccas during which to some extent in contrast to Java 
under Raffles, no real attempt was made to transplant the 
colonial principles of British Bengal to these islands. But 
Martin, a highly moral and religious man, put his personal 
stamp very strongly on the more than six year period of his 
government. This brief period of British rule in the 
Moluccas is interesting in itself, but it is also of great 
significance in our story_ 
Lord Minto, the Governor General of India, had been 
13 A much disliked market tax. 
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very impressed by MartinIs conduct during the insurrection 
at Bencoolen when its Resident had been assassinated and 
Martin had been Secretary there. Martin had received his 
training for the civil service at the Fort William College in 
Calcutta, where he had been greatly influenced by William 
Carey. Carey, with Andrew Fuller and Robert Hall, had 
initiated a renewal campaign among the Particular Baptists in 
England, which led to a surge of growth. It was Carey who 
later formed the English Baptist Missionary Society in 1792, 
the beginning of the modern foreign missionary movement in 
the English speaking world, and became its first missionary 
to India. In 1801 he was appointed Professor of Bengali at 
the Fort William College where Martin, who came to regard him 
as a Ii long fatherly friend, was a student at the time. 
The College at Fort William had an educational programme 
at the time unique in the history of European colonisation. 
New arrivals from Britain, expecting to be sent immediately 
into jungle districts of Bengal, found themselves instead in 
the classroom, where veteran lIOrientalists" offered them the 
means of communicating with Indials inhabitants in their own 
14 language • 
Martin and his fellow students had come to believe 
that England should help Asians rediscover the lost roots of 
their own civilisation. Inspired by their teachers they 
argued that Asian civilisations were truly healthy and 
vigorous in ancient times, but had somehow degenerated. They 
felt it their duty to renew the various forms of government 
which they found in Asia, and 
d 1 ', 15 an re 19lOUS • Asians, they 
Asian Institutions, civil 
, possessed talents which 
D.KOpf. British Orientalism and 
Renaissance, Los Angeles (1969) 1 p.9S. 
Bengal 
15 D.Kopf. op.cit. p.l02. 
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had hitherto lain smothered under the despondency of 
neglect. They felt, according to one modern scholar, that 
"the greatest mistake England could make was to ignore the 
h · f h . . 'I' t' n 16 ac J.evements 0 t ese ASJ.an CJ.VJ. J.sa J.ons . But Martin 
was also a devout christian who, when Resident of the 
Moluccas, did all in his power to raise the moral standards 
in the islands by encouraging Christian missionaries. 
There is a contradiction here, it will be argued later, 
which led to a conflict between two principles. 
As has already been hinted earlier in this chapter 
corruption had been riding high in both the British and 
Dutch East India Companies in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries and there is little doubt that the failure 
of the v.o.C. was to a large extent attributable to it. 
Profits had been enormous and supervision lax. Much of 
the Company officials' earnings, over and above the 
(extremely low) salaries paid, carne from "private trading ll 
which was condoned by the higher Company officials who 
themselves were amongst the most guilty. Daendels and 
Raffles undoubtedly did well out of their sojourns in the 
16 'b'd J. J. . 
d ' 17 In les . 
Captain Court, during his brief period as Civil 
Governor of the Moluccas, anticipating the need for more 
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ships, purchased the ship "Governor Bruce" from its private 
owner for $12 000 and sold it three days later to the 
government for $20 000, a transaction for which he was 
1 'd d d' , d 18 ater trle an lsmlsse • 
Martin in a letter to the Governor General in Council, 
dated 29 February 1812, discussed the matter of corruption 
at some length, concluding that the example of a governor 
would be closely followed by his subordinates, leading to an 
entirely corrupt government. He was unhappy with the system 
of government introduced by the Dutch, as he explained to 
Calcutta: 
Each district had a Regent sted by a Council 
of elders. They were charged with control and fulfil-
ment of Regulations re Crops,Compulsory Labour, etc. 
17 Daendels, who was indignant about corruption by civil 
servants himself did very well out of the Buitenzorg estate. 
This governor general's estate had traditionally been handed 
over to each incoming Governor General by his predecessor for 
a fixed sum of fl. 100 000. Daendels persuaded a docile Raad 
van Indie (Council of India) to award it to him personally on 
a hereditary basis. He then sold large tracts (the palace 
and the park to the government itself) at an estimated profit 
of one million guilders. 
Raff did well out of a deal with his friend the 
Resident Hare, who had acquired vast tracts land from the 
Sultan of Banjermassin. Finding that the local Dajaks refused 
to work, he asked Raffles for assistance. Raffles then 
transported. three thousand petty criminals and innocent 
peasants from Java. Hundreds of them died and the affair 
became known as the "Banjermassin Enormity". See Van Houtte, 
Neumeyer et ale Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden. Vol. 
IX, Amsterdam (1966) pp. 173-177 and F.W.Stapel, Geschiedenis 
van Nederlandsch Indie Amsterdam (1943) p.220. 
18 Bengal Proceedings. I.O.L. & R. P.167/40. 
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All below the rank of Elder had to perform labour 
which was demanded by the government and the regents 
to such an extent that the natives had no time or 
opportunity to improve their own conditions, transfer 
their abode to better places or develop peculiar 
talents. No qualification of genius, age or length of 
service emancipated them from this labour. As a 
result of the corrupt administration personal virtues 
were suppressed, while the evils inseparable from the 
system were aggravated. 
All offices were sold by the governor who 
pocketed the profits, especially the office of Regent. 
The cost was always retrieved from the natives. It 
was frequently purchased at an expense far exceeding 
its intrinsic value, the reimbursement of which the 
purchaser expected to derive from the expedients of 
rapine and extortion19 . 
Martin introduced .changes gradually. R.Farquhar, 
Governor of the Moluccas during the first British interregnum 
from 1796 till 1803, had advised the Governor General of the 
commercial advantages of the Moluccan spice trade, which, 
disposed of in India was estimated to yield an annual 
profit of 200 000 Pounds and, if sold in England, twice that 
amount 20 . With that in mind, Martin found it " ... not 
advisable to exonerate the natives from the obligation to 
furnish the labour required" 21 . But he increased the wages 
paid from 1 stiver and 1 lb. of rice per diem to 3 stivers 
and 1 1/3 Ibs. of rice daily. 
Shortly before Colonel Filz's surrender of the 
Moluccas, Daendels made the following estimate of the 
profits of the Moluccan spice crop which was based on a 
buying price for cloves of 3 Stivers and a selling price of 
50 Stivers. Per pound prices for mace and nutmeg were pro 
rata. The total estimated profit was calculated as follows: 
20 Letter by Minto to East India Company, London, dated 
15/12/1810 I.O.L. & R. E/4/78. 
21 Letter by Martin to Bengal, dated 29/2/1812. I.O.L. 
&R. P/167/40. 
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Buying price total crop of spices Rd., 68 750 
Cost of troops, ammunition, hospitals ll 200 000 
Civil service salaries II 91 798 
Maintenance Buildings II 30 000 
Freight and Cooly wages II 50 000 
Navy II 30 000 
Incidentals " 29 452 
Land rent and Revenues Rd. 100 000 
Total Sale Spice Crop II 1 716 666 
Total estimated Net Profit " 1 316 666 
Rd.l, ,816 666 Rd.l 816 666 
This net profit of well over 300 per cent shows clearly that, 
in spite of the failure of the Dutch monopoly, there was 
scope for an increase in the price paid to the MOluccans22 • 
Martin also wanted to disqualify the infirm and the old 
from compulsory labour, so that they would be able to "apply 
themselves with greater diligence to their domestic 
occupations". 
On the shortage of labour Martin reported to Bengal: 
"Anchorage at Ambon is good, but the lack of labour creates 
difficulties. Often no more than 300 bags of rice can be 
discharged in one day. The Dutch extracted a contribution 
of labour from the villagers round Fort Victoria, paying so 
little that it did not cover the labourers most urgent 
wants n23 • 
Martin found it necessary not only to continue 
demanding contributions of labour from the local people; but 
Daendels, staat d'er NederTa.ndsch Oost Indische 
Bezitting~. The Hague (1814) pp. 71-72. 
23 Martin to Gov.Gen. in Council 25 May 1811. I.O.L. & 
R. E/4/376. 
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also to divert workers from other jobs to work at the 
anchorage. But, in his usual fashion, he increased their 
wages. In an effort to lighten the burden of the local 
people he made an attempt to persuade the Government to send 
convict labour to the Moluccas. In this he was unsuccessful; 
the Governor General was unwilling to do so in consequence 
of the uncertainty existing in respect of the return of the 
Islands to the Dutch. In that case the convicts would have 
to be removed at great expense "since they could not, with 
any kind of propriety be left, in the conditions of slaves, 
in the hands of a Foreign Power,,24 We may note in passing 
that although mail from England took many months to reach 
India, by 1814 the Calcutta government appears to have been 
aware of the fact that there was little likelihood of a 
permanent British occupation of the Moluccas. 
Martin, although imbued with the spirit of Wilber-
force, could not see his way clear to free the slaves. He 
explained in a letter to Bengal that because of the smallness 
of the population the emancipation of slaves employed in the 
spice plantations would be premature until they had arrived 
at a greater state of civilisation. Christianity, he 
reported, was gaining ground and the inhabitants were keen 
on instruction. To make that and the establishment of 
schools and the system of education more efficient, he 
suggested that some missionaries at Serampore be invited to 
come to Ambon and take up the management and the supervision 
and instruct pupils in the principles of Christianity25. 
24 . Bengal Civil/Colonial. I.O.L. & R. 167/57 12 February 
1812. 
25 Martin's Letter to Bengal Govt. dated 18 August 1813. 
I.O.L. & R. 167/56. 
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Martin worked particularly hard to resurrect the 
Moluccan church and promote "popular enlightenment"; hence 
his request for missionaries from Bengal. In his endeavours 
to obtain bibles he was greatly assisted by Raffles, who in 
response to a government promise of money for their purchase, 
wrote to Calcutta, pointing out that in Java, unlike Ambon, 
there was no numerous class of native Christians. "In Ambon 
there are Christians for whom schools are provided by the 
government and consequently an Edition (of the Bible) in 
Arabic type will be the most valuable gift that could be 
dispersed ••• We trust that the sum which the Supreme 
Government has so graciously promised to contribute may 
be applied entirely in support of (this plan) 1126. 
Martin wanted to start a IICentral School" in Ambon, 
but he lacked properly qualified teachers. He urged the 
Calcutta government to acquire some IImissionary hearted 
educationalists" from Serampore. He also wrote to William 
Carey for his help. "I earnestly beg of you to concert means 
for sending a missionary to Amboyna. The advantages would 
be incalculable. As the Head of Administration here I would 
consider it a sacred duty to give all the assistance in my 
27 power" . In reply William Carey offered his son Jabez. In 
January 1814 Jabez Carey received his appointment and free 
passage from the Bengal government and within the span of 
three days got married, was ordained and sailed for Ambon. 
He took on the superintendency of the schools, made 
inspection tours of the islands, preached for the garrison, 
26 Raffles to Secretary Calcutta Bible Society 18 
September 1813. I.O.L. & R. 167/57. 
27 S.Pearce Carey, William London (1923) pp. 301-
307. 
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was appointed State Almoner and a member of the Court of 
Justice28 . As Superintendent of Schools Carey favoured the 
Lancaster system in which children teach children. Great 
numbers of children were gathered in a room, seated in rows 
usually of ten pupils each. An adult master taught the 
monitors and each monitor taught his row of pupils the 
lessons in reading or writing. The defect of this system 
arose, not from the principle that children can or should 
learn from each other - they do anyhow - but from the 
elaboration and distortion of it. To achieve mass results 
and mass economies the adult teacher was relegated to 
position of bystander, learning was based on dril1 29 . This 
did not fit the overall teacher image of the Moluccas. The 
Moluccan schoolmaster-pastor was an authoritative figure in 
every aspect and any delegation of this authority was 
fiercely resented. 
In his reports, Martin refers to the "fine service" 
of Carey. De Graaf asserts that his work influenced the 
internal religious life of the Ambonese30 • For too long each 
schoolmaster had had to rely on his own intuition and 
initiative and it was Jabez's efforts that gave more form to 
the Moluccan Christian Church as an entity. In time differ-
ences arose on points of tradition and dogma, as we will see 
later in this chapter, but there is no doubt that the first 
groundwork in re-estab1ishing the Church, which had drifted 
for a long period, was done by Jabez Carey. 
Both Martin and Carey regretted the fact that no other 
28 'b'd 11. 
29 Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 13 (1971) . 
. 30 De Graaf, op.cit. p.206. 
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missionaries came from Bengal, and put the blame for this 
restriction on the British Administration in India, which 
"was reluctantly passing out of fierce hostility to Christian 
Missions into confessed indebtedness 1131. Prior to 1807 the 
opinion of the British East India Company had been that "if 
it were practicable to convert Hindus to Christianity, it 
was not desirable ll32 . But further help arrived in the 
Moluccas in 1815, in the person of Joseph Kam, one of the 
first missionaries sent out by the Netherlands Missionary 
Society, which had been established in 1797. s arrival 
was welcomed by Martin and the Ambonese Christian community, 
which had not had a regular minister of the Reformed faith 
since 1794. Thousands of children had not been baptized and 
no Communion Service had been held for more than twenty 
years. That the church still functioned in some way was 
entirely due to the schoolmaster-pastors and the strength of 
the church adat. 
Kam had not become a missionary until his middle 
forties, when he had joined the Netherlands Missionary 
Society. As there were as yet no missionary colleges in the 
Netherlands, he was trained in theology by a number of 
ministers. When he had finished his training in 1811, the 
war with England and the French Continental System barred 
the sea-routes, but in 1812 he had reached England via 
Sweden. At first he was distrusted (he might have been a 
spy) but in the end he. was received very well and given some 
missionary training at a theological college at Gosport. 
31 Pearce Carey, op.cit. p.306. 
32 From a speech by Wilberforce, putting the case for 
free admission for missionaries into the Company's territories. 
Source: P.J.Marshall. Problems of Empire: Britain and India 
1757 - 1813. London (1968) p.187. 
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Here he also learned the English language, a useful 
acquisition at a time when the Dutch colonies were admin-
istered by Britain. Finally, on 8 March 1815, he arrived in 
Ambon, about a year after Jabez Carey's arrival. 
Jabez was a true Baptist who did not believe in 
child baptism, something about which, on the other hand, 
the Ambonese were very enthusiastic. Kam went, to work with 
great enthusiasm to put this matter right. Three thousand 
children were waiting to be baptized and Kam, baptizing 120 
each week, caught up with the backlog in half a year. As he 
also baptized a great many christians on the other islands, 
he acquired the nickname "Tukang Sacramen" - Sacrament 
Merchant. Ram certainly was generous with the baptismal 
water, but he saw it as the only way to keep his enormous 
flock together by an outward sign. Beside his busy minister's 
duties Kam found time to set up a printing shop. Many 
negories had had to make do for years with just a few pages 
of the Bible, from which the schoolmaster would read on 
Sundays. Bibles, hymn books and catechisms soon came off his 
press. He was musical1too, and, where there was no organ 
available, he would start the flute orchestras that still 
enliven Ambonese church services today. There is no doubt 
then, that the Ambonese Christian society underwent a 
distinct revival in the years immediately after Kam's arrival. 
Carey, however, was a complicating factor in the situation. 
Carey's work in Ambon has been discussed by several 
writers33 but little mention has been made of the relationship 
between Carey and Kam. An insight into this comes through 
33 
e.g. E.Payne, South East of Serampore and Pearce 
Carey, William Carey. 
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clearly in the correspondence of Kam with the London 
34 Missionary Society, quoted by Enklaar • While Kam made no 
mention of Jabez Carey in his letters to the Netherlands 
Missionary Society, he did so, on several occasions, in those 
to the London Missionary Society - at first in neutral or 
praising words but later in a complaining and critical 
fashion. In June 1815 Kam, writing to the London Missionary 
Society, noted that the students (of the Ambon Central 
School) were II well attended" by "Mr Kerry" who had been 
complimented by Resident Martin on "satisfactory proof of 
progress". The Resident had promised continued support for 
the provision of lithe inestimable benefits of learning, 
. 'I' , d 1" 1135 C1V1 1sat1on an re 1910n • 
Kam took the view that, especially in the Moluccas, 
the superintendency and authority over the schoolmasters, 
who were also parish pastors., should not be vested in a 
neutral government school system, but in the minister. Of 
course in matters of religion Jabez was far from neutral, 
and here was Kam's second and most weighty objection. Carey, 
as a true son of his father, IIgave free rein to the dogmas 
of anabaptism" 36 . William Carey had urged his son to revise 
catechisms and schoolbooks in Ambon and thus introduce 
"sound doctrine and genuine piety,,37. As soon as he had 
sufficient command of the language (Malay) he should 
immediately attack child baptism and sprinkling with water 
34 Enklaar op.cit. pp. 44-47. 
35 Enklaar, op.cit. pp. 44-47. All quotations of the 
L.M.S. correspondence with Kam are taken from this source. 
36 Van Doren, op.cit. p.156. 
37 Payne, op.cit. pp. 85-88 (Quoted by Enklaar p.47). 
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and prove to them, with the scriptures, IIwhat is the right 
mode of baptism and who are the proper persons to be 
baptised. Let nothing short of a radical change of heart 
38 
satisfy you in your converts ll • 
No doubt Kam concurred with the need for a true 
conversion, but as a Calvinist minister he could not accept 
Carey's methods. Although Kam does not mention the name of 
William Carey and therefore does not indicate any apprec-
iation of the latter's special place and work in the 
rejuvenation of the world missionary movement, he must have 
corresponded with him, probably specifically over his 
objections to Jabez's attitudes, because William Carey wrote 
to his son in 1817, iiI received a letter from Mr Kam. I am 
afraid his ideas of the nature of conversion and Christianity 
are very defective and confused. I hope you keep on good 
terms with him, but you must carryon a work entirely 
39 
separate from him, if you ever hope to be useful ll • 
Basically, the new interest in their church by the 
British administration was well received by the schoolmasters 
and their congregations in 1811. The funding of schoolmasters' 
salaries and church expenses was seen as the most important 
renovation brought about by the British. Jabez's arrival 
three years later had been equally welcomed and if his 
refusal to baptize their children had offended, his efforts 
to provide books, and especially Bibles, were greatly 
appreciated. Once Kam was present and only too willing to 
baptize their children, the religious life was tranquil for 
the duration of British rule. The widespread religious 
38 Pearce Carey, op.cit. p.327. 
39 Enklaar, op.cit. p.47. 
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revival in some cases led to excesses. Whether was Martin's 
fervour for religion and morals, or the ministrations of 
Carey and later Karn, that encouraged these excesses is 
difficult to determine, but a section of Moluccan Christians 
began to consider their religious life as of sole importance. 
Neglecting their normal daily obligations, they held daily 
devotional meetings where the Bible was read and psalms sung 
all day long. 
Given this background, one is tempted to look for 
signs of "millennialism" or Messianic influences in the 
revolt that followed. Millenarianism often appeals to the 
socially deprived and the doctrine of the millenium and the 
Second Advent implies an overturning of the world as at 
present constituted40 • One is tempted, indeed, to make 
comparisons with movements such as Hau-Hau and Pai Marire in 
New Zealand. Yet, it must be emphasized again, the Arnbonese 
were not a recently Christianised group, like the nineteenth 
century Maoris. Their Christianity was the orthodoxy of the 
Calvinist church, with which they had been in contact for two 
hundred years. The author has found nothing which would 
indicate any millennialist or prophetic tendencies. 
The special favours the schoolmasters enjoyed did not 
go unnoticed. While Daendels l through lack of fund had made 
the schoolmasters' salaries the responsibility of the 
negories, Martin paid them out of the government coffers. 
This made them independent of the negories and thus strength-
ened their authority. Martin saw the schoolmasters as the 
"natural propagators of the enlightenment of heart and 
intellect". This was at first an attitude shared to some 
See Lanternari J The Religions of the Oppressed. 
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extent by the incoming Dutch Administration, whose Commis-
sioners, in 1817, for one brief moment, considered the 
possibility of running the government with the schoolmasters 
rather than the old Regent class, because of their influence 
with the people. 41 The idea was soon dropped . 
As the importance of the schoolmasters had increased, 
so had the authority of the Orang Kayas, Patis and Rajahs 
diminished. Although the British had decided against changes 
in the old rule of government, they were much stricter in 
the supervision of the village officials. Whereas the 
Dutch had generally been considerate towards the old ruling 
families and had left them practically alone, so long as 
they produced enough cloves for the Government warehouses, the 
British had punished these traditional adat heads very 
severely for even minor abuses of power or corruption. This 
did nothing to improve their authority while that of the 
schoolmasters, on the other hand, increased. This change 
in authority may well have been the deciding factor in the 
ill-fated events which took place shortly after the return 
of the Dutch Government. Martin, albeit from the most 
idealistic motives, had upset centuries old social relation-
ships. 
One further point to be considered in the military 
aspect of British rule in the Moluccas. As a result of the 
taking of Java by Lord Minto, the threat to the safety of 
the Moluccas had diminished and as a consequence Raffles and 
41 De Graaf 1977 op.cit. p.207. 
Martin had been asked for a joint report on the military 
42 
requirements for both Java and Amboyna . Martin's 
suggestion was the replacement of Indian Sepoys by an 
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Ambonese Corps, founded on comparison with what he called 
the Provincial Battalion in Benga143 • The model would appear 
to have been the "irregular" corps made up of local inhabi-
tants, which, since the 1780's had been used to police 
certain "tribal areas" - Bhaga1pur for example - on the 
f ' f h 1 'd 44 rlnges 0 t e Benga PreSl ency • 
Although Ambonese had served in the Company's army 
for two centuries, the only unit made up solely of Ambonese 
that had existed until 1810 had been the Ambon Militia, 
consisting of Ambonese Burgers, which was more in the nature 
of a home guard. As in the Corps of "Irregu1ars ll in India, 
42 . 1 '1 Letter Martln to Secretary Co onla Dept, Fort 
William 14 July 1814. Bengal Board Collection p.168 Vol. 5 
No. 10 I.O.L.R. E/4/376. 
43 It is interesting to record here that this was not 
Martin's first experience with native Corps. Shortly after 
Martin had assumed the duties of the recently murdered 
Resident of Bencoo1en Thomas Parr, he entered the following 
Minute dated 25 February 1808, on the Bugies Corps of that 
colony: "The Resident (Martin himself) has already recorded, 
in his Proceedings of 27 December 1807, his opinion with 
regard to the expediency of maintaining a small establishment 
of Buginese in the service of the Company (apparently in 
contradiction of Parr's idea of abolishing the Corps alto-
gether). Important advances may be derived from the service 
of a small regulated and efficient Corps of this description 
on emergencies, when it would be neither practicable nor 
expedient to detail a party of regular Sepoys into the 
country .•• (These) descendants of the Eastern chiefs still 
consider themselves as the ... Guardians of the Company's 
interests and pride themselves upon being employed as agents 
of the Company"45 
No doubt Martin saw the Ambonese Christians in the 
same light as he saw the Buginese, who also hailed from the 
Mo1uccas~ four years earlier. 
44 See A.Barat The Bengal Native Infantry (1962) 
Chapter 2. 
45 Minutes of the Bencoo1en Residency 25 February 1807. 
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so, under the British, were the local people given consider-
46 
able powers of command • The new Ambon Corps was officered 
by five European and six Ambonese officers. The N.C.O. 
cadre was Ambonese. Its senior N.C.O. was Sergeant Major 
Matulesia. 
Ver Huell gives a.description of the man, which is 
worth quoting in full at this point: 
"Thomas Matulesia was a man of about thirty 
five years of age, tall but lean and very dark, who 
did not seem overly intelligent. He was born a 
Saparuan, was a member of the Reformed Church and a 
Burger of Saparua. He had been a sergeant major in 
the British Ambon Corps. During the revolt he was 
usually dressed in a uniform with the epaulettes of 
the Major of Engineers Beetjes, who was killed in 
the first battle of the revolt. He usually had a 
bodyguard with him and had adopted the pompous 
title of "Panhoelo Pangerang diatas Poelo Hinimoa, 
Haroekoe, Noesa Laoet, Ambon, Ceram dan lain jang 
berikot ", which means: High Chief of War over the 
Islands Honimoa, Haroekoe, Noesa Laoet, Amboina, 
Ceram and the nearby Coasts"47. 
Boelen adds to this penpicture: 
"Matulesia overdid things a little when he 
hung a third epaulette on his chest and wore the 
gold and diamond haircomb of the murdered Resident's 
wife in his hair" 48 . 
By local standards the men of the Ambon corps were 
well paid under the British; they were armed with rifles, 
were well dressed and did not have to fight outside the 
Moluccas, a clause specially written into their contracts. 
This corps was recruited over the entire Ambonese islands, 
which accounts for the fact that Matulesia hailed from 
Saparua. 
An unknown, but probably substantial,.number of 
ex-members of the corps took part in the revolt of 1817, 
46 'b'd Bar at, A. J. J. • 
47 Ver Huell Herinneringen aaneen Reis naar Indie, 
Vol. I pp. 242-244. 
48 Boelen op.cit. p.218. 
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although it was not an army mutiny. By that time the Corps 
had been disbanded. Granted Burger rights by Martin on their 
discharge, they now found themselves without means of support 
and, as Burgers, outside the village community. Their anger 
at the Dutch, who refused to re-engage them on acceptable 
terms, is understandable and as they rowed past the Dutch 
warships on their return journey to their villages, they 
gave vent to their indignation by shouting abuse at the 
'I 49 sal. ors • As many took their arms with them, it is inc om-
prehensible that the authorities failed to realize how 
potentially dangerous they were. 
Due to the complete blockade of Dutch shipping during 
the Anglo-French-Dutch wars, an acute shortage of specie had 
arisen in all the Dutch colonies. The paper money introduced 
in its place was never popular. It was also unsecured and 
devalued rapidly. The villagers did not trust it. Further-
more it violated the church adati only silver coins were 
acceptable for the Poor Boxes in the Church50 . 
Martin's concern about specie was such that, in order 
to obtain it he sold a quantity of cloves to a Captain Walker, 
the master of the private brig "Fortune". Explaining this 
sale, Martin wrote to Tucker, Secretary of the Colonial 
Departmen-t at Fort William: 
49 
50 
"I consented to permit that officer to purchase 
at so low a rate (One Sicca Rupee per pound) to 
Boelen op.cit. p.137. 
see pp. 125-129. 
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retain for circulation at this island, a quantity of 
specie which must otherwise have been exported. 
Although some of the. same considerations have 
recently engaged my consent to the disposal of an 
additional quantity of cloves, I have, not with-
standing the notoriety of the abundant produce of the 
last harvest, succeeded in obtaining the price of one 
Rix Dollar per lb. for the quantity which has been 
disposed of by private sale. As a reasonable supply 
of specie has by this means been obtained, I trust 
that my conduct in these transactions will receive 
the approbation of the Supreme Government ll5l . 
Despite these stop-gap arrangements, specie remained 
scarce and this would in time lead to some disastrously 
wrong decisions by the Commission which took over the colony 
for the Dutch government. 
In general it is probably fair to say that Martin, 
in Ambon, tended to legislate too much but to govern too 
little. He readily did away with much that existed, but it 
can be argued that the shortcomings which certainly were 
evident in the old system were increased by what Van Kemp 
calls a slipshod administration. His ideas of creating a 
new order of things were well intended, but it cannot be 
denied that the other task of the ruler, administration 
itself, was neglected. Nothing was done regarding the main-
tenance of buildings, fortifications and roads during the 
entire period. This meant a considerable lightening of the 
burden of compulsory supplies and labour and as such was 
welcomed by the population. However the Dutch returned and 
seven years of accumulated neglect had to be made good, with 
the subsequent heavily increased demand for supplies of 
51 Martin to Bengal Civil/Colonial, 19 June 1814. 
I.D.L. & R. 167/57. 
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materials as well as labour services, the inevitable result 
was a further hardening of the negative attitude to the 
incoming government. Van Doren argues that British policy 
in this respect was deliberate. "The British government in 
the Moluccas ~aimed more at the downfall than at the flowering 
of the islands" 52 . According to him this was prompted by the 
fact that spices were now produced in other British colonies 
and Ambon, which, it was expected, would be handed back to 
the Dutch, was seen as a competitor. Van Doren does not 
back up this assertion with definite proof and may be expres-
sing merely a personal opinion. 
Van Doren also asserts, however, that the revolt that 
broke out after the handing over was in fact already 
smouldering during British rule, and here he does quote 
some evidence in support of his case. The Raja of Nollot 
had already risen against the British appointed Resident 
Neys of Saparua in 1816. The inhabitants of Siri-Sori Slam 
(Muslims), whose request to Martin to replace their Christian 
Raja by one of their own Islamic faith had been refused, had 
held a number of meetings planning a revolt, but this had 
53 been squashed • Such assertions may perhaps be put along-
side the assertions of Buyske's that the governing of the 
natives under British rule was lacking in even handedness. 
When negory inhabitants complained about their Heads, the 
latter were often dismissed without a hearing. As a result, 
Pattis and other Heads lost their authority; they became 
afraid to punish their people, who, as a consequence, became 
d d ' b d' d' b d' 54 more an more lSO e lent an lnsu or lnate . 
----~van Doren, op.cit. p.18. 
53 ibid p.5. 
54 Buyskes, Report 472. f.7. 
62 
In general it appears as if it was felt to be suffic-
ient to draw up rules. A despotism such as Daendels' was 
not wanted, but it seems likely that Martin went to the 
other extreme. He failed to see that the Moluccas required a 
strong hand at the reins at a time when the seeds of disor-
ganisation were already present. This was further demon-
strated by unrest among the people and the murder of a 
British Resident in Haruku in 1815. One might speculate that 
his Orientalist ideas, with Christian notions superimposed 
upon them, clouded his judgement. It is, however, important 
to keep this disorganisation and unrest into its proper 
perspective. Such riots and murders as did occur were 
directed at specific officials or events and not at the 
government as such. Until the establishment of British rule 
in 1796, the Company rule had been accepted by the population 
in the same unquestioning way as the rule of native princes 
had always been accepted by the peasantry. But Martin had 
diminished the authority of the Regents and thereby auto-
matically that of the government. Also his milder rule had 
convinced the Moluccas that Dutch rule had been harsh and 
as a consequence they did not look forward to their possible 
return. This fear and the general unruliness created a 
climate fit for revolt. But as we will see in Chapter III, 
when the revolt came, its goal was not independence of 
European rule but rather the retention of British government 
and the prevention of the re-establishment of Dutch authority~ 
After the revolt was over, Buyskes gave it as his "opinion" 
that once all the Dutch possessions had been taken over by 
the British, and Holland itself had been incorporated into 
the French empire, there had been a deliberate policy of 
assuring the Moluccans that the Dutch, as a nation, had 
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ceased to exist and would never again be reinstated, so that 
the Moluccas would remain forever under British rule. The 
wish was certainly the father of the thought. Buyskes also 
asserted that many European officials and employees, as well 
as officers of the armed forces were married in the Moluccas 
and had settled down there and the news of the restoration of 
the Dutch nation and later of the London Treaty, returning 
these colonies to them, were far from welcome55 • Buyskes 
was "absolutely convinced" that this dissatisfaction had led 
to further attempts to intensify anti-Dutch feelings by 
reminding the people of the extortions of earlier Governors 
and Residents and predicting that the favourable dispositions 
regarding schoolmasters, compulsory services, forced 
deliveries and the like would be rescinded, that paper money 
would be substituted for hard cash, and that once again their 
children would be sent to Java as soldiers. They compared 
their lot to that of the people of Ceram and Goram islands, 
who could be considered free and independent of Dutch rule 
and who therefore could sell their produce to the highest 
bidder of any nation. 
"Although I trust" writes Buyskes, IIthat the top 
British civil servants and army officers were innocent of 
these incitements, is certain that some subaltern indivi-
duals of that nation as well as some native chiefs have been 
guilty of those acts. How else can it be explained that the 
mutineers of Saparua, immediately after taking Fort Duurstede, 
did hoist the British flag, and that the attack on Fort 
Zeelandia at Haruku took place with a number of these flags 
55 Buyskes, Report No. 472 f.7. 
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flying?,,56 
A more wide-ranging appreciation of the situation 
at the end of the British period comes from the work of Van 
der Kemp. He puts it this way: "The natives, until the 
arrival 9f the British, only knew what they called (and 
which said it all) 'the Company'. They had always accepted 
that the way her servants understood their duties was the 
way it ought to be" 57 • With the advent of British rule they 
saw the possibility of a much more liberal direction, the 
appeal of which grew even more, now that they saw this rule 
slip away again. Even if their unfavourable disposition to 
the returning government had not been stimulated by "unattain-
able ideas of liberty and independence,,58, it would nonethe-
less not have altered the fact that the Dutch returned under 
much more adverse circumstances than those under which they 
had left. 
Through Napoleon's debacle in Russia, which suddenly 
opened up prospects for a restoration of old relationships, 
the colonial question became again acute. On a visit to 
England in April 1813 the Prince of Orange made some tenta-
tive enquiries as to the intentions of the British government. 
They did not need to feel themselves bound by the Kew Letters 
since the colonies had been returned to the Netherlands at 
the Peace of Amiens and had afterwards been conquered again 
56 ibid f.9. 
57 Van der Kemp (1911) op.cit. p.477. 
58 P.~1eyer, Kroniek, (1841) p.563. 
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by Britain. But Castlereagh did not hold the view that this 
conquest was necessarily the final word. In principle he 
was prepared to return the colonies to the Netherlands, but 
did not commit himself as to how far he was prepared to go. 
From the start he coupled the colonial question to that of the 
future size of the Netherlands in Europe. The stronger its 
position on France's north boundary was going to be, the 
greater would be its claim on its former colonies. 
Only after the battle of Leipzig did Castlereagh 
declare that the situation as at 1 January 1803 was to be 
the basis of negotiations. By the London Convention, dated 
13 August 1814, it was finally decided that the colonies, 
with the exceptions of Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope, would 
be returned to the Netherlands within six months. The 
Netherlands had no reason for complaint. They received back 
the East Indian Archipelago and with it the chance to become 
a major colonial power, a chance which, in the century that 
followed, was eagerly accepted. 
The transfer itself was a difficult matter. A 
Commission was appointed byWilliarn I. There were many old 
hands eager for appointments, but the king preferred new 
people and appointed C.Elout, G.Baron van der Capellen, and 
A.A.Buyskes as CommissionersGeneral, to take over the East 
Indies from the British officials on the spot. 
Elout was the oldest and most capable of the three, a 
member of the Council of State, who had distinguished himself 
in a number of earlier appointments. Van der Capellen was 
Secretary of State for Trade and the Colonies and was 
Governor General designate. Buyskes, the only one who had 
had personal experience in the Indies, went as the maritime 
59 
expert • 
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Napoleon's return from Elba delayed the departure of 
the Commission. It was not until April 1816 that the 
Commission arrived in Java with a group of civil servants 
and eighteen hundred soldiers. 
To the astonishment and indignation of the Commission, 
Fendall, Raffles' successor, who had been led to believe that 
he had a three year tenure, had instructions to attempt 
delays. Only after receiving new instructions did he 
transfer the colony, on 19 August 1816. Through all these 
delays the Moluccas did not change hands until 1817, almost 
three years after the London convention60 • 
From the Indonesian side there was at first little 
resistance against the change of government. Outside the 
Moluccas only in the perpetually restless Banten and Cheribon 
did some disturbances occur and the Java War of Dipo Negoro, 
which broke out nine years later no doubt had some of its 
roots in the events of 1816, but that falls outside the 
scope of this study, as does the Padri war in Sumatra, which 
can be seen as the result of an Islamic religious contro-
versy and as such not a direct result of the change of 
sovereignty. But in the Moluccas a return of the spice 
monopoly, and the accompanying hongi-expeditions, were 
feared. The fierce explosion that occurred there had to be 
put down by Buyskes himself. 
59 Van Houte. op.cit. p.179. 
60 ibid p.180. 
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CHAPTER III 1 
THE REVOLT 
On 19 August 1816 the island of Java was formally 
taken over from the British by the Commission General sent 
for that purpose from Holland. They established their 
headquarters in Batavia and at the end of that year 
appointed a Commission to take over the Government of the 
Moluccas. As First Commissioner they appointed N.Engelhard, 
described as "a capable and decent man". As Second Commis-
sioner and Governor of the Moluccas they appointed 
J. van Middelkoop. Van Middelkoop was later described as a 
man who perpetually tried to curry favour with his superiors, 
egotistical and scheming and given to making ridiculous 
2 
scenes with his colleagues Also in the party that sailed 
for the Moluccas was 27 year-old Johannes Van den Berg with 
his wife and young family. Van den Berg was very well 
connected. wife was the grand-daughter of a past 
Governor General, W.A.Alting (1780-1796) I and a niece of 
another past Governor General, J.Siberg (1801-1805), who 
still lived in Batavia. His own father, who, as Resident of 
Yogya, had amassed a fortune in the V.O.C. era, was well 
regarded by King William I, whom he had represented on a 
1 This chapter concentrates on the course of events of 
the revolution. As a full discussion of the immediate causes 
of the revolt - seen in the context of contemporary analysis 
of those causes - forms the subject of Chapter IV, only 
passing references to these causes are made at this stage. 
2 Enklaar, op.cit. p.48. 
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number of delegations to Paris and London in the Napoleonic 
3 
era. The Commissioner Engelhard was Van den Berg's uncle. 
The Commissioner arrived in Ambon on 11 February 
1817, having been detained by lack of ships and manpower. 
The number of troops that accompanied them was extremely 
small for these reasons, but Batavia was confident that the 
Moluccas would be taken over without trouble. Here was one 
of the many mistakes and miscalculations they made. 
Because of the influence the past Governor General 
Siberg had with the current officeholder, Van der Capellen, 
Van den Berg, who had been sent out to the Indies as a mere 
Class III civil servant, was appointed Resident of Saparua. 
The appointment to such an important and difficult post of 
a man so young, and so completely lacking in training and 
experience in the civil service and in native affairs, was 
surprising to say the least. The Moluccas had always been 
considered a difficult area to govern, in that there was 
much rivalry between negories, and Saparua had the worst 
reputation of them al14 • 
In the V.O.C. era, however, the Saparua Residency, 
which produced more cloves than the rest of the Moluccas 
3 Van den Berg. "De Tragedie op het Eiland Saparua ll in 
Bijdragen Vol. 104 (1948) pp. 242-245. 
4 R.Leirissa. "Notes on Central Maluku in the 19th 
Centuryll, Prisma No. 22, September 1981, pp. 63-64. In this 
article Leirissa argues that most of these troubles sprang 
from land and boundary disputes, leading to interminable and 
often bloody battles between negories. He notes that 
opposition towards the clove monopoly was not frequent. 
Other than the Pattimura Revolt of 1817, only the attempted 
uprising of 1829 was brought about by this monopoly. No 
other major opposition can be noted on the basis of the 
monopoly. . 
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put together, had been an el Dorado for corrupt Residents5 • 
Buyskes alludes to this corruption in his Report to the 
Commissioners in Batavia dated 17 November 1817: 
"By sheer coincidence it came to my notice 
through the papers of a Resident, who was in function 
forty years ago in the Saparua Residency, that this 
official in a very short period of time gathered a 
fortune of one hundred thousand Rix Dollars and 
since the salary of a Resident at that time was 
extremely low and there was almost no opportunity 
to engage in the smuggling trade of spices, it only 
leaves me to suppose that extortion must have been 
commonplace. This suspicion is confirmed by the 
considerable debt the heirs of the Resident of 
Saparua, Blomdeel, are still owed by several of the 
principal Heads of that island~ the bonds of which 
have been confiscated by the past British Resident 
Martin and passed on to the Commissioners, because 
he felt he had to interfere in this debt settlement. 
The debt was (as I understand it) originally for fines 
imposed by the Moluccan government of the day, which 
the Resident had to advance, after which it was left 
to him to recoup as best he could. He then made 
arrangements by way of Bonds or Pledges for payment 
of such amounts as, the deduction of moneys 
due to the Negory Heads for spice payments were still 
owing. I presume that these practices took place in 
all Residencies although Saparua~ as the most densely 
populated island, which produced the greatest 
quantities of cloves, must have been the richest 
plum, and I suppose that this is the reason why the 
past Governor General Siberg has recommended his 
nephew Van den Berg to Your Excellencies, for the 
post of Resident of Saparua,,6. 
The appointment of Van den Berg was not the only 
blunder the Batavian Commission General was to make in its 
Ambon appointments. 
5 Olivier (Land en Zeetogten in Nederland's Indie, Amster-
dam (1830) Vol.I p.13l) quotes a few examples of the unbeliev-
able misuse of some officials in the V.O.C. era: "The Resident 
(of Saparua) whose servant was a hairdresser, had this man 
make wigs of goats' hair. As a mark of honour he made the 
Regents wear these wigs after having their own hair cut off. 
Each Regent had to pay one hundred Ducatons for this honour". 
6 Buyskes Report 472, ff. 1-2. Archief Schneither 
Inv. No. 57. No~jksarchief, The Hague. 
70 
Van den Berg arrived on Saparua on 15 March and 
assumed office on the twenty first. The official change of 
government of the Moluccas as a whole did not take place 
until 25 March, but Van den Bergls takeover was possible 
because the agreement between the Commissioners General and 
the British Resident, W.B.Martin7 had been reached at Ambon. 
The official transfer of Government took place on the 
morning of 25 March 1817. The British Resident, Martin, 
had presented a Memorandum of Transfer to the Commissioners 
describing the state of the Moluccas. On the subject of 
Justice it asserted that the Dutch Rule of Justice had 
remained unchanged as guaranteed by the terms of capitulation 
in 1810. On the subject of Trade, the Memorandum claimed 
that the Spice Monopoly had been run "in general on the same 
terms as existed previously". The inhabitants had still 
been obligated to sell their entire crops to the government, 
but the prices to the producers had been increased. 
The incoming Dutch Commission was led to believe that 
the system of government was much as it had been before. 
Little or no change had been made, except that the super-
vision of the Regents and other heads had been much stricter 
than under the previous Dutch government. 
Mainly on the strength of Martinis very favourable 
report on the school system, which was still in the care 
of Rev. J.Carey as Superintendent of Schools, no change was 
made here, at least for the time being. But this situation 
was not to last long. The new Dutch administration did not 
Although Martinis official title was "Resident" there 
were eight other Residents in the Moluccas who were subordin-
ate to him. His powers were therefore those of a Governor. 
A similar arrangement existed in Malaya under the British. 
support Careys authority sufficiently and a decline in 
school attendance soon became obvious8 . Kam, who had 
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disagreed with Carey's religious views on many points, could 
only see Carey's further school and missionary work as 
creating confusion and difficulties and wanted to take his 
place and in this he had the full support of the government. 
This is the reason why Jabez's work in the Moluccas came to 
a sudden end. In a letter of 26 May 1816, Kam had already 
urged the London Missionary Society to approach the Dutch 
Ambassador in London in order to frustrate the plans of the 
Baptist Society, "which is very anxious to get full alowans 
(sic) to promoot christianity in the Molucos islands" 9 . 
But now, independent from Kam's endeavours, came the 
decision of the Commissioners 'General in Batavia that Jabez 
should be honorably discharged as superintendent of schools. 
Commissioner Buyskes in particular, newly returned from 
Ambon, saw it as "very unusual that this school-supervision 
was undertaken by one person and a foreigner at that, who 
10 does not understand one single word of our language" . He 
felt that Jabez's continuation in that position had been out 
of consideration for Resident Martin, rather than on the 
ground of his usefulness in this post under Dutch rule. 
Jabez Carey twice petitioned the government for permission 
to remain in Ambon as a missionary, but Buyskes was adamant 
and early 1818 the decision came down that again lithe request 
by the Baptist minister Carey, to be allowed to make converts 
11 
out of the Dutch Reformed Parishes, has been turned down" . 
8 Report of Mr Livett, a British merchant 
to the London Missionary Society, dated 12 May 
9 Enklaar, op.cit. p.47. 
living in Ambon 
1818. 
10 P.V.d.Kemp "Herstel van het Nederlandsch Gezag ll 
B~jdragen Vol. 66 (1912) p.148. 
11 ibid Vol. 65 (1911) p.45l. 
72 
Pearce Carey puts it thus: "he eventually left the Moluccas 
because the Dutch government would allow no preaching nor 
baptizing, save in the name and the mode of their State 
Church,,12. The older Carey was upset and disappointed but 
Jabez returned without, he said, resentment or discord. The 
schoolmasters' position and their salaries remained the 
same, including the payment of wages by the government. This 
point is important since later it was alleged that the 
change in the existing school system/upon the return of the 
Dutch, was one of the causes of the revolt13 . 
The small military force that accompanied the 
Commission did nothing to reinforce or enhance their 
prestige. III equipped as they were, they could be seen 
standing on guard duty, "half naked and armed with a bamboo 
spear,,14. This was in part due to the shortage of men and 
equipment, caused by transport difficulties, and partly by 
the false hope of the Batavian government that troops might 
be readily enlisted in the Moluccas. 
The Ambon Corps of well over four hundred men, created 
by Martin, had been offered to the Dutch when the London 
Treaty had been negotiated, but for a number of reasons this 
offer had not been taken up. One of these reasons was the 
optimistic expectation that, once the Moluccas had been 
Pearce Carey op.cit. p.305. 
13 J.v.Doren, Thomas Matulesia het Hoofd der Opstand-
elingen 0I?-.3et land Honimoa. Amsterdam (1857) pp. 175-188. 
14 Buyskes op.cit. f.9. 
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occupied, it would not be difficult to acquire the type of 
soldier who made up this Corps. Article 11 of the 
Instructions for the Moluccan Commission directed that 
negotiations be entered into, with the British Military 
Commandant at Ambon, for the transfer of native troops in 
British pay_ The British, however, could not agree to a 
direct transfer because of a special clause in their 
recruitment contracts. It could be argued that this clause 
was expressly included because the return of the Moluccas 
was not considered entirely unlikely at the time the 
contracts were entered into. The contract explicitly stated 
that, in the case of a transfer of sovereignty, the soldiers 
had to be discharged so as to be to join the Dutch army 
or not, as they chose. This was made clear to the 
Commissioners when the soldiers unanimously demanded that 
this clause be upheld. 
Martin, who throughout the change-over acted '\.vi th 
correctness and courtesy, cannot have foreseen the conse-
quences of the ceremonial disbanding of the Ambon Corps that 
followed. Nor, for that matter did the Commissioners at the 
time. Only in later documents do we find negative reactions 
to it15 . Martin ordered all Native Soldiers in the Moluccas 
to report to Ambon, some days after the official ratification 
of the agreement with the Dutch on 24 March. They came in 
their decorated Orembaais to the Capital. The British 
Resident made flattering speeches and handed out presents, 
as well as Burger Patents, granting burger rights to all 
d ' h d ld' 16 h h' l' th' 1SC arge so 1ers . T ere was not 1ng unusua 1n 1S, 
ibid f.9. 
16 
e.g. J.Boelen "Ret Merkwaardig Dagboek vaneen 
Nederlandsch Zeeman Vol~ II Amsterdam 1860. 
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the Dutch government had always followed this same practice. 
What did raise objections on this occasion was the date of 
discharge and the very large number discharged and granted 
burger rights at the one time. The Burger Patents were 
ante dated before 24 March, a fact that some writers have 
presented as irregular, but this is arguable. Boelen notes 
in his Journal that the ex-soldiers, returning to their 
villages, used the occasion to display their dislike of the 
Dutch without restraint17 • Among these returning soldiers 
was Thomas Matulesia. 
It is not difficult to see that this return to the 
villages, without proper means of support, of so many more 
or less trained ex-soldiers, part of whom were armed, could 
have dire consequences, if the seed of discontent were to 
fallon fertile ground, as indeed it did. So, according to 
Buyskes, these ex-soldiers soon became a danger to the 
bl " order18. pu ~c 
The question that should be asked here is whether it 
would have been possible for the civil and military author-
ities to do something about this matter. The answer must be 
yes. Engelhard gives us the explanation: The Commission 
General in Java required troops for Java and issued its 
Instructions to the military authorities in Ambon. Article 
5 of these Instructions ordered that recruitment from the 
disbanded Ambon Corps be exclusively for Java. This was the 
reason for the refusal to join, most of the troops did not 
want to leave their home-islands. The result, wrote 
Engelhard, was that only 33 of a Corps of four hundred 
17 Ver Huell,Q.M.R. Herinneringenaaneen Reis naar Oost 
Indie Haarlem (1835) p.37. 
18 Buyskes op.cit. f.lO. 
19 
entered Dutch service, and most of these were Javanese . 
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The objection was not to the joining as such, so long as they 
would have been allowed to serve exclusively in the Moluccas, 
as they had done under British rule. The Dutch Military 
Command in the Moluccas refused to budge on Article 5, even 
though the army's strength there was far below requirements. 
The Residents of Saparua and Hila strongly recommended that 
the Corps be re-engaged for the Moluccas, no doubt with an 
eye to their own pitiful forces, but the military command 
remained adamant. Governor Van Middelkoop also objected to 
recruiting local soldiers for the army since he supposed 
"that this will encourage the smuggling of spices instead 
f d · . . ,,20 o guar lng agalnst lt Engelhard did not agree with this 
view "because the British had very successfully made use of 
the Ambonese Corps, who had fought just as strongly against 
21 the smuggling trade as had the Dutch troops before them" . 
Once the revolt started, the objection to Article 5 
disappeared and the Moluccan Commission, by Decree No. 17, 
dated 8 June 1817 ordered the Commandant to re-engage such 
of the ex-British force as were prepared to enter service for 
the Moluccas only_ By this time, of course, the harm was 
done; many of the ex-soldiers were either actively engaged in 
the revolt or were sympathetic to it. 
A revolt such as exploded in the Moluccas almost 
certainly must have been prepared on a wide scale in the 
villages, and it is highly improbable that the village heads 
Middelkoop, Sourabaya Report. 
20 Middelkoop, Sourabaya Report. 
21 Engelhard's Batavia Report. 
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would remain entirely unaware of it. Heads who, for 
whatever reason, did not want to see it develop, were in a 
most difficult position when deciding whether or not to 
inform the European government officials. The European 
rulers on the other hand, needed to be extremely accommo-
dating to those people, if they did not want to discourage 
this kind of information, as otherwise, they might well 
expose themselves to the possibility of suddenly and 
unpreparedly being faced with a catastrophic situation. 
But at the time of the Dutch return this accommodation was 
sadly lacking. 
That revolt was smouldering even before the takeover 
is obvious from the fact, that within a few days of that 
event, there were secret assemblies and correspondence 
between the people of Hitu and those of the North Coast of 
Haruka and probably with those of Saparua l whereby solemn 
vows were made under oath that they would co-operate to 
achieve freedom and independence. A report had been sent 
to the Commissioners at Ambon by Resident Uitenbroek of 
Haruku, advising that, on 20 April, only twenty one days 
after Van den Berg had taken up his post in Saparua, the 
ex Rajas of Pelauw and Aboro~ two loyal servants of the 
Dutch government (who, incidentally had a grudge against the 
British, since Resident Martin had deposed them for alleged 
misconduct) informed the Resident that a meeting had been 
arranged in the forest of the Liang district, in Hitu, of 
over one hundred men on 4 April, on which occasion a 
conspiracy against the Dutch was entered into and the 
conspirators vowed, by means of Open Letters to the 
inhabitants of Ceram and other islands, to influence them to 
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break with the Dutch government and join their conspiracy22 
Equally perplexing is the fact that those Dutch officials 
did not act against these assemblies when informed of them 
by some loyal Heads. Those officials not only refused to 
believe them, but had their informants flogged and arrested 
for their trouble. Not just one but every official the 
Heads turned to, acted with the same lack of insight. 
The first mistake Van den Berg made in Saparua 
occurred soon after his arrival. An Ambonese Burger, 
Anthony Rhebok, son of an old and respected Saparua family 
who had served the Company faithfully for many generations, 
and his friend Filip Latumahina, while drunk, had beaten one 
Daniel Sorbeck, until the latter fell into the water. 
Sorbeck lodged a complaint with the Resident, who heard the 
case and sentenced Rhebok to a caning. This was a grave 
mistake as it went completely against the burger rights. 
Burgers, when sentenced to corporal punishment, were tied to 
a wooden bench. On this they lay and were then beaten with 
.a rope. Only Negory-folk and other non-burgers were tied to 
a tree and caned. The punishment amounted to much the same 
thing, but it was the "form" that mattered, Rhebok and 
Latumahina had "lost face". Benjamin Pattiwael, a son of 
the Samuel Pattiwael who took part in the revolt and took 
care of the surviving child of the Resident (see p.84) 
described the sequel of the caning as follows: 
Buyskes ibid. 
"here upon both went home with a bitter heart 
(sakit hati = a sick heart) and subsequently went 
from village to village over the entire island of 
Saparua, to agitate the inhabitants and induce 
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them to join them in the fight against the "Companyll. 
Before this, however, they assembled at a lonely 
spot in the forest and swore an oath to disobey all 
the orders of the Resident"23. 
Rhebok in particular was seething with rage and soon 
became Matulesia's Second in Command. 
The Resident, although aware that rumours had been 
circulating regarding discontent among the Saparuans but 
convinced that he was enforcing the orders of the Governor 
in a reasonable manner, saw no reason to attach any weight 
to such "marketplace gossip,,24. When one Pieter Soehoka 
came to report these rumours to him, he investigated the 
matter privately. He also summoned the Regents of Booy and 
Nollot and, on their as.surances that all was well, he had 
Soehoka also caned. A few days later, however, the Njora 
of Nollot, the Raja's wife, while having a cup of coffee 
with Mrs Van den Berg told her in all innocence that 
Soehoka had told the truth and had been unjustly punished, 
since there were indeed daily meetings at Nollot, and the 
25 
negory folk were readying their weapons But, like his 
chiefs in Ambon, so too did Van den Berg ignore the warnings. 
23 C.Van den Berg. "The Tragedie op het Eiland 
Saparoea in het jaar 1817 tijdens den Opstand in the 
Molukken", Bijdragen Vol. 109 (1945) p.262. The author of 
that article was a great-great-grandson of Resident Van den 
Berg and a direct descendant of the child that survived the 
massacre. His source was a report of Benjamin Pattiwae1, 
part of the Os. de Vries Archive in the possession of the 
Van den Berg family. 
24 J.Boe1en, Het Merkwaardig Dagboek van een Nederlandsch 
Zeeman, Amsterdam (1865) Vol. II p.17. 
25 V.d.Berg (1948) op.cit. p.281. 
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h ' f ' , S ' S ,26 J h K' I T e RaJa 0 Slrl- orl eranl , 0 annes lrau y, a 
faithful servant of the Dutch government, had also heard of 
plans for a revolt. He was reluctant to inform the Resident 
for fear that the latter would name him as his informant; 
the result could have been death at the hands of villagers, 
both for himself and his family. He therefore decided to 
report these rumours to the Governor in Ambon in person, 
but neither Governor Van Middelkoop nor his fellow 
Commissioner Engelhard would believe his confidential 
report and for his trouble he found himself under town-
arrest in Ambon. 
The Resident of Haruku, Uytenbroek, also received a 
warning from several Heads, including the Raja of Pilauw. 
This Resident sent for the Raja of Sameti and secretly 
ordered him to investigate. This Raja reported in due 
course that the rumours were figments of the imagination of 
the informers and the Resident had them sent to Ambon, where, 
like the Raja of Siri-Sori, he was placed under strict 
police surveillance. 
27 Ambon required timber for building purposes Van 
26 The Siri-Sori Negory was divided into two Communities; 
Siri-Sori Serani which was Christian and Siri-Sori Slam which 
was Muslim. Each of these two communities had its own Raja. 
27 Both the cutting of timber and the supply of the 
orembaai for its transport were demanded under the compulsory 
labour obligations. The people of Porto and Haria, from 
where the timber was to be shipped, were not satisfied with 
the wages paid. Although the population in V.O.C. times had 
always been obligated to supply both the boat and the rowers 
for the government, this custom had lapsed under British rule 
and its re-instatement was strongly resented. More will be 
said about this later in this chapter. 
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den Berg received orders to have this timber cut and 
d h ' lIb t d d' 'f ' 28 transporte. T 1S compu sory a our crea e 1ssat1s act10n • 
Th t ' b h h d b t dId d ' 0 b ,29 e 1m er, owever, a een cu an oa e 1n an rem aa1 
at Porto. The Resident, who now had been warned by the 
coffee-drinking Njora of Nollot, decided to send an orderly 
to Porto with orders for the vessel to depart and for him to 
travel with to Ambon, with a letter informing the Governor 
30 
of the current rumours The orderly ran into a hostile 
crowd who refused to let the vessel sail, mistreated him and 
kept him captive. 
The story of the start of the revolt is given in the 
31 't ' 1 b f h h 1 Porto Report ,wr1 ten 1n Ma ay y one 0 t e Porto sc 00 -
masters. It records the plundering of the post 'prahu at 
Porto. It begins by describing how six men, including 
Johannes Matulesia, a brother of Thomas l>1atulesia, went round 
the houses at Haria to urge the men to come to a meeting 
in the "wildernis" of Haria, to discuss the rumour that the 
Company was going to press people to go to Java as soldiers. 
One hundred men then gathered and, after prayers, decided 
to destroy Saparua's Fort Duurstede. Anybody who refused to 
participate would be killed by the community and their 
families exterminated. Six days later, on 9 May, another 
meeting was called to appoint a leader or Kapitan. Thomas 
Matulesia got up and said: "I shall be Kapitan and will 
28 Buyskes quotes as an example of Van Middelkoop's 
injudiciously given orders the order of 12 April 1817, for the 
supply of timber. Cf Chapter IV. 
29 Qrembaai - a large prahu - see illustration next page. 
30 Van Doren p.18. 
31 The Porto Report is an unsigned report dated 13 
November 1817. It is a Report on the Revolt by the school-
master of Porto who took part in the revolt. There is some 
doubt as to his true identity: he was either Rissakota or 
Strudiek. The original is in the Van Alphen Archive, Rijks 
Archief, The Hague, No. XXII - 315. 
8l 
Kora kora engraving from Valentijnes Oud en Nieuw Oost Indie. 
gather a fleet of Orembaais, attack and destroy Fort 
Duurstede and kill the Resident". 
On 15 May, after hearing about the outbreak at 
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Porto, the Resident - who, whatever his failings, does not 
seem to have been lacking in personal courage - rode to 
Porto alone, where he was accosted by the rebels and not 
allowed to return home. When this news reached Saparua his 
clerk Ornek at once rode off on horseback to relieve his 
chief but after encountering an armed mob and getting shot 
in the hand, he was forced to retreat to Saparua to obtain 
reinforcements. Ornek now made a second attempt with a 
force of twelve Javanese soldiers and some twenty armed 
burgers. After further casualties they had to retreat to 
Saparua once more. Among the rebels they encountered were 
Rissakota, Strudiek, Pattiwael and Thomas Matulesia, all of 
whom lived at Haria. 
The rebels intended to murder the Resident immediately 
but Rissakota32 argued with the mob explaining that the 
revolt was a matter of the entire island; why should the 
Resident be killed in Porto or Haria, thus putting the blame 
on. these two negories alone. The Resident was then allowed 
to go back to Saparua and the Fort Duurstede. Rissakota's 
admonitions could indicate that he was not completely 
convinced that the rebels would be victorious, or that his 
sympathies were at least to some extent with the Resident. 
These same sentiments could also have been the reason why 
Soehoka and others reported the forest meetings to the 
authorities. 
Shortly after his return Van den Berg received a 
32 Porto Report, passim. 
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visit from Anthonie Rhebok and Latumahina, the sons of 
prominent Saparuan families, whom he had caused to be caned 
some weeks earlier. On the face of it Rhebok seemed to have 
taken the punishment in good part because he now came, he 
explained, to give the Resident some good advice. He pointed 
out that the situation was critical since not only the 
island of Saparua was in revolt but Ambon was also involved 
in the movement. Rather than take harsh measures, he said, 
it would be wiser to try to solve the matter peacefully. 
Van den Berg expressed readiness and assured Rhebok that he 
regretted the punishment he had had to impose. At Rhebok's 
behest he then wrote a letter to people of Siri-Sori Slam, 
who, according to Rhebok felt particularly aggrieved. He 
agreed to deliver the letter. All he did with it was to stick 
it to a post in the Saparua market place. He had no doubt 
used the opportunity provided by his journey to see what the 
defences of Fort Duurstede were like. 
It seems unbelievable, but Mrs Van den Berg somehow 
managed to get a boat to go to Ambon with a letter to her 
uncle, the Commissioner Engelhard, imploring him to send 
ief. The clerk Ornek, whose loyalty never faltered, sent 
a letter by the same carrier to Cornnissioner Midde1koop, the 
Governor. 
Instead of defending his fort to the utmost and, 
pending the arrival of reinforcements, bringing his guns into 
play to scare off the rebels, the resident, possibly because 
he believed the situation was hopeless, now had the white 
flag hoisted. This act, on the morning of 16 May, was 
certainly not an act that would encourage the garrison. The 
stream of mutineers steadily increased and Matu1esia was now 
asked to lead an assault on the Fort. In the first wave, the 
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Resident was shot in the leg and collapsed. The twelve Java-
nese soldiers - the entire native garrison - thinking that 
the Resident was dead, jumped down the walls, perhaps to 
flee, but were promptly killed by the rebels, who now scaled 
the walls in their hundreds. The Resident, who was still 
alive, was tied to a pole, a schoolmaster stepped forward to 
say a pr.ayer and the Resident was shot repeatedly. The rebels 
then dragged Mrs Van den Berg and her children to where her 
husband's body lay and they were literally hacked to death. 
Only one child, a little boy of about five, survived33 • The 
rebels then - significantly - ran up the British flag over 
the fort. 
While the revolt in Saparua was in full swing and had 
already spread to Haruku and Hitu, the Commissioners General 
in Ambon were acting in a most peculiar fashion. Engelhard 
reports a hysterical dispute that broke out when Van 
33 -The little boy who survived was seriously wounded; he 
had a sabre cut across the head and his ear was cut in two. 
Later in the night when some natives came to have another 
look at the place of the massacre, the child lifted it's 
head saying "Goea belom mati" - I am not dead yet. (Source: 
Pattiwael Report quoted by Van den Berg (1945) op.cit.) 
Cf. Ch. III p.78. One of the women took it and brought it 
to Matulesia. There are two versions of his reaction. The 
first is that he said to those who as yet wanted to kill the 
child that "God had shown He wanted the child to live and 
God would be angry if His wishes were ignored". The other 
version is that where an ex-servant of the Resident asked 
that he and his wife might look after the child, Matulesia 
said; "Tra verdoelie, abil itu babie putih" - It doesn't 
matter, take the white pig. Whichever version is the correct 
one, the child was looked after by Salomon Pattiwae1 and 
his wife, who lived in the forest until the end of the 
rebellion. In November 1817 a band of rebels surrendered 
at Tiouw bringing the child with them. Commander Ver Heull 
then had the child looked after on board his ship and in due 
course handed it over to its grandparents in Sourabaya. The 
boy lived to the ripe old age of 82. Source: Ver Hue11 
PPM 230-240. The boy's great-grandson is the author of 
De Tragedie in Saparua, an attempt at justifying Resident 
Van den Berg's conduct in 1817. 
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Middelkoop planned to send a new Resident to his post without 
allowing him any fund whatever. When Engelhard did not 
concur with his decision, Middelkoop declared that he was 
unable to govern with Engelhard's obstructions and threatened 
to relinquish the Governorship. He demanded to be placed 
under arrest by the military commander, who promptly 
refused, saying that it was not within his competence to 
arrest a governor. Van Middelkoop was dissuaded, but the 
incident shows the caliber of the men who were in charge of 
the Moluccas at that critical time34 . 
When Mrs Van den Berg's letter and the one from the 
clerk Ornek about the revolt at Saparua reached Ambon, the 
High Council gathered to discuss ways and means to quell 
the revolt. Commander Ver Huell of H.M. "Evertsen" wanted 
to sail for Saparua immediately to relieve Fort Duurstede. 
There were drawbacks to this plan, such as the large size of 
the ship for the shallow waters of Saparua and the weather 
at that time of the year. The East Monsoon had set in, 
bringing very rough seas to the South of the Uliasan islands. 
In the ship's Journals of the next few weeks several 
35 
accidents caused by the monsoon are recorded , but since 
"Evertsenlt's Commander was prepared to take his ship, there 
was much to be said for immediate strong action to relieve 
the fort, save the people and suppress the revolt quickly. 
34 Engelhard Letter to Commission General, Batavia dated 
12 June 1817, quoted by Van der Kemp in Bijdragen Vol. 65 
(1911) p.6l1. 
35 Ver Huell Vol. I p.102. 
86 
The fate that had befallen the government people of Saparua 
on 16 May was as yet unknown in Ambon. Rather than heed 
the opinions of Commander Ver Huell, the Council took the 
doubtless well meaning advice of Resident Martin (who was 
sailing for Bengal the next day), and the Harbour Master, 
Waith, who, on the basis of earlier experiences, felt that 
it would be unwise to send a ship of the line. The only 
ship not too large to sail out of the Bay of Ambon and into 
the Bay of Saparua at that time of the year, they advised, 
was the Corvette H.M. "Iris". But she had arrived in port 
only the day before in a rather distressed state and it 
would require a number of days to make her shipshape again. 
The Council decided on 16 May that the "Evertsen" 
should be kept at Ambon and that H.M. Frigate "Maria 
Reigersbergen" , which was expected in Port soon from Ternate, 
would be sent to Saparua. Ver Huell received orders to 
anchor his ship just past the South-East point of the Fort 
Victoria, in other words right in front of the main part of 
the town, her batteries loaded with live ammunition so that, 
in the unhoped for event of a revolt, resolute action could 
36 be taken . 
As no warships were available immediately the Council 
decided to send an expedition to Saparua in native boats. 
The organisation was in the hands of Lt. Colonel Krayenhoff, 
a weak officer whose appointment as military commander had 
been very much a matter of second choice, symptomatic of the 
36 Ver Huell Vol. I, p.129. 
37 general shortage of officers in the army 
He appointed Major Beetjes of the Engineer Corps, 
who some years earlier had worked on Saparua as a civil 
engineer and thus had local knowledge, to take command of 
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a detachment composed of 120 men of the naval ships, under 
their own officers, plus thirty European and fifty native 
troops. The whole plan was later condemned by General 
Anthing, the Army Commandant, on the grounds that Beetjes, 
who had served only in the Engineering Corps and thus had 
had no experience as a field officer, was given command, 
and also on the grounds of the composition of the detachment. 
"It should have been composed of trained troops, and the. 
seamen, certainly not less courageous but less experienced 
in tactical matters, should have been kept in Ambon to 
t t th f t ,,38 pro ec e or • 
The expedition left Ambon on 17 May, marching to the 
Baguala Pass, where was hoped to find boats to take them 
39 to Saparua . On arrival it was found that no boats were 
available and the troops marched on to Tial where boats were 
found and the crossing was made to the Haruku negory. Here 
news reached them that the east coast of Haruku island had 
joined the Saparua revolt; this information decided Beetjes 
to leave a detachment of 55 men at Haruku negory. With the 
rest of his troops he now went round the north coast of 
Haruku and then between the islands of Haruku and Saparua 
under cover of darkness, reaching Saparua Bay in the morning. 
37 V.d.Kemp, Bijdragen Vol. 65 (1911) p.403 and 
pp. 407-408. 
38 Anthing Report 20 June, 1817, quoted by V.d. Kemp in 
Bijdragen (1911) p.602. 
39 Journal Lt. H.P.M.lt Hoofd, Rijksarchief, The Hague. 
passim. 
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The strong surf made the landing of the ten kora-koras near 
Fort Duurstede impossible, so the boats, sailing in line 
abreast, made for Paperoe, all running on to the beach 
together. The landing-site proved to be an unfortunate 
choice as the ground was very marshy. The landing was a 
hasty af with many of the troops jumping into the water 
and getting their powder wet. The rebels, led by Matulesia 
and Rhebok 40 were lying in ambush in the dense brushwood that 
ran along the beach, and they opened heavy and accurate 
The troops formed into three divisions on the beach but the 
resistance was too strong and they were beaten back. Most 
of the off icers, including the commander ,Haj or Beetj es, 
were killed. The boats, which had been left unguarded, had 
dri away from the beach and the retreating troops had to 
swim for them. Many of the exhausted men, who had been on 
the move for 24 hours, were shot or cut down with swords 
while up to their necks in the water. One boat with about 
50 men capsized and all of them drowned. Only one boat got 
away and eventually reached Zeelandia on Haruku. Only 30 
men had survived the battle. 
J)lJ.atulesia, who had conducted his fight well, now 
changed his simple uniform for that of Major Beetjes and as 
a further embelishment hung the third epaulette, mentioned 
earlier, on his chest. He ordered the people of Nusa Laut, 
who, he felt, had not supported him properly, to bury the 
dead. Two survivors were found amongst the corpses and both 
were spared; one because he pretended to be English, as proof 
of which he showed his tattoos, and the other because he was 
40 . 32 Van Doren, Op.C1t. p. • 
41 
a drummer and a tailor by trade . 
The rebels did not rest, they called on the entire 
south coast population of Ceram and their call met with a 
large response. Their ready participation could possibly 
be explained by the fact that the Dutch were known to be 
intent on the complete elimination of the lucrative spice 
89 
smuggling trade between the Cerammers and the Makassarese. 
OVer a thousand fierce mountain Alfurs crossed to Saparua 
and took part in the fighting when it broke out again. 
Matulesia also sent a Ceram-owned boat to the independent 
Raja of Bali, asking for a supply of gunpowder. The Raja 
obliged but the vessel was intercepted by the corvette 
UWilhelmina u and its cargo confiscated, but other attempts 
were more successful. The "Porto Report" mentions that on 
ten occasions between 28 August and 13 October 1817 
Matulesia bought gunpowder, and paid for it with the cloves 
he had found in the stores of Fort Duurstede42 . 
The participation of the Ceram Alfurs must not be seen 
as a widening of the conflict beyond the Moluccas; the Ceram 
Alfurs were part of the Moluccas. Neither should the gun-
powder supplies from Bali be taken as such an indication. 
The Balinese had no quarrel with the Dutch; both Bali and 
Lombok were independent in all but name until 1841 and even 
by 1885 only a small part of Bali was effectively occupied. 
The barter of gunpowder for spices was purely a matter of 
trade as far as the Balinese were concerned. For them it was 
business without risk, the cargoes were carried in Ceram-
owned boats and payment in spices was received before the 
ibid. 
42 Bijdragen Vol. 65 (1911) p.641. 
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gunpowder 'Vlas shipped. At no stage did the Ambon revolt 
spillover into islands beyond the Moluccas. 
The retreating Dutch survivors of the Beetjes 
expedition, on arrival at Fort Zeelandia on Haruku, rejoined 
the fifty men left behind on the way dmvn and the reinforce-
ments which had arrived there in the meantime, thirty men 
who had arrived there on 22 M:ay. The British ship "Swallow" 
under Captain Wilson had brought two fieldguns from Ambon 
to replace the rotting mountings of the Zeelandia's guns43 
This too must not be seen as widening the dispute any further 
by involving Britain. The several British ships that were 
involved in the various expeditions were simply hired by the 
Dutch. They were privately-owned vessels and all trans-
actions were between the individual masters and the Dutch 
government, and as will be seen below, the masters earned 
for themselves the stern disapproval of the Bengal government. 
Further reinforcements arrived at "Zeelandia" on 22 
May, bringing the total strength of the garrison to 106 men. 
The British cruiser "Nautilus" now arrived in Ambon, 
on its way from Ternate to Bengal to take back Ternate's 
British Resident Mackenzie. The Moluccan Commissioners 
requested the Captain of the "Nautilus", Commander Hepburn, 
to assist in putting down the revolt, the more so "since the 
rebellion is fought under the British flag and one might 
reasonably have expected that they would have seen this as 
44 
an affront to their flag, which they would have revenged II • 
43 Ver Ruell. Vol. II pp. 181-188. 
44 Engelhard Letter to Batavia dated 12 June 1817. 
Schneither Archief, Rijksarchief,The Hague. 
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But Mackenzie refused pointblank, and indicated that even the 
involvement of Captain Wilson of the IISwallow ll did not meet 
with his approval and that the master "would have to justify 
his actions to his government and that his ship might very 
well be confiscated", since he had fought against a people 
with whom the British "had had the friendliest of relations 
only days ago and who had done no harm to themll45 . A later 
complaint about this refusal, to the Bengal Governor-General, 
elicited the terse reply that individual commanders were 
certainly not authorised to use government ships for purposes 
for which they were not intended, and that the Bengal 
government was seriously disturbed that British civilian 
merchant vessels had aided the .Moluccan Commission in its 
war with the rebels46 • This refusal of the British to 
render assistance against the rebels, was, it should be 
noted, in direct contradiction to the policy the Bengal 
government had laid down in an exchange of correspondence 
between the (British) Government of Batavia47 and the 
Governor General in Council at Fort William48 in 1816, 
regarding the implications of the London Treaty of 13 August, 
1814. In their reply to points raised by the Batavia 
Government, Bengal wrote: 
"Para 15. The questions discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs comprehend all those classed under the 
political branch. The financial questions, as 
already stated, will form the subject of a special 
V.d.Kemp Bijdragen Vol. 65 (19ll) p.64l. 
46 ibid p.642. 
47 Letter from The Government of Batavia to Earl Moira, 
Governor General in Council, 15 March 1816. 
48 Letter from Governor in Council, Fort William to 
Charles Assey Esq., Secretary to the Government of Batavia, 
18 May 1816. (1. O. L. & R.) 
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dispatch. I therefore proceed to the only remaining 
point, which, although partly of a military nature, 
must be determined mainly by political considerations. 
The question is whether in the event of the native 
princes refusing to admit the Dutch, the British 
government are warranted (and if so, to what extent) 
to compel them to do so. 
Para 16. On this subject I am directed to observe 
that, if there were to be any opposition made by the 
natives to the entrance the Dutch, we should be 
bound to suppress it, as we are engaged to put them 
in possession." 
On Haruku large numbers of rebels had now assembled 
and on 30 Mayan attack was launched on Fort Zeelandia by a 
force of 600, but the grape shot of the field guns caused 
such heavy casualties that the rebels soon retreated49 • 
Ver Huell reports that the next day "an Indian" 50 
was caught assessing the strength of the fort. When 
threatened with torture, he revealed that a mass attack was 
planned for 2 June, with a force of two thousand men, 
attacking from five points at once. This news was immediately 
conveyed to Governor Middelkoop who sent another two hundred 
men reinforcement. The attack came one day late. The Fort 
was attacked at a number of points, but the swords and 
spears that most of the rebels were armed with were no match 
for the fieldguns and once more they had to back. 
Several small attacks took place during the next few days 
but the fort held. During the revolt the British flag was 
flovm at various points of Haruku island, possibly with the 
aim of winning over Captain Wilson of the "Swallow", the 
Huell Vol. II, pp. 142-144. 
50 In that period Indonesians were at times referred to 
as II Indians II • 
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British transport hired by the Commission, but that had not 
prevented Captain Wilson from flying the Dutch flag during 
51 the fight and firing grapeshot at the rebels . 
The IIPorto Report" describes Thomas M:atulesia's anger 
at the unfavourable reports that reached him from Haruku. 
He had not personally taken command of the fighting there, 
but had sent his sabre with the rebels as a "jimat" or good 
luck token 52 . 
"On 16 June people from Hoelalioe, the Raja of 
Oma, the schoolmaster and five people from Haruka 
came to inform lo1atulesia that the old Raja Aboro 
had wished to surrender but that the enemy had 
shot him. M:atulesia kicked these messengers and 
the villagers of Haria beat them with rifle butts 
and one of them was beaten to death. On the 18th 
the people brought a peace letter to the village 
hal15 3 of Haria and gave it to Matulesia who threw 
it on the floor. The people of Latau and Iha also 
sent letters but Matulesia burned them or tore 
them up"54. 
No further mention is made in the Porto Report about 
the fighting on Haruku and there is a gap in it from 26 June 
to 21 July. 
Matulesia, who had proved himself a good field 
commander, realised that with his victory over Fort Duurstede 
the revolution had not ended. He started to build fortif-
ications along those roads on Saparua which were likely to 
be used by Dutch troops. He had walls built of coral stone, 
IIsix feet high and four feet thick. Every thirty metres he 
Journal Lt. H.P.M. 't Hoofd. 
52 Van Doren, pp. 34-35. 
53 Matulesia's Headquarters for most of the time. 
54 Porto Report. 
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built a traverse, a wall diagonally across from one of the 
parallel walls, leaving a narrow gap or gate at one end, and 
at the other end in the next one. This forced anyone 
advancing to criss-cross between the traverses being 
continuously exposed to enemy fire from the next traverse n55 • 
The Moluccan Commission decided that immediate 
further action against Saparua was out of the question. More 
armed vessels were needed, and it was most important to hold 
on to that which had not yet been lost, Haruku and Ambon 
itself. 
The total professional military force on Ambon and 
the Uliasan Islands now numbered only fifty five artillerymen, 
55 European and 250 native foot soldiers; a precarious 
situation, especially for Ambon, where precautions had to be 
taken before anywhere else. 
The Burgers were now called up and placed under the 
command of the Magistrate, an ex-naval officer. This gave 
a corps of 800 men of whom only 300 had rifles; the rest had 
pikes. The Governor also called for volunteers who, 
required, were to serve in Ambon's Fort Victoria. This gave 
another corps of 250 to 300 men, drawn from the ranks of the 
junior civil servants and the sons of the notables. 100 of 
these had riflesi the remainder were trained to man the fort's 
guns. A third corps was a kind of home-guard drawn from the 
negory population. Finally there was a small remnant of 
55 Ver Huell Vol. I. p.249. 
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Bengalis left over from the British era, of which a small 
corps of 40 men, on foot and mounted, was formed for police 
duties; they were to patrol the town and, it was hoped, quell 
t b II ' , d' t 1 56 any a tempt at re e lon lmme la e y . 
The Sultans of Ternate and Tidore also offered their 
help to the Commission, but Van Middelkoop felt that they 
were not to be trusted. The reason why they came down on 
the side of the Company is partly to be found in a succession 
crisis in these islands in which the Sultan of Ternate looked 
for the support of the government; also important was the 
fact that they had received an annual payment going back to 
1650 as a compensation for the spice income they lost when 
the Company established its monopoly in the Ambon group and 
destroyed all clove trees in the rest of the Moluccas, 
including Ternate and Tidore. Buyskes, a few months later, 
made grateful use of the offered support. 
The Raja Eti, King of the Mountain Alfurs of Ceram, 
came with a large vessel to offer his help against the 
rebels. There was always trouble between the South Coast 
Cerammers and the Mountain Alfur and the fact that the former 
had joined in Matulesia's revolt was probably enough reason 
for Raja Eti to take the other side. However, here too, 
Van Middelkoopdid not consider it prudent to trust a chief 
of these "primitive" tribes. 
The news of the rebel victory in Saparua was spread 
by Matulesia's messengers to the other islands in the Ambon 
group, in the obvious hope that they too would now openly 
revolt and thus force the Dutch to spread their forces. In 
Leitimor everything remained quiet but on the Hitu peninsula 
56 Bijd:ragen Vol. 65 (1911) p.630. 
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trouble erupted in several places. As far as manpower would 
allow, reinforcements were sent to the Pass of Bagoeala, 
Hila, Hitu Lamah and Liang. At la the Resident and 
Commander of the Forces was killed l but the rebels were 
repulsed. Prisoners were hanged, without trial l from the 
nearest tree. 
The Head of the Islamic Hituese rebels was the SO-year 
old Raja Oeloehapa, a descendant from a family that had 
traditionally resisted the Dutch since the sixteenth century 
and who had also been involved in the attempted "Royalist 
Coup" in 179657 Being too feeble to walk he had himself 
carried into battle in a sedan chair from which he gave his 
orders and encouraged his men. 
To safeguard Hitu and stop its contact with Ceram as 
much as possible, private boats were hired and armed. Liang 
on Hitu's north coast fell to the rebels, albeit at a heavy 
cost in lives. Ambon immediately sent reinforcements to 
Wai, south of Liang, to attempt the retaking of this place. 
If the commander considered his force of 51 men too small 
for this purpose the detachment at Bagoeala was to added. 
Hila, however, remained a tributary of the rebels and under 
Matulesia's sway_ The most that could be achieved was to 
ensure that no further reinforcements for the rebels could 
be brought in from Ceram. Once Matulesia was captured and 
the revolt in Saparua had been successfully quelled with the 
fresh forces brought in by Buyskes, the Hituese negories 
gradually surrendered to government forces. 
57 See p.35. 
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On 25 June H.M. "Reygersbergen", commanded by Commander 
Groot, sailed into Ambon Bay and was immediately made ready 
for an expedition to Saparua. She was to be accompanied by 
the "Iris", the "Swallow" and the "Dispatch", another 
British ship, under Captain Crozier, that, to the annoyance 
of the Bengal government, actively assisted in putting down 
the revo1t58 . The flotilla was ready to sail on 24 June. 
Its orders were, according to Van Doren59 , "to punish the 
inhabitants who had taken part in the revolt", but Engelhart 
in his Batavia Report asserted that it sailed: "in order to 
enter into dialogue with the natives,,60. 
Besides its crew the "Reygersbergen" carried twenty-
four armed and 12 unarmed burgers, the latter to act as 
rowers for the orembaais. Some of these proved later to be 
unreliable. 
The first goal of the expedition was not, as might be 
expected, the capital of the island but the Hatawano district 
in North-east Saparua. There, a group of five negories was 
to be found, and it was hoped that an attack here would cause 
a diversion and prevent the rebels from using their combined 
61 
might at Saparua • This seems rather strange, since 
Saparua was in the hands of the rebels and at that time the 
government forces were not launching an attack on that town. 
It is, however, certain that an attack on Hatawano had been 
planned. 
Fire was opened with the ships' guns but little 
58 . . It' . 1 th t Captaln CrOZler s mo lves were slmp y a, as an 
independent skipper, he could hire his ship to anyone who 
offered him a reasonable price. 
59 Van Doren. pp. 45-46. 
60 Engelhard, Batavia Report. 
61 Van Doren, passim. Boe1en,passim. 
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damage was done since the projectiles went right through the 
bamboo houses, merely tearing a hole in the woven bamboo 
walls. It was decided that this was a waste of powder and 
shot. Only sporadic rounds were fired after that, just 
enough to keep the rebels apprehensive. The rebels remained 
defiant and calls ca..-ne from the beach to I:Come on Hollanders 
and Ambonese burgers, come ashore to take what we have for 
you and bring your Captain to take the place of Major 
Beetjes u62 . 
The Commander of the flotilla now attempted negot-
iations. The white flag was hoisted on all ships and a barge 
was sent ashore with a Proclamation that was on the 
beach, tied to a white flag. Free conduct was offered to a 
delegation of the villages. That night the ships were hailed 
from the shore and an extension of time was requested; the 
letter could not be answered until Monday as the Proclamation 
would be read from the pUlpit in all churches on the Sunday. 
On the Sunday morning a letter attached to a white 
flag was left on the beach. It contained a request for the 
captain to come ashore as the villagers had no boats to come 
to the ships. Lieutenant Ellinghuizen together with 
Lieutenant Christiaansen, who was a retired pilot and spoke 
Malay fluentlYr went ashore. A table and some chairs were 
placed on the beach and the negotiations started. The village 
Heads gave them the following list of grievances: 63 
1. That they had been hindered in the exercise 
of their religion by the Dutch government. 
2. That they could not be content with the paper 
money introduced by the Dutch since they could 
not care for the poor with it. Paper money 
62 Ver Huell, Vol. I, p.174. 
63 Boelen, p.42. 
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could not be placed in the poor box since adat 
required it to be hard cash. 
3. That, after putting paper money into circulation 
the Resident had refused to accept it for pay-
ment at the government stores but had demanded 
silver specie for all payments. 
4. That the Resident had threatened, if they 
refused, to lock them in chains and send them 
to Batavia, but if they paid with silver money, 
that would not happen. 
5. That the Resident had demanded that burgers and 
villagers hand in their Burger patents and then 
refused to return them unless they paid fifty 
Spanish Dollars (about One hundred and twenty 
five guilders). 
6. That they had to deliver locally made salt 
and dried meat (dendeng) without payment. 
7. That all labour and supplies of materials, 
which in the past had been paid for by the 
Dutch and the English alike, were now demanded 
without payment. 64 
The representatives of the Commander then asked what 
their conditions were for a return to peace. The Heads 
replied that they wanted two preachers from Batavia for 
their religious services. 
This agreed to, it was decided that the white flags 
would be kept flying until their grievances had been brought 
to the notice of the Governor. 
Later that morning a request came from the five 
negories to send Christiaansen to Saparua to negotiate with 
Matulesia. Christiaansen was willing to go and departed 
that afternoon for the west coast of the island, travelling 
overland to Saparua. From there a letter arrived, signed by 
the rebels and Christiaansen, saying that the people were 
strongly inclined to make peace and that the next day an 
officer and a cadet should come to the capital. The 
Commandant now sent one of his officers, Lt. Boelen, to 
Ambon to confer with the governor. The rebels, becoming 
64 The seven points are here merely given as presented. 
They are analysed and assessed in Chapter IV together with 
the 14 points set out in a statement of Matulesia which in 
essence cover the same grievances. 
:=: : j 9>:; ~. 
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impatient, wrote a number of letters to the Commandant who 
was stalling for time, but, at the rebels' renewed request, 
he sent Ensign Feldman to Saparua to negotiate with the 
leaders of the revolt. 
On the 18th, realising that he could stall no more, 
the Commander sent a letter to the rebels indicating that 
he would come ashore to negotiate and that he would expect 
Lt. Christiaansen and Ensign Feldman to be there. 
Feldman meanwhi had reached Saparua where he was 
met by an estimated six hundred armed rebels, led by 
Matulesia. At Matulesia's command they all aimed their 
weapons at Feldman while he was being interrogated by him. 
Several times Matulesia jumped up and ran his sword across 
Feldman's neck, asking him if he should kill him. He then 
had Feldman tied to the tail of his (Matulesia's) horse and 
rode to his mother's house, about one hour's distance from 
Saparua. The old women looked at Feldman pityingly but did 
not speak. When asked about his parents, Feldman mentioned 
that his father was a Minister of the Church and then his 
treatment improved. The rebels told him that they would 
like his father to come to Saparua as their Resident and he 
was to write this to him. On the 19th he was sent back to 
Hatawano after promising Matulesia to pass his requests on 
to the Commander to send him a black silken waistcoat and 
65 
some gunpowder • 
Feldman came back on board the "Reygersbergen" in the 
morning of the 19th, but Christiaansen, who according to 
Feldman had had a very bad time of it, was not allowed to 
65 Ver Huell Vol. I pp. 181-188. 
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return to the ship by the villagers and was kept on the 
beach. 
At 2 p.m. that day Commander Groot himself went 
ashore to negotiate. Seeing that he knew what had happened 
to his envoys, Groot's conduct seems strange. Perhaps it 
was a case of not wanting to leave Christiaansen to his 
, perhaps he genuinely thought that this latest display 
of dare-devilry would achieve results. 
The village-heads were dressed in their best black 
frock coats and received the delegation with all signs of 
respect. When asked by Groot why they waged war against 
the government they replied it was because of religion. 
Seeing armed men converge on the meeting place and observing 
that several Regents tried to leave the conference surrep-
titiously, the Commander gave orders to return to the ship 
at once. They just made the barge before the armed mob 
66 
reached them • At that moment Matulesia appeared. By his 
orders the rebels were to attack the Dutch party the moment 
he appeared and to deliver them to him dead or alive. Only 
the British Captain Crozier, who was acting as interpreter, 
had to be spared since the British were seen as allies67 . 
On the morning of 21 July a landing party set fire 
to the negory houses including the house of the local Raja 
and the church; the prahus and larger boats met the same 
fate. The entire negory consisted of about twenty houses. 
Why all this force was used and the village burned down is 
hard to explain; it was done on the Governor's orders and 
66 Ship's Journal H.M. "Reygersbergen" , 18 July, 1817. 
Rijksarchief, The Hague. 
67 Ver Heull p.190. 
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so seems to demonstrate again the complete unsuitability of 
the Ambon government both in matters civil and military. 
The "Reygersbergen" sailed for Saparua on 31 July. 
The IIIris" had sailed a couple of days earlier with orders 
to cruise a few days in the Banda sea to intercept any 
weapon and ammunition shipment from islands like Flores 
and Soembawa, after which she was to rendevous with the 
"Reygersbergen", the "Maria" and the "Dispatch" off 
68 Saparua . 
While cruising off Nusa Laut, the "Iris" was hailed 
by a prahu flying the Dutch flag and carrying the Patti of 
that land, who reported that the inhabitants of all the 
69 
seven negories there were loyal to the government and that 
he had been sent to ask for assistance against the rebels 
who were on the island and against the violence of Kapitan 
70 Lucas . This Lucas was the same person known as Thomas 
Matulesia. The Patti reported that this Kapitan Lucas now 
ruled over the islands Saparua, Haruku and Nusa Laut and on 
his orders the Rajas had no more authority with the people. 
He (Lucas) was prepared to make peace with the Dutch 
government and would be prepared to tolerate a Resident, as 
long as that functionary came under his authority. 
68 Ship's Journal "Reygersbergen" 21 July, 1817. 
69 Nusa Laut, the smallest island in the Uliasan group 
had always been the least troublesome and most peace-loving 
one. Its inhabitants had been coerced into participating 
in the revolt, but their co-operation was less than 
enthusiastic, to the annoyance of Matulesia. It was as a 
punishment for their lack of zeal that they were forced to 
bury the dead of the Beetjes expedition. 
70 The writer has not been able to find any reason why 
Matulesia is here referred to as "Lucas". 
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The Patti who had been at the parley on the beach of 
Hatawano on the 19th also gave information about Fort 
Duurstede, which, he said, had been ringed with man traps 
and pitfalls; all its guns had been spiked and all gates had 
been fastened with steel bands. He further reported that on 
Saparua, too, the bulk of the villagers preferred the Dutch 
government, but were too much under the influence of Kapitan 
Lucas to dare say so for fear of having their heads cut off. 
On 1 August the flotilla which had operated at 
Hatawano sailed south to commence the attack on Fort 
Duurstede and Saparua town. For particulars of the action 
of the next few days, the author will draw heavily on the 
71 Ship's Journal of H.M. II Reygersbergen II , Commander Groot . 
On 3 August, at 5.30 a.m., the landing force took to 
the boats, while at the same time the heavy ship's guns 
opened fire on the Fort. Resistance was minimal and by 
6 a.m. the Dutch flag flew again over the Fort. In spite 
of the information given by the Patti of Nusa Laut, Fort 
Duurstede was in fact found to be unmanned. Matulesia had 
probably decided that once the Dutch warships had laid 
siege to the Fort, with their heavy naval guns against 
which the rebels had no means of reply, his men would be 
trapped in the Fort and unable to participate in any further 
fighting. Inside the Fort all guns were spiked and a 
quantity of bullets was found 72 • During the day the Fort 
was readied for defence. Guns were brought from the ships 
71 Journal Groot. Rijksarchief, The Hague. 
72 Boelen p.264 also describes in some detail some of the 
gruesome finds in the Fort, such as a bloody sock with a 
little child's foot still inside it. 
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and houses in the periphery, including the Resident's house, 
were burned down to clear the field of fire. Not much was 
seen of the rebels who had fled when the heavy guhs opened 
with grape-shot. 
The capture of Fort Duurstede was mostly a moral 
victory. The entire island was still in rebels' hands and 
only well armed parties could venture outside the fort. The 
only well that provided for the Fort as well as for the 
ships was a few yards outside the walls and at times it ran 
dry. It was also under constant sniper-fire by the rebels. 
The greatest strategic value in the occupation of the fort 
was the fact that it did tie down enemy forces, preventing 
further attacks like the one on Haruku on 3 June73 • 
If Groot was to take strong action, he would need 
supplies of every description, but Ambon seemed to lack both 
the resources and the fortitude to manage affairs. After 
much delay the merchant ship "Anna" arrived with water and 
gunpowder but no cartridges, bullets or reinforcements. 
The villagers, meanwhile, during the dark of the night, 
had built coral stone fortifications close to the fort and 
as one side destroyed them, the other rebuilt. On Sunday 
21 September, the rebels appeared with tables and chairs, 
dressed in black and called out to the fort that they wanted 
to hold a church service in the field. Fire from the fort 
soon persuaded them that it was seen as a ruse to lure the 
Christian Ambonese troops to join them. 
Commander Groot, still hopeful of persuading the 
rebels to surrender, issued a Proclamation, many copies 
See p.92. 
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of which were left in the field by the patrols. It advised 
therebels to submit and thus avoid having their possessions 
and house burned or otherwise destroyed. It also offered a 
thousand guilder reward for ~1atulesia, dead or alive. The 
rebels' response was to hang a bundle of these Proclamations 
on a stake in front of the fort, showing their derision74 . 
Although Ambon had received news of the revolt as 
early as 16 May, the Moluccan Commission had not informed 
the Commission General in Batavia until 2 June, in a letter 
sent by "Nautilus", which had sailed from Ambon on 9 June. 
No doubt they cherished the hope that they could put down 
the mutiny in a short time. The "Nautilus" was the British 
ship carrying Resident Mackenzie back to Bengal, the same 
ship the Commission had hoped would have been made available 
to fight the rebels. The news of the Moluccas, related to 
the Commission General by Mackenzie, only confirmed their 
loss of confidence in their Ambon Commissioners. 
The Commission General sprang into action immediately. 
By Secret Decree of 24 June, 1817, it was decided that 
Buyskes, the Third Commissioner, was to sail to the Moluccas 
with reinforcements. The expeditions would be assembled in 
Sourabaya and leave at the earliest possible moment. 
The next day the important Decree of 25 June, dealing 
with the strife that seemed to exist between the Ambon 
Commissioners, gave Buyskes authority to disband this 
74 Boelen p.272. 
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Commission and assume responsibility for government himself, 
if he deemed it advisable. After their consultation with 
Mackenzie the Batavia Commission had little doubt that the 
blame for the disastrous events had to be placed to a large 
extent on the Moluccan Commissioners. 
In a letter to Buyskes, who by this time had left for 
Sourabaya to supervise preparations for his expedition, they 
wrote on 28 June: 
"It seems certain that the Dutch officials 
lost sight of the need to treat the natives, 
especially the Christians, with gentleness and 
that, to preserve the peace, exactly the opposite 
actions should have been taken, than were in fact 
taken. 
It is therefore our belief that, where no 
immediate involvement (with the revolution) has 
taken place, one can not be too lenient. 
Those who participated in the revolt and the 
crimes that went with it, will most likely, out of 
fear for punishment, persevere, and measures 
commensurate with their behaviour must be taken; 
but since our aim is to reap profits from these 
possessions, force must be used wisely. 
We should not omit to mention that, in truth, 
the behaviour of the Commissioners who, as we 
understand it, live in enmity, appears to us to be 
highly undesirable and the fitness for office of 
Mr Van Middelkoop is extremely doubtful. His 
removal from office therefore seems advisable and 
we are satisfied to leave this matter to you n75 • 
The troops Buyskes took with him to the Moluccas 
consisted of 250 men, both European and native, under the 
76 
command of the youthful, 28 year old, Major Meyer . Buyskes 
arrived at Ternate on 1 September, 1817, and discussed the 
renewal of contracts with the Sultans of Ternate and Tidore. 
The Sultan of Tidore, who had usurped the throne with the 
help of the British, had difficulties with his son the 
Sultan Mudah, pretender to the throne and with his subjects 
75 Van d K er emp. Bijdragen Vol. 66 (1912) p. 6. 
76 Ver Huell, Vol. I p.196. 
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in some districts, who refused to acknowledge his right to 
the throne. Buyskes adjudicated in the matter, convincing 
the Sultan Mudah to stay in Ternate until the government 
could rule in the matter. The Sultan of both Ternate and 
Tidore then "gave proof of their attachment to the Dutch 
government by placing twenty armed and manned kora-koras each 
at my disposal,,77. Buyskes obviously had more faith in 
the Sultans than did Van Middelkoop two months earlier, a 
matter on which Buyskes does not comment. These kora-koras, 
from Ternate and Tidore were armed with swivel guns, and all 
able bodied men that were to be found were pressed into 
service, apparently much against their will. "So great was 
78 the fighting spirit of the Ternatese", writes one observer 
"that some cried like children while others desperately 
tried to jump into the sea or to escape to the mountains". 
Unrelenting south winds prevented the ships I departure from 
Ternate until 12 September, and even then the contrary 
winds made progress so slow that the fleet did not reach 
Ambon till 1 October. 
At the time of Buyskes
' 
arrival, the state of affairs 
in the Moluccas was serious. All the negories of Saparua 
were in revolt. Fort Duurstede was in Dutch hands but so 
surrounded that fetching water from the well, only 25 paces 
from the walls, was a dangerous business. Of the negories 
77 Buyskes Buitenzorg Report dated 25 September, 1818. 
78 Van Rees. Het Nederlandsch Tndische 
(1859) p.89. 
Amsterdam 
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of Haruku only Samet and Haruka remained loyal, but many of 
even their inhabitants sympathized with the rebels. Nusa 
Laut was completely under the rebels' sway. The South 
coast of Ceram also was sympathetic to the rebels' cause 
and had sent armed men to Saparua, Haruku and Hitu. Only 
the Leitimor peninsula of Ambon had remained loyal. 
Buyskes' first action was the dismissal of Van 
Middelkoop and Engelhard on the grounds of incompetence 
and conduct which compromised them to the extent that the 
civil service could not have faith in their authority. 
In Van Middelkoop's case, incompetence had resulted in 
injudicious orders regarding the supply of timber, and the 
payment in paper money in areas where this could not be 
exchangedi both these actions were bound to lead to 
dissatisfaction in the population. 
On 3 October Buyskes assumed control of government 
hims , but since, because of his military duties, he 
could not give it his full attention, he transferred 
Resident Nuys from Ternate to run the day-to-day business 
of government. 
Buyskes was convinced that an enemy, attacked from 
two or more directions, can be considered defeated, 
especially if his discipline is weak. He made the restor-
ation of peace in Ambon his first priority and when the 
twenty kora-koras from Ternate and Tidore arrived on 12 
October, he was ready to deal with the rebels at Hitu 
peninsula. 
On 10 October he had signed a Proclamation to the 
negories at Hitu's west coast from Wakasihoe to Hila, 
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. ddt' .. . 1 79 urglng surren er an gran lng an amnesty ln prlnclp e The 
attack on Hitu on 12 October was made from the sea at Larike 
and Hila while at the same time a land force crossed over 
the mountains of Hitu from Laha and Baguala, but even before 
these actions had started, the negory heads of Seit and 
Lima travelled to Ambon to offer submission. They were, 
however, suspect since they had left their women and 
children behind and so they were kept in Ambon. In most 
negories the government troops, on their march, were met 
by delegations wanting to surrender, claiming that their 
negories had always really been loyal, but had been forced 
by the Raja Oeloepaha to take part in the revolt. The few 
skirmishes that did take place usually ended with the flight 
of the rebels, hotly pursued by the Ternatese Alfur 
auxiliaries who killed hundreds of them. 
The victorious expedition was back in Ambon on 19 
October. Their quick success restored confidence in the 
government and its military force. A number of negories, 
which had hesitated until then, came to offer submission. 
Spirits soared amongst the Ambon burgers who now were keen 
to fight the rebels. More than 300 volunteered and they 
were armed with weapons confiscated from the rebels. 
Buyskes decided to lead the operation against 
Haruku and Saparua personally. The negories of Pilauw and 
Kailolo showed only weak resistance. Buyskes had given 
orders that pilauw was not to be destroyed but, "to punish 
the rebels and at the same time satisfy the rapacious 
auxiliaries, a plunder of 24 hours was permitted". The 
79 Van Doren, op.cit. p.75. 
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Proclamation had reached the mountains and now hundreds of 
villagers returned. All rebels were locked up in the church 
and it was felt that an example had to be set. Twenty one 
leaders, including the aged schoolmaster, were picked out 
and led to the church square where they got orders to kneel 
and say their prayers, after which they were executed. Was 
this punishment legal? Was it useful? Much discussion 
took place later regarding its legality. On the matter of 
its usefulness some have argued that the shooting was a 
salutary warning but others felt that all it did was to 
strengthen the resolve of the rebels. In the light of what 
happens in our twentieth century, we should perhaps be 
careful with our judgement. Ver Huell l s comment is worth 
recording: 
"It is certain that this punishment had a strong 
influence on all the people who were still rebellious 
and it has saved much blood, since the idea of 
surrender now took stronger root. It was therefore 
essential that a severe example was seti and as 
strict justice was observed, they became convinced 
that this war was not waged against them out of 
bloodthirst, but to bring them back from their 
erring waysn80. 
Ver Huell obviously tried to extenuate the executions but 
he is hardly convincing. It must be remembered that the 
promise of an amnesty had been given in such wide terms that, 
on the strength of it, people had returned from the forests 
or mountains to surrender. Where Ver Huell argues that the 
punishment had a strong influence for the good and saved a 
lot of bloodspilling since "the idea of surrender now took 
81 
stronger roots", Van Rees reasons: "They no longer trusted 
promises of pardon and did not dare leave the forest". The 
80 Ver Huell, p.220. 
81 Van Rees, p.138. 
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tenacious defence of Saparua, discussed later in this 
chapter, seems to justify Van Rees's opinion much more than 
Ver Huell's. 
In the second half of October Buyskes ordered the 
"Evertsen", Commander Ver Huell, to Saparua and although the 
distance was only 15 miles it took the ship fully two days 
to get there, owing to the monsoon. Commander Groot and 
the "Reygersbergen" were still anchored off Fort Duurstede, 
which was now commanded by Captain Lisnet. 
The rebels meanwhile got more and more daring and 
their numbers increased steadily. Their fortifications of 
coralstone came ever closer to the fort and the negory of 
Tiouw, a little inland from Duurstede, could be seen to have 
been well strengthened with stone parapets. The nature of 
the coral stone was such that it stopped and smothered 
bullets while the walls remained intact, making it useless 
to squander powder and bullets on them from the heavy ship's 
guns. 
Buyskes now decided to attack from two sides forcing 
the rebels to divide their forces 82 . The attacks were to 
come from Duurstede, already in government's hands, and 
from Porto and Haria, where a landing was made without much 
resistance. In the fighting both these negories were 
burned down. Both government detachments now pushed on to 
Tiouw. It was a difficult march, the road was a narrow 
82 Journal Groot and Ver Huell passim. 
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track with heavy bush on both sides, giving excellent cover 
for rebel snipers. Also the Alfur auxiliaries slowed the 
march down. They were used to fight from ambush positions 
and did not want to go forward. Once troops got to Tiouw 
and attacked from two sides, the negories of Tiouw and 
Saparua, the strong fortifications not withstanding, were 
in government hands by 8 a.m. 
83 Meyer gives a description of the fortifications of 
the negories: nOne cannot wonder enough at the construction 
of the enemy's defences; walls of coral stone 12 to 14 feet 
thick and 15 feet high, buttressed on both sides with 
heavy beams which could not be penetrated by thirty pounders". 
Another matter that amazed and dismayed the Dutch 
was the fact that the rebels considered their revolt almost 
as a Holy War. As we have shown the Church-minded Ambonese 
had always considered State and Church as one entity. 
Interference with religion meant that the government was 
disloyal to the church of God and therefore they would no 
longer be bound to obey the temporal ruler who had broken 
faith. Proof of this may be seen in the fact that Lt. It 
Hoofd84 , in the Church of Saparua, had found the Bible 
opened at Psalm 17: 
83 
"Hear a just cause, 0 Lord, 
Hide me in the shadow of thy wings 
From the wicked who despoils me 
My deadly enemy who surrounds me 
Deliver my life from the wicked by thy sword". 
Meyer. II Kronij k II p. 355 . 
84 Journal 't Hoofd. Rijksarchief Inv. 2-21-4 No.2. 
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On 10 November a forced march from Tiouw left early 
in the morning: four hundred men under Captain Krieger, plus 
150 Ternatese Alfurs. Now, for the first time, the troops 
encountered the traverses built by Matulesia (see p.25) at 
Siri-Sori. At the same moment the Ternatese kora-kora 
fleet under their prince 0 Toessan, stormed the beaches and 
after surprisingly little resistance nine fortifications 
were taken and Siri-Sori was in their hands. 
In front of the church the troops found a table, set 
with four glasses and a bottle of wine. Ver Huell assumed 
that the chief rebel had started a leisurely breakfast, not 
expecting his stronghold to betaken so rapidly. This seems 
rather unlikely and a more logical explanation would be that 
the set table was meant as a gesture of friendship and 
submission. 
The only real opposition was met at the negories of 
Oelat and Ow. A reconnoitering party of sixty men reported 
that the enemy was numerous, had strong fortifications and 
was well supplied with fire-arms. Major Meyer, the officer 
commanding, did not want to attack immediately because he 
had sent several detachments into the mountains to spread 
proclamations and arrest fugitive Heads, and his forces 
were thus depleted. Although he deemed it wiser to await 
the return of these detachments, he allowed his mind to be 
changed by his second in command, Captain Krieger. Krieger 
and probably Meyer himself felt that the report of such a 
strong force at Oelat and Ow was probably exaggerated and 
advanced on the negories with a force that had been reduced 
85 to 118 men . Due to a shortage of ammunition the order 
85 Buyskes Buitenzorg Report. 
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was given for a bayonet charge. Despite the fact that all 
officers were wounded in the charge (Major .Meyer was to die 
of his wounds some weeks layer) eight stone and log bulwarks 
were taken. But when the force entered Ow, which lies at 
the foot of a steep mountain, they found themselves 
surrounded by enemy fire. The Javanese soldiers faltered 
and only the threat of fire from their own troops induced 
them to stand firm. The enemy force numbered several 
thousands. Meyer's troops, in the shelter of the conquered 
bulwarks, held their ground and during the night received 
reinforcement of a hundred man strong naval detachment from 
Tiouw. This force held out till midday the next day when 
further reinforcements in the form of three Ternatese 
kora-koras arrived. The enemy now fell back and the negory 
was taken. The rebels had fought bravely, inspired, not 
by the Rajah of the negory, Paulus Triago, but by his sixteen-
year-old daughter Christina Martha. She had helped with the 
building of the fortifications and, when the ammunition ran 
out, she was the first to throw stones at the troops. In the 
end she was dragged, half suffocated, out of the burning 
house, still clutching a spear in her hand. This was the 
end of the resistance. 
As long as his star was rising, the rebel leader 
Thomas Matulesialived in style, first in the Resident's 
house in Saparua and then in a house in Haria. He granted 
his wife the title of "Princess of Saparua". He had a 
great number of servants and from time to time he invited 
lIS 
the Regents to dinner. On the other hand he saw to it that 
the negories he had subjected, or which had chosen his side, 
remained orderly. The daily work went on as usual and the 
Sundays were dedicated to religion. Unreliable Regents were 
dismissed and lax ones were punished. He rejected a 
proposition to destroy the clove culture; in fact he did all 
in his power to promote it. 
A circular dated 29 September 1817 shows how firmly 
Pattimura kept a hand on the Christian faith: 
"TO all regents of the island of Ceram. In 
the first place: I hereby instruct you all, rajas, 
pattis, orang kajas, that you see to it, as far as 
possible, that all Christians, be they members of 
the community or not, both men and women, continue 
to live in peace such as we have been used to, and 
that you continue to further the interests of our 
Christians in accordance with the commandments of 
the Almighty who is in heaven. This must be done 
by going to Church on Sundays and attending the 
gatherings during the week. Let no one be careless 
about keeping God's commandments - so that we may 
gain strength and encouragement in this war which 
must serve to improve our lot and that of our country. 
Secondly, you must see to it that the children 
go to school. According to our custom, all mothers 
and fathers must entrust their children into the 
teacher's care, so that they can be taught the word 
of God as becomes a Christian, for the glory of 
our country, in accordance with God's holy will. 
Furthermore, if any of you does not fulfil this 
instruction, he will be sentenced and punished, he 
will be killed and all his family with him". 
Matulesia, it is clear, saw himself as a guardian of 
the Christian faith which he felt was threatened by the 
government. He did not, however, regard himself as a 
prophet, still less as a messiah. He remained a staunch 
Calvinist to the end. 
After the fall of Siri-Sori, the Raja of Boi, a 
negor~ across the bay from Siri-Sori, approached the Dutch 
commander, offering to deliver Matulesia to him, provided 
he was given some troops to accompany him. The Raja of 
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Boi had been deposed by Matulesia. The Dutch were at this 
point only too willing to make use of the internal 
dissension amidst the Ambonese. Lt. Pietersen, an Ambonese 
officer, with forty men in twoorembaais was sent with the 
Raja. He entered a house pointed out to him and indeed 
did find Matulesia "dejected and not knowing what to do 
next" 86 . Pietersen advised Matulesia to surrender and when 
the latter hesitated he was taken prisoner by the Raja of 
Boi. Once on board the "Evertsen" :r.1atulesia refused to say 
very much and when the Ternatese Prince 0 Toessan asked him 
how he could have been so rash as to make war on a body as 
powerful as the "Company" he remained silent IIbut looked 
at the Prince with eyes full of 10athing,,87. 
At the request of Major Meyer the order was given to 
burn all the boats belonging to the rebels. On landing on 
the beach of Paparoe to burn anorembaa;h, the owner, an old 
villager pleaded with the soldiers not to destroy his sole 
means of existence, in return for which he would show them 
the hideout of Latumahina, the third in command of the rebels. 
Latumahina was arrested without any resistance. Two other 
important rebel leaders, Anthony Rhebok and Thomas Pattiwael, 
were also arrested, but the author has not been able to find 
any particulars or dates. 
Ver Huell who had been informed that the child of 
the Resident Van den Berg was still alive, having been looked 
after by one Solomon Pattiwael and his wife, sent out patrols 
to locate the child, without luck, but on 12 November a band 
86 Boelen, op.cit. p.280. 
87 Van der Kemp, Bijdragen Vol. 66 (1911) p.71. 
117 
of rebels came to surrender and brought the boy with them. 
He was in reasonable health and was in due course handed 
over by Ver Huell to his grandparents in Sourabaya. 
The Raja Triago was sentenced to death, despite the 
pleadings of his daughter Christina Martha, and executed on 
Nusa Laut. The girl, on account of her youth, was set free 
and given in the care of the schoolmaster of Nusa Laut. 
After the execution of the chief rebels at Ambon (see 
p. 119 ) the lesser rebels were banished to Java and placed 
aboard the "Evertsen". To Ver Heull's surprise the girl 
Christina Martha was among them. 
"The heroic girl" he wrote, "had escaped from the 
care of the schoolmaster and had taken to roaming alone in 
the forest, living on wild fruit. Soon her fellow country-
men, steeped in superstition, saw her as a witch or Sawah 
(an evil spirit), and the Commissioner had decided that she 
88 
should not stay there" • 
When Ver Huell's ship left for Java he received 
orders to take the girl there, where she could be properly 
cared for. But she had lost the will to live, pined away 
and died before the ship reached port. She was buried at 
sea. 
88 Ver Huell, p.271. 
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Confirmation of Matu1esia's Death Sentence 
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On 21 November the "Evertsen" had reached Ambon and 
her prisoners were transferred to the jail. They were tried 
in the Court of Justice and sentenced to be hanged. The 
execution of the four chief rebels took place on the square 
in front of the Fort Victoria. 
On the evening of 15 December, Ver Hue11 visited the 
prisoners, a visit he recorded as fo11ows: 89 
"The Chief, Thomas Matu1esia, was surrounded by 
schoolmasters to prepare himself for death by 
the continuous singing of psalms. He seemed calm, 
completely absorbed in the religious service and 
oblivious of his surroundings. The other mutineers 
were silent ..• At seven a.m. the rebels: Thomas 
Matu1esia, Chief; Anthony Rhebok, Captain; Philip 
Latumahina, Lieutenant and the Raja of Siri-Sori, 
Sajat Printa were led out. The sentence of the 
Court of Justice was read. When Matu1esia heard 
that his dead body would be hung in an iron cage, 
"as a deterrent for others", he looked up for a 
moment. After that he looked straight ahead. 
Latumahina was first. He was a heavy man and the 
rope broke. Half dead he was hoisted up the ladder 
again and was definitely hanged. Matu1esia was 
the last. With firm steps he climbed the ladder. 
As the noose was placed round his neck he greeted 
the judges respectfully and said in a clear voice: 
"S1amat Tinga1 Tuan Tuan", a polite eastern greeting 
which, literally translated is: "Happy staying 
behind Gentlemen". He entered eternity like a 
gentleman. The corpses were taken to the outer-
gallows and Matu1esia's ,was hung in a long iron 
cage" . 
The other rebel leaders were banished to Java to work 
in the coffee plantations. A number of them were later 
allowed to return to Ambon. 
89 ibid p.269. 
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CHAPTER IV 1 
THE INQUEST 
The revolt was over. Dutch rule had been re-estab-
lished, but the Dutch still had to make their analyses of 
what had gone wrong. As we look at these contemporary 
analyses in some detail we may perhaps begin to formulate 
our own conclusions as to the immediate causes of the revolt. 
We must remember all the time, of course, that most 
of our sources were provided by people with a direct inter-
est, such as the Commissioners and the Rebel leaders, or are 
the Journals of naval officers who took part in the 
operations but who were often expressing personal opinions 
and/or hearsay when discussing causes. In the case of Ver 
Huell, his original Journals were lost with his ship in a 
shipwreck and rewritten from memory, two years later; in 
the case of Van Doren and J.Boelen, their accounts were 
written many years after the event, which must raise some 
doubts about their accuracy_ We should perhaps be prepared 
to admit at this point the possibility that even after close 
investigation, we may not be able to say positively where the 
1 In this chapter the immediate causes of the revolt 
will be scrutinized and in this connection a short chronology 
will perhaps be useful, since so much happened in so short 
a period: 
8 March 1817: 
14 May 1817: 
20 May 1817: 
1 October 1811: 
16 November 1817: 
Arrival of Dutch Commissioners in 
Ambon. 
Start of the Revolt at Saparua. 
Expedition under Major Beetjes 
annihilated. 
Arrival of Buyskes. 
Thanksgiving service in Saparuai 
end of the resistance. 
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direct causes of the revolution lay. Reports from the 
responsible authorities, including Engelhard's version, 
must, under the circumstances, be read with the utmost 
circumspection. But we are obliged, as historians, to make 
what we can of these reports. 
Regarding the Commissioners, Van der Kemp does not 
seem far off the mark when he describes the Governor as 
"that stupid Van Middelkoop,,2 and Engelhard as "Ineffect-
ual" 3 . To be sure, Van :£I.1iddelkoop was not a man of strength, 
or gifted in the art of government; the takeover from the 
co-operative English Resident went well enough, but with 
Engelhard beside him, he was in no way capable of handling 
a revolt. A closer look, however, should be taken at the 
Moluccas of his day. With neither money nor the personnel, 
with only pen and paper and many good intentions, the 
Commissioners' aim was to make a model Dutch colony out of 
the carelessly ruled British administration. When, at the 
reintroduction of Dutch Rule, the new administrators tried 
to run their regime along the old lines, the result, in the 
always unruly Saparua, was immediate and fiery conflict -
and under those circumstances neither of the Commissioners 
was in his right place. 
While still in Ambon Engelhard wrote in a private 
4 5 letter that the revolt was due to Van Middelkoop's orders , 
2 P. V.d.Kemp, "Het Herstel van het Nederlandsch Gezag" 
Bijdragen Vol. 65 (1911) p.504. 
3 P. V.d.Kemp, Het Nederlandsch Bestuur in 1817 tot het 
Vertrek der Engelschen. The Hague. (1913) p.21. 
4 Letter from N.Engelhard to his brother-in-law, 
S.Van Basel, 12 June 1817. Rijks Archief, The Hague. 
5 "As for his part in the revolt of Saparua,which he 
now blames on the unfortunate Van den Berg, by accusing him 
of actions, for which he himself gave the orders and which he 
now prefers to negate, assuming that the Saparuan archives 
will by now be lostll. 
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but in his Batavia Report he declares that the causes were 
"totally unknown" and that he was not able to throw any 
light on the matter II s ince communications with Saparua had 
ceased and communications with Ambon were at a complete 
standstill". Notwithstanding, he gives a lengthy opinion 
on the causes, seeking them in generalities: it is, he 
says, lithe dislike of the Saparuans in general for all 
subservience and social contracts, being by nature inclined 
to an independent, self-opinionated, easy lifestyle, which 
inclination induces them to reject any acceptance of a 
regular government, and to the misguided expectation that 
they, like the people of Ceram and elsewhere, could stand 
on their own without being bound by any obligations,,6. 
Even if it were ethnographically correct, such a 
state of affairs could hardly be said, by a responsible 
government, to be an "extenuating circumstances"i it is the 
function of that government to control such circumstances. 
The inhabitants of Saparua had long been known to be 
"difficult" and inclined to opposition. Buyskes acknowledges 
that lithe independence of Ceram invited emulation since its 
inhabitants did not come under the immediate control of 
Dutch military forces or its civil servants and that 
therefore they could trade as and with whom they liked. 
The desire for independence and the advantages that came 
with it had long since been stirring in the inhabitants"? 
6 Buyskes Report 472. 
7 Van Middelkoop's "Ambon Report" and "Sourabaya Repor.t.". 
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On 29 May 1817, at Saparua, Matulesia issued a 
manifesto listing fourteen points of contention. Rather 
than giving the full text of this elaborate document here, 
we will give a short resume as follows: 
1. Dutch authorities interfered with schools 
and religion. 
2. Ambonese were forcibly recruited for Java. 
3. Paper money was unacceptable. 
4. No wages were paid for government work. 
5. The government punish villagers who complained 
and fired guns at them. 
6. Compulsory salt making was objected to. 
7. The Resident increased taxes. 
8. Buying off of labour duties at the expense of 
other villagers was objected to. 
9. Complaints by villagers went unheeded. 
10. Payment for mail transport to Cerarn was too low. 
11. Payment for mail deliveries to Ambon was too 
low. 
12. Compulsory deliveries of dried fish were 
objected to. 
13. Experiments with coffee and nutmeg cultivation 
were objected to. 
The fourteenth point is given in full since it gives 
an indication of Matulesia's thinking: 
"14. The above matters have been reported in truth. 
If the Dutch government wishes to rule us then 
it must do so well and just, as the British 
did, who kept their promises; but regarding 
the Dutch government, if they do not govern us 
as they (the British) did then we will resist 
them in eternity. Furthermore, we, the Regents 
and the people have not chosen our above 
mentioned leader, but he has been appointed by 
the All High Himself". 
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This statement was signed by the twenty one regents of 
Saparua and Nusa Laut. It should be noted that among the 
signatories were Melojior Kesaulija, Patti of Siri-Sori 
Serani, and Sarassa Sanaki, Patti of Siri-Sori Islam. Of 
these two neighbouring negories, the first (Serani or 
Nasarani) was Christian and the second Muslim8 , which 
proves that, voluntarily or under coercion, the Muslims 
of Saparua sided with the Christians against the government. 
Van Middelkoop in both his defence reports9 analyses 
the eight grievances embodied in Pattimura's fourteen 
points and the list of grievances given to Colonel Groot 
in Hatawano, and gives his version of the matters raised. 
These points are, he says: 
1. the paper money 
2. the order to make salt 
3. the laying out of a nutmeg plantation 
4. the cutting and supplying of timber, and 
gaba-gaba 
5. the dismissal of schoolmasters and the order to 
send the Saparua children to school in the 
island's capital 
6. the recruitment of Ambonese soldiers for service 
in Batavia 
7. the supply of dried fish and dendeng 
8. the compulsory delivery of coffee. 
The questions that should be asked here are: Which 
of these grievances were seen by the people as the most 
serious? What was the opinion of the Rebel Leaders 
themselves? 
cf. p.6l. 
9 Middelkoop's Ambon Report and Sourabaya Reuort. 
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The grievances fall into two categories, economic and 
ethno-psychological. The first group comprises the 
compulsory supply of timber, atap,gaba-gaba, dried fish, 
dendeng and coffeei under the second heading come the 
questions of school, church and recruiting. We shall 
consider these eight points one by one: 
I. THE PAPER MONEY 
The "Publication ll of the Commission General in 
Batavia of 14 January 1817 started pompously: "Just as His 
Majesty has given an unshakable base to the monetary 
conditions in the Netherlands, so has he ordered an equal 
right for the Netherlands Indies, guaranteeing a wide and 
continuous circulation of money". It states that two million 
guilders, in specie, had been sent with the Commission and 
that paper money would be issued, declaring that "the 
paper coin will never be issued or accepted at a value above 
or below its nominal value and always at equal value with 
the specie of which it is completely representative". In 
reality the paper money was unexchangable - there were only 
three Exchange Banks to be opened in the whole of the 
Moluccas, one each at Ambon, Ternate and Banda - and at the 
time the paper money was put into circulation these Banks 
had not yet been organised - another example of poor 
government. In 1810 the Dutch had left the Moluccas under 
a cloud, after issuing emergency paper money that had had 
to be kept in circulation by force, and now, seven years 
later, they started in a similar way. 
By Decree No. 18, dated 10 April 1817, the Commission 
had directed that "All spice and other deliveries in the 
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Residencies resorting under Ambon will be paid entirely in 
hard cash on account of the difficulties the acceptance of 
paper money will entail for the inhabitants of these island, 
as no exchange-banks could be established there, necessit-
ating a journey to Ambon every time they would be paid." 
This, says Van Middelkoop, meant that the inhabitants of 
those islands were favoured above those of Ambon itself, 
and he argues that therefore this could not possibly be a 
cause for revolt, "although there was an immediate dislike 
of the paper money, possibly for fear that it would in the 
long run be disadvantageous, as it had been in the past". 
"But II , he continues, "this was the reaction of the well to 
do, not the indigent Ambonese, who probably were being used 
as a means to stop the introduction of the paper currency; 
the British had introduced the Spanish Dollar in 1811 and 
this was highly favoured"lO. 
If Van Middelkoop's explanation does anything, it 
does prove the truth about the shortage of specie. As there 
were exchange offices only in Ambon, Ternate and Banda, 
paper could not be e:Xi.changed anywhere else. The government 
did not pay the inhabitant with paper money, but this 
applied only to payments for spices and other compulsory 
deliveries. In the same report we read that the Commission-
ers, to prevent the export of silver coins, "did not allow 
the exchange of silver coin during the first two months 
after the change over of the colony". To justify this, they 
refer to Banda where, "but for the timely intervention of the 
Resident, the entire stock of silver coins would have 
Van Middelkoop's Sourabaya Report. 
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disappeared". "Being aware of the silver shortage in Java", 
he continues, "and the difficulty of obtaining the amount 
sent to this colony, I decided not to make silver available 
to everybody for their personal gain at the expense of the 
government, as this would have exhausted our silver coin 
holdings, which would have been exported to places from 
which not one stiver would have been returned to government 
establishments and this would surely have brought about 
the displeasure of Commissioners General (in Batavia). 
Moreover, it is not the common man who is interested in 
silver, he much prefers to be paid in doits, while his 
entire wealth seldom amounts to more than four or five 
11 
rupees" . But complaints are so general about this 
matter that it cannot be dismissed so lightly. The fault 
lay definitely with the Moluccan Commissioners and, 
indirectly, also with the Commission General in Batavia 
who were responsible for the paper issue and the unsatis-
factory monetary system in general. Buyskes himself notes 
in his Report that "the payment in paper money created 
immediate dissatisfactionllj the people remembered what had 
happened in 1810 and now that the British were leaving "the 
people were again forced to accept payment in paper rather 
h . 1,12 t an spec~e . There seems, therefore, to be little doubt 
that the paper money question was a contributing factor to 
the general dissatisfaction that sparked the revolt. 
11 ibid. 
12 Buyskes Buitenzorg Report. 
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II. THE MAKING OF SALT 
Matulesia says in his fourteen points: "Also the 
Resident ordered us to make salt, which the government 
wished to sell; but from the earliest time till the present, 
we have never done this kind of work for the government; 
this is the reason for our dissatisfaction~. 
By Decree No. 30 dated 10 April 1817, Van Middelkoop 
had requested the Residents to investigate the possibility 
of constructing saltpans in their areas; for the same 
purpose he appointed a commission for the island of Ambon, 
which, "after having completed its investigation reported 
that even the most likely places were not suitable". The 
governor's request stressed that nothing should be left 
untried in an effort to eliminate the shortage of salt, of 
which none was available either from the British or from 
private sources; none had been imported from Java and such 
imports were unlikely in the near future. The Governor's 
request was therefore an attempt to see if the Moluccas 
could be made self sufficient in this commodity. Van 
Middelkoop could not see any grounds for complaints of the 
local people because the measure had been prompted by his 
concern for their welfare, because in that way they would 
"have an easy way to obtain salt at a much cheaper price than 
if they were obliged to buy imported salt at high prices; or 
to obtain it by burning old wood impregnated by seawater or 
driftwood,,13. 
13 Van Middelkoop's Sourabaya Report ff. 35-36. 
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III. THE LAYING OUT OF A NUTMEG PLANTATION 
Matulesia said: "We are hard pressed to take care 
of the clove and coffee plantations and yet we have been 
ordered to layout nutmeg plantations, this makes our men 
and women, who have to do a lot of heavy work for the 
government, very bitterll. 
Van Middelkoop explains the nutmeg plantation as 
follows: He and Engelhard feared that the severe earthquakes 
of 1816 in Banda would have a long term effect on the nutmeg 
cultivation. In order to relieve the "disadvantages for the 
government and", he added somewhat grandly, "the inconven-
ience to humanity" the Commissioners had written to the 
Residents ordering them to layout "trial nutmeg gardens". 
Saparua had started a plantation of 750 trees. Haruku had 
reported that their soil was unsuitable for nutmeg culti-
vation and Hila had not replied at all as yet. The Governor 
therefore, could not see any grounds for a revolt on account 
the nutmeg policy, since nthe population of this island 
is so large and suitable land is available so near to the 
f t h t th f 1 b . 1 d' , . 'f' t n14 or , t a e amount 0 a our 1nvo ve 1S 1ns1gn1 1can • 
It is notable that Van· den Berg, both in the salt making 
project and in the matter of the nutmeg plantation was far 
more eager than most of his fellow officials; he clearly had 
not yet learned the 'festina lente' technique his colleagues 
in Hila and Haruku, both with many years of experience in 
h 1 · l' b' 1 d t' 15 t e co on1a serV1ce, were 0 V10US Y a op 1ng . 
14 ibid. 
15 At the outbreak of the revolt neither Hila nor Haruku 
had taken any action as regards the salt but Van den Berg had 
already started experiments. 
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IV. DELIVERIES OF CUT TIMBER, ~ AND GABA-GABA 
This was taken to be one of the most serious of the 
grievances and certainly not unjustly so. Van Middelkoop 
mentions the dilapidated state of government buildings and 
adds: "In order to rectify this and also to proceed with 
the necessary repairs to government buildings in Banda, I 
issued a general requisition for timber from Saparua, Hila 
and Haruku in April last16 but no timber has been received 
as yet. Some timber is available at Hila but a shortage of 
boats has, so far, made shipment impossible". The delivery 
quotas were to be spread over the various negories of Saparua, 
Hila and Haruku. Then follows his usual justification: 
"This demand for timber was no burden on the people since, 
compared with deliveries in earlier times, even under British 
rule, especially when they first arrived here, it was in no 
way excessive and had always been an obligation of the 
population which had been maintained by the British through-
out their stay. For the felling and cutting a fair wage 
was paid as per my Decree 43 dated 13 April, especially since 
the timber was not theirs, but grew wild on government 
land" . 
It has been argued that this was contrary to adat 
law and a continuation of the theory of Raffles, who, 
through his exorbitantly high land rent, can be said to 
have turned the whole of Java into a tenant farm of the 
17 government • 
Idema18 quotes a price list for timber supplies: 
16 Decree No. 39 dated 12 April, 1817. 
17 C. van Vollenhove. Het' Adat Recht van Nederlandsch 
Indie. Leiden (1931), p.236. 
18 H.A.Idema. "De Oorzaken van den Opstand van Saparua 
in 1817" Bijdragen Vol. 79 (1923) pp. 598-618. 
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Beams 6" x 12' to lS' Guilders 2.16 
ditto under 6" x S ' to 12' II O.lS 
Planks l~" x 12' to lSi " 2.00 
ditto under l~" " O.lS 
Posts of Nany wood " 2.00 
etc. 
This is part of the list set by "Secret Order No. 36" of 
12 April. (Why 'Secret' one may ask? One would have 
expected such a price list to be widely publicised.) As 
we saw, the method of payment was very involved and required 
the fiat of the Governor in Ambon, causing long delays, and 
after all that, payment was expected to be made in the 
despised paper money. These long delays were probably the 
reason for Matulesia's claim that no payments were 
received. It must also be kept in mind that the actual 
amount received was not the most important point: what 
really hurt was the seemingly endless demands for labour 
in order to supply all manner of requirements. The added 
enforced experiments, with salt making and the nutmeg 
plantation, would no doubt have added to the general 
d ' t' f t' 19 1ssa1S ac 10n • 
The timber deliveries, as we saw, provided the spark 
in the powder keg and the removal of the timber cargo from 
the orembaai at Porto by the rebels was the first act of 
defiance. Once the revolt had broken out, immediate 
improvements were made by Decree dated 24 May, giving 
Superintendents of ~egories funds for immediate payment, 
in specie, for deliveries. 
19 The workload for compulsory deliveries of timber often 
fell unfairly on villagers. It was, for instance, possible to 
buy off one's obligations on pa~ent of a set . This, 
however, meant that the other v1llagers had to do the extra 
amount of work required to fill the unaltered quota. 
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Buyskes classified the orders for compulsory 
deliveries among the 'injudicious' orders of Van Middelkoop20. 
On 3 May the Resident of Saparua asked the 
Commissioners to inform him whether the rowers for the many 
orembaais required by the Government for the transport of 
goods, personnel or mail, should be paid a daily wage of four 
stivers per day per man, as had been the practice of the 
British government, considering that the previous Dutch 
government had made no such payment. The present author 
has not been able to find the Commissioners' reply. Perhaps 
this is the basis for Matulesia's complaints: "for the 
transport of mail to Ceram only four guilders is paid, for 
that to Ambon only two guilders, this is really too bad". 
In a Decree of the Commissioners dated 2 August 1817 -
after the outbreak of the Saparua Revolt, it will be noted -
the Commissioners had an obvious change of heart. "To all 
negory folk employed in government service on orembaais 
transporting goods, personnel or mail, will be paid five 
stivers daily and the usual rations when they have to leave 
the bay and go out to sea, but if they remain in the bay or 
on the island, only four stivers and no rations; on request 
part of this may, in their absence, be given to the wife or 
children for their subsistence" 2l • 
The following passage is also interesting: 
liThe superintendent is seriously recommended to 
make sure that this burden is equally spread over 
the negory folk and that nobody, whose turn it is, 
is allowed to buy off this obligation, since this 
will create disconsolation in the others and may 
lead to Commotion, while he will also give his 
20 Buyskes' Report 4:z.~. 
21 Decree No. 117 dated Ambon 2 Aug. 1817. 
attention and see to it that those who have given 
these services or delivered materials, will 
receive prompt payment in full; he will be 
accountable for any acts to the contrarylt22. 
As regards the spirit of the government, it is 
obvious that the timber supplying negories were hard 
pressed, but there is no indication whatsoever that the 
Governor ever stood up for the interests of his people, 
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against the countless requisitions of the Military. Again 
and again the Superintendents of Negori'es are ordered to 
supply this or that "by way of distribution over the 
negories". And a tremendous amount was required: poles for 
the navy wharf, big repairs to the Castle, the military 
hospital and the small post in Leitimor, even firewood for 
the newly arrived warships. Regular transport with the Bay 
of Bagualawas also demanded, also by equal distribution 
over the negories. Two ore:mbaais had to be available at the 
first request of the Military Commander - as the Decree puts 
it: "as under the previous Dutch govenerment, an obligation 
abolished by the British government as being unnecessary". 
Tidy Dutchmen that they were, a Decree of 19 Apri1 23 ordered 
all roads in the town to be thoroughly repaired and the town 
cleaning was reorganised. By Decree of 25 April the police 
force, which had cost the British seven to eight thousand 
Spanish Dollars annually, was replaced by night watches of 
armed burgers, "as such an expense cannot be continued". 
Obviously Busykes' condemnation of these compulsory services 
as "injudicious" was a considerable understatement. 
22 ibid. 
23 Decree No. 47 Ambon 19 April 1817. 
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v. THE DISMISSAL OF SCHOOLMASTER-PASTORS AND THE 
ORDER TO CONCENTRATE TEACHING OF SAPARUA CHILDREN 
IN THE ISLAND'S CAPITAL 
Pattimura claimed that "the British respected our 
religion and therefore the people were obedient and lived in 
peace, but as soon as the Dutch came to rule us, all this 
was finished; for this reason the people became dissatis-
fied and rose against the government; this is why the people 
of Hunimua(another name for Saparua) and Nusa Laut no 
longer wanted to obey the government; but then the Resident 
became angry and has fired cannon and guns24 and our hearts 
got sick and we began to oppose such a man". Here he is 
obviously referring to the period of government of Daendels, 
who, when faced by lack of funds, made payment of the 
schoolmasters' wages the responsibility of the negories; 
he is referring also to the reversal of this rule by the 
British as soon as they took over again in 1810, when the 
government again resumed responsibility for the financial 
support of the school-church system. However, the traditional 
school and church in each village - which gave the village 
its importance - had the obvious disadvantage of high costs 
and Jabez Carey, as school superintendent of schools from 
1814 on, had begun to concentrate the pupils of the small 
schools in the Ambon district in one large central school 
in Ambon town. This had then led to discontent amongst 
the schoolmasters. This particular grievance therefore 
preceded the return of Dutch rule in 1817, but may well have 
24 This directly contradicts the Porto Report which 
states that only on 15 May guns were fired in the attempt to 
relieve the Resident on the road between Haria and Fort 
Duurstede. 
135 
been re-introduced because of its sure emotional impact. 
The Dutch Commissioners wanted to extend the system 
of concentration into larger schools to Saparua, partly 
because Van Middelkoop saw in this the chance of improving 
the teaching, especially the teaching of the Dutch language 
- which was seen as a means of increasing loyalty to the 
Dutch. But the main reason was, no doubt, the cost saving. 
But all that actually had been done was the sending of a 
letter by Van Middelkoop, asking advice from the Residents 
25 
of Saparua and Haruku. Van Middelkoop reports that no 
action had been taken. His original letter on the subject 
had been written on 9 April and on 15 April Van den Berg, 
the Saparua Resident, sent his advice, strongly rejecting 
the proposition, arguing that the complete school system 
would have perished if the British Government had not 
reinstated the payment of schoolmasters' wage, after the 
"French,,26 had made this the responsibility of the negories. 
"A change in this arrangement" Van den Berg wrote, "will do 
great harm as it will disrupt the entire school and church 
27 
system" . The Resident of Haruku reacted in the same way 
and the proposal was then dropped by Van Middelkoop. In a 
Report to the Commission General in Batavia dated 26 April 
- well before the outbreak of the revolt, it should be noted 
- the Commissioners in Ambon wrote that "among the Ambonese 
there is an apprehension of the likelihood that our govern-
ment will again reduce and change the school and church 
25 Van Hiddelkoop's Sourabaya Report. 
26 Obviously a reference to the fact that Daendels 
represented the Holland of Louis Bonaparte. 
27 't 106 Van Doren Op.Cl . p. . 
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system ll • The grievance was unfounded, but the rumour had 
got around and the villagers believed it. The fact that 
the population was so upset by a mere investigation was 
therefore known to the Commissioners and should have made 
them very cautious in all other matters. After all, the 
Moluccan schoolmasters were rigidly puritanical in their 
outlook. Their position, in fact, invites some comparison 
with that of the Tuangku among thePadris who played an 
. 1 . hI' . l' S 28 ~mportant ro e ~n t e Is am~c rev~va ~n umatra . A 
local "nationalistic" sentiment figured as prominently 
among the schoolmasters as it did among the Padris. 
The rumour that the government intended to 
centralise the schools, which would lead to the dismissal 
of a number of schoolmasters and a general dimunition of 
the influence of the Reformed Church in Moluccan society was 
a strongly contributing factor in the subsequent insurrec-
tion. Later it was found that, in an effort to get the 
added backing of the 10 per cent of the population of 
28 The Padris (a term either derived from the Portu-
guese word Padre or from the town of Pedir in Sumatra, Men 
of Pediri or Padri) played an important role in Islamic 
revival in the Minangkabau region of Sumatra. They were 
members of an Islamic sect that had fallen under the 
influence of the puritanical Wahhabi movement, while making 
a pilgrimage to Mecca. They opposed polytheist and animist 
accretions of Islam and sought to introduce the strongly 
patriarchal norms of Islam among the matriarchal Minang-
kabau people and soon drove the conflict between Islam and 
adat into the open. The methods which the Padris adopted 
so aggravated the problem of adapting the customs of the 
Minangkahau to Islam, that the attempt ended in armed 
conflict and the murder of the entire Minangkabau royal 
family, with the exception of one fugitive. The Dutch 
authorities, mainly for reasons of conservatism, sided with 
the inland rulers, who, because of their high-handed actions, 
lost the confidence of their people. See S.Tas, Indonesia: 
The Underdeveloped Freedom. Pegasus, New York (1974) p.49. 
See also Christin a Dobbin. Tslamic Revi valismin a Changing 
Peasant Economy, London 1984. 
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Saparua who were of the Muslim faith, the rumour had been 
spread that Muslims would be forced, by the government, to 
embrace Christianity. This of course made the religious 
29 
unrest complete . 
Matulesia, throughout his career as the leader of 
the rebellion, was surrounded by schoolmasters who acted as 
his principal advisers and go-betweens. Van Doren paints a 
vivid picture of the aged schoolmaster of Saparua, "a very 
orthodox follower of Protestantism" who, "bible in hand ll 
always urged his fellow villagers on to fUrther resistance30 . 
VI. RECRUITMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR BATAVIA 
The Commission General in Batavia needed to extend 
its army in Java and was looking to the Moluccas for this 
purpose. Article 5 of the "Instruction to the Military 
Commander" ordered recruitment in the ~loluccas of natives 
exclusively for service in Java. Engelhard felt that this 
would prove to be a difficult task because "the population 
is very much against it; the feat of military service is so 
great since earlier recruitment campaign actions that a 
renewed campaign in these islands would be sufficient to 
create great unrest under the population and lead to 
revolt,,3l. This term of the population did not apply to 
service in the Moluccas themselves and, with the very small 
army strength, it would seem to have been the sensible 
thing to restrict recruitment there to local service only. 
Enklaar, op.cit. p.5l. 
30 Van Doren, ibid. 
31 Engelhard Letter to S. Van Basel dated 12 June 1817. 
The Residents of Saparua and Hila, especially, made very 
strong recommendations to this effect, no doubt prompted 
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by the completely inadequate forces at their disposal. 
However, the Recruitment Officer, Lt. Colonel Krayenhoff, 
refused to deviate from Article 5. Governor Van Middelkoop 
concurred since "the very close connection of these islands 
inhabitants with those of the people of Ceram could encourage 
smuggling of spices, rather than guard against it". 
Van Middelkoop "did not want to deny that the 
attempts at recruitment created a wrong impression in some 
quarters" because "the Ambonese is reluctant to leave his 
village and has a wildly exaggerated fear of Batavia". But, 
he added, "there was not the slightest attempt at coercion 
or forced recruitment and the recruitment officers had not 
even left Fort Victoria prior to the outbreak of the revolt; 
the reason for the fear was entirely to be found in the 
forced recruitment under Daendels,,32. In this same report 
Van Middelkoop also reports that the Resident of Menado had 
managed to take over the Menadonese soldiers who had been in 
British pay, but with the proviso that they would not be 
obliged to accept transfer from Menado. The Resident had 
reported this to the Governor who informed Krayenhoff. The 
latter disapproved, "since a soldier is bound to go where 
his Sovereign needs him", and he remarked that, even if 
these soldiers did not have to serve in Batavia, they should 
at least be liable for service in the entire Moluccan 
archipelago. The author has not been able to ascertain 
whether this assertion by Krayenhoff led the authorities to 
32 Van Middelkoop's Ambon Report. 
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renege on promises made, but since shortly after the outbreak 
of the revolt the Commission ordered that Ambonese recruits 
be engaged for three years service in the Moluccas only, 
this does not seem likely33. 
Engelhard's incompetence is again illustrated. 
Although he disagreed with Van Middelkoop regarding the 
fectiveness of Ambonese soldiers in controlling smuggling 
- since the British had employed them in that function with 
great success - and also with the Military Commandant 
regarding the strict adherence to Article 5, he did do 
nothing to counteract their decisions. In his Batavia 
Report this First Commissioner wrote: "I considered 
useless to give my contrary opinion because the Military 
Commandant and Chief of Troops was not to be swayed to 
deviate from his instructions". Only after the outbreak 
of the revolt, when a large number of ex-soldiers had either 
joined the revolt or were sympathetic to it, did it dawn 
on the civil and military officials that giving in to the 
demand for service in the Moluccas exclusively would not 
only increase their troop strength, but would also ensure 
greater control over the dangerous elements of the Ambon 
Regiment. 
Buyskes, who showed a much better understanding of 
the interests of the Ambonese soldier (perhaps with the 
benefit of hind-sight), was convinced that the Ambonese 
could even have been won over to serve in Java, common 
sense had prevailed. IIConsidering that the main reason for 
the. inhabitants' objection to military service in Java is 
33 Decree No. 47 dated 8 June 1817. 
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the uncertainty they about the fate of parents, 
children and other loved relations, and the impossibility 
to provide for them after their (the soldiers')·departure. 
Further considering that the knowledge that relatives are 
assured their essential needs may have favourable results 
in increasing the number volunteers for Java, it was 
decided: "that the parents, children, brothers or sisters 
of Ambonese soldiers serving in Java will receive a 
monthly allowance of twenty pounds of rice and half a pound 
34 
of salt" • 
VII. SUPPLIES OF DRIED FISH AND DENDENG WITHOUT PAYMENT 
Commander Sloterdijk of the navy squadron in Ambon 
required these stores for his ships since their supply of 
salt meat had gone rotten. The Governor "by way of fair 
distribution" requisitioned part of this from the Resi-
dencies Saparua, Hila and Haruku, since none was available 
in Ambon and there had been no imports from Java. The price 
was set at 15 Rix Dollars per piCU135 giving the lie to the 
statement that no payment would be made. The inhabitants of 
Hila and Haruku had accepted this price but those of 
Saparua requested payment of 20 Rix Dollars per picul, a 
price that had been paid during the previous era of Dutch 
rule, on occasions when large quantities had been demanded. 
The government agreed to pay this amount, provided the 
Saparuans could prove that this price had been paid in the 
past. It does not appear as if the higher price was paid 
34 Decree No. 230 dated 23 February 1818. 
35 Requisition dated 30 April 1817. 
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because the ex-Governor states: "About this nor about any 
of the other alleged grievances, nor yet about mistreatment 
and oppression of which the Resident was accused after the 
36 
revolt, no complaint or petition reached me; 
The total quantity involved in this grievance was 
1000 Ibs, of which Hila's share was 500 Ibs, Haruku's 200 
Ibs and Saparaua' s a mere 300 Ibs or 5 piculs. The total 
amount of money in dispute was 25 Rix Dollars, which makes 
this particular grievance seem - at least to the outside 
observer - rather trifling. 
VIII. COMPULSORY DELIVERY OF COFFEE 
Van Middelkoop rejects this point entirely. Although 
the supply had been recommended because of the shortage 
caused by the non-arrival of supplies from Java and the 
demand for supplies by naval ships and troops, a fair price 
had been agreed to and orders had been issued that only 
coffee in excess to local requirements was to be requisit-
ioned. A similar arrangement had already been in force 
under British Rule. In Van Middelkoop's opinion it could 
therefore not be advanced asa grievance against the Dutch. 
In support of his rejection of all grievances 
connected with compulsory deliveries of timber, salt, coffee 
or dried meat as well as those about paper money and charges 
about interference in school and church matters, as the 
reason for the revolt, Van Middelkoop quotes the statements 
of the ex-Raja of Pelauw and the Orang Kaya of Kailolo37 that 
36 Van Middelkoop's Sourabaya Report. 
37 Van Middelkoop' s ~ourabaya Report. f. 26. 
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the first meetings of the mutineers of these negories took 
place on 4 April, just ten days after the take-over from 
the British and barely two weeks after Van den Berg's 
arrival in Saparua. This was well before paper money was 
brought into circulation, requisitions were made, or salt 
experiments had been requested. 
On 17 June somebody wrote from Ambon to Bengal about 
the events in Saparua: "The causes of the unfortunate 
rebellion are said to be the paper money, the recruitment 
of people for Java, the fact that the Resident had had a 
woman stripped naked and flogged in the bazaar, that he had 
demanded supplies of fish and sago for the troops without 
payment and that he had relied too much on his clerk Ornek". 
This was published in the Government Gazette of 7 August in 
calcutta. The Batavian newspaper Bataviasche Courant No. 49 
of 6 December 1817 reprinted this, adding: "The experiences 
and reports, which anybody here can obtain, will show these 
reports and the opinions expressed therein, for what they 
are". The righteous indignation is somewhat puzzling since, 
overall, the reports are in no way unjust. The fact that 
the Commission General and its money system might have 
been, at least in part, the cause of the revolt, did not 
dawn on them. "The sad affair of Saparua", Van der 
Capellen wrote in a private letter to the Minister of the 
Colonies, A.R.Falck, on 8 July 1817,38 "is conveyed to you 
in the Official Missive. Wrong direction, tactless treat-
ment of people and affairs, and the misuse of authority are 
undoubtedly the causes". And on 14 October39 liThe Resident 
38 A.R.Falck,Gedenkschriften p.467. 
39 ibid p.471. 
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Van den Berg seems to be mainly responsible for this 
40 
revolt" . liThe Saparuans are mostly so-called Christians 
and very fanatical. The British have maintained this 
spirit in the Moluccas and seem to have instilled the belief 
in the inhabitants that we would introduce an entirely 
different system. This caused bad blood". Again here the 
blame is put elsewhere. 
Although Van den Berg is made the scapegoat by just 
about everybody, it is not very difficult to demonstrate 
the injustice of such a verdict. Buyskes' only accusation 
of Van den Berg is that it is hard to understand how he 
could have failed to suspect the rebellious stirrings which 
had been going on in Saparua since early May4l Van den Berg 
was not entirely ignorant of these facts. After Pieter 
Soehoka had told him the rumours about revolutionary 
meetings in the forest 42 , the Resident had asked the 
Regents of Booy and Nollot43 for comment and was assured 
that it was nothing but malicious gossip. It is not known 
for certain when the Njora of Nollot visited the Resident's 
. f 44 w~ e , but it must have been very shortly before the 
outbreak; the fact that she mentioned that weapons were 
made ready points to that. It is unthinkable that Van den 
Berg would still have doubted the truth of Soehoka's message 
after it had been confirmed by the wife of the man who had 
misled him, and it is equally unthinkable that he - who had 
40 This judgement was clearly based on Van Middelkoop's 
reports. 
41 Buyskes' Report 472. 
42 Van Doren. op.cit. p.128. 
43 Sensibly he chose Regents of two negories, one of 
which was situated in the South and one in the North of 
Saparua. 
44 cf. p.78. 
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shown himself to be a man of action on several occasions -
would have failed to pass this on to his superiors in Ambon. 
Van Doren45 claims that the Njora told Mrs Van den 
Berg "in all innocence" what was happening, but in view of 
the good relationship between the ladies, as evidenced by 
the coffee-visit, it is very likely that she intended this 
as a last minute warning of imminent danger. It was the 
Resident's misfortune that the warning did not come earlier 
since that would have led to strong action from Ambon, at 
least if their eyes had been opened. But we know that even 
the warning delivered to him in person, by the Regent of 
Siri-Sori, Johannes Kyrauly, was disregarded by Van 
Middelkoop, but this is not mentioned by either of the 
Commissioners in their reports. Engelhard, according to 
Van Middelkoop, found all incoming warnings livery confusing, 
speculative and unclear". He did arrange for a small 
garrison of a sergeant, a corporal and six privates to be 
sent to Fort Hoorn at Pelauw and sent a few men to Hila to 
garrison Hitulamai but that was the sum total of his actions 
in this regard, since Colonel Kraijenhoff maintains that 
he could not spare one single man more. 
h d ' 46 d' h' 'd Engel ar s report regarJ.ng t e warnJ.ng to ResJ. ent 
Uitenbroek of Haruku is very important because it shows 
47 
where, when, why and how the revolt was planned . 
f dd h k ab h ' 48 I we a w at Buys es wrote out t e conspJ.racy: 
45 Van Doren. op.cit. 
46 Engelhard's Batavia ReEort. 
47 
cf. p.76. 
48 Buyskes' Buitenzorg Report. 
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II I repeat smouldering fire of revolt, since 
it appears that, within a very few days after our 
take-over, there were meetings here and there, that 
there was correspondence between the inhabitants 
of Hitu and the north coast of Haruku and most 
likely with those of Saparua, at which they 
committed themselves under solemn oaths to make 
themselves free and independentll. 
These quotations from Engelhard's and Van Middelkoop's 
reports prove: 
1. that the intention of the rebels was to gain 
independence and freedom from the government, which had 
nothing to do with local government actions in Saparua; 
2. that within a very few days after the change 
49 
of government rebel meetings took place ,so that any 
connection between these and the Resident Van den Berg's 
actions is non-existent, because 
3. the Hitu peninsula on which Liang is situated 
is part of the island of Ambon and the invitations to the 
conspiracy originated from that island and that the source 
of the revolt was on Ambon and not on Saparua. 
From the above the conclusion may be drawn that the 
list of grievances as compiled by Matulesia and the Heads 
at Hatawano was drawn up to secure villagers' support for 
a course of action which had been decided upon wholely or 
largely independently from them. 
It is clear that Buyskes realized immediately that 
the revolt had been hatched in Ambon, even though the chief 
rebels Matulesia and Rhebok were in Saparua and the 
revolution erupted there. He wrote: 
"As soon as I had taken over the government and· 
had been briefed about the position, I realized 
49 Only ten days after Van den Berg took up his 
appointment, from 25 March to 4 April. 
that it was absolutely essential to achieve the 
sUbjection of the rebellious negories in Hitu and 
restore peace on the island of Arnboina, before 
action against the mutineers of Saparua and the 
neighbouring islands could be undertaken 
advantageously and safely"50. 
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Ver Huell had suggested the immediate dispatch of his ship 
to Saparua "to occupy Fort Duurstede and forcefully suppress 
the revolt", but, as Buyskes reported to the King, "The 
Commissioners did not want to deprive Ambon of one of the 
capital ships in order to have them available to escape. 
At least", Buyskes wrote, "all measures taken have confirmed 
me in this opinion" 51 
This action by the Commissioners, which seems to 
have been inspired by personal interest, could be seen as 
highly reprehensible because the execution of Ver Huell1s 
plan would have retaken the Fort in May (in fact it was not 
retaken until 3 August), the Beetjes expedition would not 
have been dispatched and the loss of his force of approx-
imately two hundred men, not to mention the loss of military 
prestige, would have been avoided. All these factors contri-
buted to the extended duration of the revolt, because they 
necessitated the preparation of a second expedition, thus 
giving the mutineers plenty of time to prepare fortifications 
on Saparua making reconquest so much harder. 
We have looked at the part the grievances of the 
mutineers, whether justified or not, played in the actual 
50 Buyskes 1 Buitenzorg Report. 
51 ibid. 
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eruption of the revolt. We have reached the conclusion 
that Van den Berg, as an inexperienced Resident, without any 
training for his difficult task, may have acted injudiciously 
and harshly, as both Van der Kemp and even Governor General 
Van der Capellen represented matters. But the facts point to 
the likelihood that Van den Berg was made the scapegoat. 
Buyskes' conclusion quoted above: 11 ••• 1 repeat 
smouldering ••• " starts thus: IIUnforgivable are some 
dispositions of the Governor shortly after the take-over, 
which could only serve to fan the already smouldering fire 
f 1 t " ,,52 o revo u 2on... . If Van Middelkoop proved incompetent, 
Engelhard was weak and ineffectual. Both failed sadly in 
their duties and their mismanagement contributed to the 
revolt in Saparua. Engelhard himself confirms this in 
h " 1 tt t S 1 f d t I" 53 2S e er 0 enn van Base re erre 0 ear 2er even 
if he represents Van Middelkoop as the only guilty party, 
when he writes: 
"It is certain that Van Middelkoop and the 
Decrees he issued, disregarding our instructions 
to conduct the government, provisionally, on 
the principles introduced by the British, 
contributed greatly to the troubles in Saparua". 
In the same letter he accused Van Middelkoop of putting 
all blame on "the unfortunate Van den Berg for events to 
which he, Van Middelkoop, himself gave the orders, a fact 
he carefully refrained from mentioning, in the expectation 
that the Saparua archives will by now have been burned or 
lostll. Those statements are of course an admission of guilt 
by Engelhard who, as First Commissioner, should never have 
consented to the orders issued by Van Middelkoop in 
52 cf. pp. 76 and 145. 
53 cf. footnote p.121. 
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contravention of their instructions. 
Irrespective of the blunders of the Ambon Commission-
ers, a good deal of blame must attach to the Commissioners 
General in Batavia. Their mistakes and shortcomings can be 
tabulated as follows: 
1. The appointment as Resident to Saparua of a man 
who had had no training whatsoever for the position. 
2. The demand that Moluccan soldiers be recruited 
especially for Java. 
3. The dispatch of a totally inadequate military 
force to the Moluccas after authorities in Holland, at the 
Treaty of London of 13 August 1814, had parsimoniously 
declined to take over the Ambon Corps. The totally 
inadequate Dutch military might can only have encouraged the 
revolutionaries. 
4. The introduction of the paper money system must 
also be laid at the door of Batavia or the Dutch government 
in Holland. 
5. The failure of the Batavia Government to timely 
send supplies of salt, dried fish and meat, as well as 
coffee, to the Moluccas, for both the population and the 
naval squadron, was the reason for the forced deliveries, 
the main grievance of the negory people, which, in their 
eyes, fully justified the war against the "Company". 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above must be 
that the immediate cause of the revolt of 1817 was the 
dissatisfaction of the people, caused by the fear of the 
re-introduction of the tough, pre-British, Dutch rule, 
fanned by an elite of schoolmasters and village heads who 
saw their traditional ruling status threatened, and by the 
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ex-soldiers, disgruntled by a Dutch refusal to re-engage 
them on acceptable terms; they, as newly created burgers 
fell outside the dati system and thus became dependent on 
the charity of their kinfolk. The incompetence of Dutch 
civil and military officials on the spot as well as the 
shortsighted policies of the Batavia and the Hague governments 
who approached delicate matters in the most hamfisted 
fashion, can only have confirmed the islanders in their 
resolve. 
in Adat Dress showing strong Portu 
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CHAPTER V 
THE AFTERMATH 
What, if anything, had been achieved by the revolt 
to affect the Moluccas and the Moluccans either immediately 
or in the future? Peace was restored. The leaders had 
been tried by the Ambon Raad van Rustitie (Court of Justice). 
Twenty three had been sentenced to death; fourteen of these 
had been executed and nine had had their sentence r'emi tted 
to banishment with hard labour in Java. These last joined 
a great number of prisoners considered dangerous to the 
public order. Buyskes had returned to Batavia, to his duties 
as Third Commissioner General and in his place Major-General 
H.M. De Kock was appointed Governor of the Moluccas. 
Governor De Kock took up his appointment on 25 
February 1818 and held the office for less than one year. 
Although an excellent governor ln the opinion of the 
Commission General in Batavia, he was recalled to Java by 
the end of 1818 to succeed General Anthing as Army Commander 
on the latter's return to Holland. De Kock saw the revolt 
as a result of the fear felt by the natives of the return of 
the old system after the mild and supposedly fair rule of 
the British and of a number of wrong decisions taken by the 
government1 . He went out of his way to convince the 
islanders that it was the government's intention to rule 
fairly and that no one would be oppressed. He was genuinely 
1 Gen. De Kock Memorie van Overgave (1819) Schneither 
Collection 57 No. 128. Rijksarchief, The Hague. 
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concerned about the poverty that was rampant in the negories 
of Saparua, Haruku and the coast of Hitu, where most of the 
houses had been destroyed by fire, either in the course of 
the war or as punishment for participation in the revolt. 
To assist the people 
labour was demanded 
rebuilding, little or no compulsory 
them during De Kock's term of office 
and sago from the large government sago forests on Ceram 
was made available to the population at a very modest price. 
He was convinced that peace could be lasting if the natives 
were ruled gently and no great demands were made for 
compulsory labour. He also ordered that the Hongi 
expeditions should not be conducted annually; they were, 
he thought, too harsh on the villagers. He did not conduct 
one such expedition during his term of office, feeling that 
one every third year would be sufficient. He also took 
issue with Batavia over the rate of pay for civil servants 
in the Moluccas, which, despite higher prices in the 
islands, was lower than in Java. This, he felt, could 
easily lead to renewed extortion2 . 
Baron Van der Capellen, the Second Commissioner 
General and Governor General, has a reputation as a humane 
and compassionate man. He was an ardent admirer of the Abbe 
Raynal, author of Histoire philosophique des establissements 
et du commerce des Europeens dans les deux Indes 3 (the 
2 ibid. 
3 Published in Amsterdam in 1771. 
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East and West Indies}, who did for colonial rule what 
Rousseau had done for education and political science. The 
Abbe was a genuine representative of the Enlightenment; he 
clearly exposed the dark side of empire4 , especially in the 
Moluccas. His influence on Van der Cape11en was a lasting 
5 
one . 
When the first Governor General for the Indies was 
to be appointed after the British interlude, there had been 
a number of people who felt themselves eminently eligible 
for the office. Prominent among them were Daende1s and 
Dirk van Hogendorp, people with extensive experience in 
government of the colonies. But the King's choice fell on 
Van der Cape11en, a man who, the King felt, subscribed to 
the same ethical and social ideals as he did himself. This 
was the reason why William bypassed the people with colonial 
experience whom he considered to belong to the past. The 
new colonial government was to have as its hallmark that 
decency and respectability that were the guidelines of 
6 William's own c.onduct as King of the Netherlands . 
Like Raffles, Van der Cape11en was of the opinion 
that the Indonesians had to be protected and their burden 
lightened; but he went a step further by explicitly recog-
nizing that a degree of compulsion - on both sides - was 
necessary. He warmly supported the view of those who, in 
the Charter of 1802 7 , had laid down that the administration 
4 
cf. p.170. 
5 De Graaf (1977) op.cit. p.235. 
6 Brugmans, H. Geschiede<n<is van Nederland. Vol. VIII, 
Amsterdam (1937) pp. 377-8. 
7 
cf. p.36. 
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"should treat the indigenous people as a father treats his 
child and not as a ruler treats his subjects,,8. 
King William I saw the colonies, as did most of his 
contemporaries, as a concern that should be profitable. 
He ordered the Commissioners to re-organise the government 
for which purpose they received extensive instructions. 
The last lines of Art. 19 of these instructions read: 
"with regard to the cloves produced in and 
around Ambon, they shall especially investigate 
if and why the Monopoly must be considered more 
advantageous to the State than the encouragement 
of the cultivation through free trade and the 
introduction of land dues and import and export 
duties II • 
This part of their instructions had not yet been 
fulfilled by the Commission by the time the Revolt erupted. 
During the Ambon Revolt Van der Capallen had shown 
a special conce~n for the operation of the Moluccan system 
and its effect on the population. When, after Elout's 
and Buyskes' departure, he assumed the office of Governor 
General, one of his first acts was to set up a Moluccan 
Commission, composed of H.J. Van de Graaff and G.T.Meylan, 
his chief advisers. In their report, submitted in 1821, 
they expressed the opinion that the conditions of the 
people, under the present system, were most unfavourable 
and they recommended the abolition of the monopoly and the 
encouragement of colonisation by European farmers, to grow 
spices under free-trade conditions. This commission's 
findings were backed by Governor Merkus who made an 
extensive inspection tour of the entire Moluccas shortly 
after taking up his appointment there. 
Tas, S. op.cit. p.54. 
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Before making a decision Van der Cape.llen decided to 
acquaint himself with the circumstances, in person and on 
the spot, but the heavy pressure of work forced him to 
delay his visit until 1824. Then, with Merkus and Van de 
Graaff as his advisers, he conducted a new investigation. 
There is a record of their deliberations in the 
, 'k h' f9 Rl) sarc le . They agreed that the Monopoly System should 
go, not only in the interest of the population which had 
suffered under it for two centuries, but also in the real 
interest of the state. They based this decision on the 
following considerations: the impossibility of maintaining 
the monopoly in the face of the free shipping concessions 
in the Moluccas, which made it impossible to maintain all 
the measures required to enforce it; the high cost of 
government supervision and defence that were inseparable 
from the system; the fact that the interest of the popu-
lation was diametrically opposed to the demands of government; 
and finally on the diminishing income derived by government 
due to steadily sinking prices for spices, both in the 
Indies and the European Markets, as a direct result of the 
planting of clove trees outside the Dutch East Indies, 
especially during the British Interregnum. This last point 
they saw as the reason why the Moluccas, instead of being 
a profitable possession for the fatherland, would become a 
pressing financial burden on the finances of the Indies. 
They were agreed, not only on the necessity of introducing 
a system of government for those territories that would be 
more in harmony with the principles on which the government 
was now based - fairness to the people and the clearly 
understood continuing interest of the government - but also 
----.~--------"----------------------------------------------------9 Collection "Kolonien na 1813 11 file 966, Rijksarchief, 
The Hague. Quoted by Stapel op.cit. p.182. 
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in the belief that the intended changes must consist of 
total abolition of the monopoly system and its replacement 
by a system of free-trade. The introduction of free trade 
would necessitate the levying of regular taxes to offset 
the cost of sound, politic and financial government. 
As regards the way in which this government was to be 
achieved and the means setting it into operation, the 
opinions of the Commission differed. They felt that special 
measures were required to introduce the system, but Governor 
Merkus felt they could be introduced immediately. 
Whatever the course, it would cost a considerable 
amount during the first few years. If the existing system 
were abolished gradually no immediate reduction of the army 
would be possible and costs would be considerable for a few 
years. If, on the other hand, it was abolished immediately, 
then the benefits would be immediate too. The people's 
co-operation with the government, that would result, would 
allow an immediate reduction of the armed forces in the area 
and a consequent saving of expenses. 
The Governor General felt that the old monopoly 
system was incompatible with the personal ideals of the 
King and these considerations inclined him to consent to 
the immediate nemoval of all obstacles to this abolition, 
but he also considered that, on such a matter of principle, 
he would not be justified in making decisions without 
extensive debate about the consequences by the entire 
"high Government". He also thought that some immediate 
measures should be taken to remove the worst of the pressure. 
The result was the IIMoluccan Publication ll of 1824, 
which was posted allover the islands in a Dutch and Malay 
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text. This remarkable document is printed in the 
Staatsblad (Goverrunent Gazette) No. 19a 182410 • After the 
solemn opening, addressed to all the South Moluccan peoples, 
mentioned by name, the Governor General informed them of the 
King's bidding to pay special attention to the Moluccas 
during his stay in the East. Pressure of work had prevented 
him, so far, from doing much about this and he had had to 
rely on other people to investigate the needs of Ambon, but 
now he had come in person to study their plight. Here 
follows a list of disasters which had affected the Moluccan 
people, interspersed with some of their failings: poverty, 
dependency, unrest and disputes, rebellion against the 
Heads, smuggling, lawlessness and laziness. To a consider-
able extent the fault was not theirs, and therefore, Van 
der Capellen claimed, he had not come to punish but to save. 
He promised some improvements: complete abolition of the 
hongi-expeditions, no more unpaid labour duties and a 
doubling of payments for materials supplied. New laws and 
regulations regarding local goverrunent would be introduced 
and other reforms brought down. For their part, the 
islanders ought to receive goverrunent officials well, 
because from now on the offences which had been committed 
by officials would cease: no more clove trees would be cut 
down, no more gardens destroyed, no more prahus or houses 
burned, there would be no more interference with religion 
and people would be protected against attacks from pirates. 
In his Journal, after discussing the Publication, Van der 
10 Quoted by F.W~Stapel in "Een en ander over de 
Molukken publicatie van 1824", Bijdragen Vol. 86 (1930) 
P .18 O. 
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Capellen wrote: III have informed the King of my trans-
actions in Amboyna and not hidden from His Majesty that the 
Monopoly System can no longer be maintained llll . 
No doubt one of Van der Capellen's most bitter 
disappointments must have been that the King disagreed with 
most of his actions. The interference of the Dutch govern-
ment in the economics of the islanders, the almost complete 
freedom given to the Governor of the Moluccas, Merkus, to 
prepare for a system of free trade and cultivation, the 
Ilfanatical speeches ll to the people and the Publication were 
in the King's eyes "polemical and pointless ll • In 1826 the 
Count Du Bus de Gisignies, sent out to the Indies as a 
Commission of One, was authorised by the Minister for the 
Colonies to reverse the decisions regarding the Moluccas and 
to re-instate the compulsory cultivation. The islanders 
remained free to dispose of their cloves as they wished, 
as long as they were sold in Ambon. In 1827 Du Bus de 
Gisignies ordered that the clove cultivation be extended to 
the South Coast of Ceram, that the cultivations be regularly 
inspected and that everything that stood in the way of this 
cultivation be eliminated, but care was to be taken not to 
. h' 1 d 12 antagon1se t e 1S an ers • 
Less than a month before the Ambon Publication was 
proclaimed on 15 April 1824 - in fact at the very time that 
Van der Capellen was in Ambon - representatives of the 
Netherlands government had signed the London Treaty of 17 
March 1824, in which, in Article I, the subjects of both 
11 IlJournaal van Baron Van der Capellen van zijn reis 
door de Molukken II " T'ijdschrift voor Nederla'nd'sch Tndie. 
Vol. II (1855). ---- '-
12 Staatsblad No. 80, 1827. Source: H. van der Wijck, 
IlDe Nederlandsche Oost Indische Bezittingen ll Ph.D. Thesis, 
s 'Gravenhage. (1866) . 
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states were guaranteed free trade in each others colonies, 
but in which also, in Article 7, the Moluccan Islands and 
especially Ambon, Banda and Ternate and their immediate 
dependencies were "specifically excluded until such times 
when the Netherlands government will deem it advisable to 
abolish the monopoly in spices". 
This decided the fate of Van der Capellen's 
.. 13 proposltlons 
The IlMoluccan Publication ll is an important document, 
nonetheless, as the first official government document 
which expresses a new spirit. It differs from other 
government documents in that it openly admits that the 
policies pursued thus far had been detrimental to the 
population. The appreciation of such open mindedness, as 
might be expected, was varied. The Lt. Governor General 
admired it greatly. But an (anonymous) civil servant wrote 
in the margin of the Publication: IIIf the population had 
been able to understand it, it would have caused much 
damage" 14 • Such prognostications did not eventuate, 
however, probably because the Ambonese, in all likelihood, 
did not understand the stilted high Malay. 
Why should the anonymous writer have been worried? 
Most likely because of the new spirit expressed in the 
proclamation. An open confession of guilt, until this 
moment, had not been the government's line. But why had 
the King refused to abolish the clove monopoly in the 
Moluccas? There were several arguments against an immediate 
13 See p. 161. 
14 Stapel (1930) op.cit. p.18l. 
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or rapid abolition of this century old economic system. 
Van der Capellen and Van de Graaff already suspected that, 
with the abolitions of the (in their view fatal) monopoly, 
little or no co-operation by the people could be counted 
on, as they would see the unpleasantness of the unfamiliar 
rather than the benefits intended. The long suffering, 
mostly conservative, Moluccan population would not welcome 
change but only saw trouble in innovation. Having been 
used to enforced cultivation for centuries they simply would 
have no conception of free cUltivation and also lacked the 
necessary experience to act as merchants in a free market. 
Another difficulty was fiscal in nature. The 
compulsory clove cUltivation had become a kind of tax. 
Abolition of the monopoly would therefore inevitably mean 
the introduction of a sales tax on the crop or an export 
duty on the cloves produced. Those duties would then, in 
fact, only be paid by the government's subjects and not by 
the people of Buru, Ceram, Djilolo and other islands adjacent 
to Ambon, since these islands, at that time, did not pay any 
attention to government authority. Consequently they would 
be able to sell their cloves at a lower price to itinerant 
traders, creating unfair competition for the duty paying 
government subjects. A prerequisite for the general intro-
duction of a free economy would be the subjection of all 
the clove producing islands by the Dutch government and the 
prospect for this was still way off. The only result of 
Van der Capellen's visit was a modest increase in the price 
the government paid for cloves. In 1828 a law was passed 
that prohibited anybody from leaving their negory, unless 
they had fulfilled their obligation to tend 90 clove trees15 . 
Stapel. ibid passim. 
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In the long run, however, the clove monopoly was 
unsustainable. Not only was the liberal element in Holland, 
which gained power in 1848, strongly against it, but the 
system also was no longer viable financially. World market 
prices dropped steadily. Since the end of the eighteenth 
century increasing quantities of cloves were grown outside 
the Moluccas and the abolition of the monopoly was therefore 
a matter of time. When the so-called Culture System, 
introduced much later than the Ambon System, was gradually 
abolished, the clove monopoly of Ambon was also finally 
abolished. The date of the official abolition was 1 January 
1864. 
Tardiness in this matter was largely due to the fact 
that the Dutch King could govern the colonies autocratically 
since no one had objected when the Constitution of 1815 left 
the complete control over the colonies to the King. This 
clause remained in the revised Constitution of 1840 and 
parliament did not have direct control over the policies 
followed by the government in the Indies until the 
Compatability Act of 1864 had been voted. 
Anticipating the difficulties which Ambonese, lacking 
in business mindedness, might have in marketing their own 
produce, they were allowed, for a number of years, to 
deliver their cloves to the government stores at a fixed 
price. The Moluccans never took up business as merchants 
and the market was cornered by the Chinese and Arab traders. 
Prices dropped tremendously. While in 1874 the price was 
still 105 cents per pound had dropped to a mere 16 cents 
by 1903. This was the end of the Moluccan spice trade. 
Whereas the entire clove trade had once been concentrated on 
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Ambon, the total crop of the islands today represents only 
th t f th ld . 16 two to ree per cen 0 e wor consumpt10n 
The end of the spice monopoly did not mean the 
inevitable pauperisation of the Moluccas. Nature is kind 
in these islands; there is plenty of fish in the sea and 
the sago tree provides food in abundance for very little 
work. So it took little effort to enjoy a simple stence. 
But there is a large gap between a simple existence and a 
degree of prosperity, and the more enterprising sought to 
close that gap, in order to do which, they had to look 
beyond their native islands. 
The people of Ambon still had an important role to 
play for which the past had prepared them to some extent. 
As soldiers, minor civil servants and evangelists, they 
were important in the Indies in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and after, just as they had been in the 
second half of the eighteenth century. 
It was the Pattimura revolt that revived the 
Ambonese Schutterij or Burger Militia. Although its origin 
went back to the sixteenth century, it had gone into a 
decline in the eighteenth. In 1817 it had played its part 
well, especially in Saparua. Immediately afterwards it had 
again gone into a brief decline from which it was revived 
anew for the visit of Governor General Van der Capellen in 
1824, after which it flourished until its final abolition 
in 1923. The militia, which trained with the regular 
garrison, helped keep the military tradition and spirit 
of Ambon alive. This spirit had received a severe setback 
H.J. De Graaf (1977) op.cit. p.244. 
Ambonese Troops in the war with Boni on CeLebes ti~~9) 
aIter a drawing by P.J. de Veer. 
Ambonese troops t-ighting Atj ehnese "rebels" during the 
second expedition in l(:S"{4. 
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in 1804 when Daendels ordered the recruitment of three 
companies of Ambonese infantry and one cavalry company and 
his recruiting platoons did not shrink from crimping and 
shanghaiing villagers. This was the reason why military 
service was still unpopular in 1817 and why comparatively 
few Ambonese took part in the 1825-1830 Java war when 
soldiers were badly needed. However, in this war the 
Ambonese did serve as garrison troops in the Moluccas, thus 
freeing other troops for Java, but this was still done on 
the strict condition that Ambonese troops could undertake 
no service beyond their home islands. 
In 1829 a conspiracy among Saparuan soldiers in the 
Ambon garrison was apparently discovered, with a new revolt 
as the aim. The fact that the conspirators were Saparuans 
may provide a link back to 1817: a small number of rebels 
from that time had remained in hiding in the Saparuan 
mountains. The 1829 conspiracy was said to have been 
better planned and to be more far reaching than the 1817 
mutiny. Plans had been carefully prepared and nothing 
leaked out until, on 16 February, some letters, containing 
invitations to take part in the revolt, were smuggled into 
the hands of the government. Further incriminating letters 
were intercepted and the suspicion was confirmed that they 
originated amongst the military in Saparua. An informer 
now revealed that nine Saparuan soldiers were the leaders 
who had planned to stage a revolt on the night of 18 February 
1829; they were to murder all the Europeans in the Fort, as 
well as those Ambonese soldiers who refused to co-operate. 
The Military Command acted at once and on the 17th the 
hundred and fifty Saparuans in the garrison were arrested 
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17 during unarmed morning parade It was subsequently found 
that the guns in the Fort had been spiked and filled with 
rubble and rock. An investigation brought evidence that the 
plot was hatched by nine Saparuan soldiers in the Ambon 
garrison, who had personal grudges and had made common cause 
with the remnants of the 1817 mutineers in the Saparua 
mountains18 • This was the last real stirring in the 
Moluccas. 
By 1828, enlistment in the army became truly 
voluntary and an attractive handsel was paid on enlistment. 
As a result military service regained popularity and 
soldiering, in time, became an honorable profession again. 
As soldiers the Ambonese were excellent, brave and 
generally reliable, although their self confidence, 
significantly, at times threatened to turn into insurrection 
when they felt wronged. They played a major role in the 
pacification of the Indonesian archipelago, participating 
in the expeditions against Bali and Lombok and particularly 
in the protracted Atjeh wars at the end of the nineteenth 
century, when no fewer than 4434 Ambonese served in the 
army, a number that, on the basis of the population of the 
islands, was very high indeed. At this time there were few 
17 De Bruyn Kops, op.cit. pp. 32-39. 
18 Penerbitan Sumbur-Sumbur Sedjarah. Arsip Masional 
Republic Indonesia No.4. LampOr"atl Politik Tahun 1837 
Djakarta (1971). 
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families who did not have a relative in the Dutch colonial 
19 
army 
Because of their Christianity they remained aloof 
from their environment in all the large garrison towns in 
Indonesia, establishing their own settlements with their 
own churches and ministers. They also retained contact with 
their home islands. It was customary, for instance, to 
refrain from having children, born outside Ambon, baptized 
until the whole family was on furlough in their Ambonese 
village. Up to and including the difficult situation during 
World War II they remained loyal. Even in the years of the 
Indonesian struggle for independence was there much strong 
loyalty. 
'Over the centuries, both before and after the 1817 
revolt, a strong bond had existed between the Dutch rulers, 
whether Company or Government, and the Ambonese, especially 
the Christian Ambonese. Such confrontations as there were 
before 1817 had been between negeries ra-ther than between 
negories on the one hand versus government on the other20. 
The birthday of the Prince-Stadholder, and later of the 
Monarch, were nowhere celebrated more enthusiastically than 
in Ambon; the "trinity" God-Ambon-'Oranje ll was no empty 
rallying cry. It was through this alliance that they were 
able to play an important role in the archipelago. 
In this "eternal alliance" two things stand out 
clearly: First, it had a patriarchal or paternalistic 
character. Today when the word "paternalistic" is used, 
there is, often unjustly, a pejorative implication. But let 
19 G.W .. T.Dames, 'Oem Ambon· Va'n het· K.N.T.L. The Hague. 
(1954) p.15. 
20 
cf. p.68. 
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us remember what "paternalism" meant in practice in Ambon 
in our period. It meant first that almost all initiatives 
came from Batavia or the Ambon Fort. Although this state 
of affairs created a feeling of loyalty in the Ambonese, 
it did not mean that the civil servant in the Moluccas had 
an easy job. It seems to be almost an innate trait of the 
Ambonese not to accept passively all that has been ordained 
by government. Second, the bond with the Dutch also 
provided the Ambonese with a somewhat privileged position. 
Ambon's soldiers received higher pay than soldiers from 
other ethnic groups and the fact that schooling had been 
provided in Ambon literally centuries before elsewhere in 
Indonesia gave it a monopoly position in supplying minor 
civil servants from Sabang in the west to Merauke in the 
east of the Indonesian archipelago. 
This patriarchal system was curtailed when in 1921 
an Ambon Council was established. This legislative body 
of twenty seven members numbered five Dutchmen, two 
Vreemde Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals), a term referring 
to Chinese and Arab citizens, and twenty Ambonese. Some 
other parts of Indonesia were given similar bodies but 
nowhere was.the number of indigenous members as high. 
This Council was readily accepted by the population 
but had the effect of slowly diminishing the special 
nature of Ambon's position. The new Hollandsch-Tnlandsche 
School (Dutch-Native Schools), where Dutch was taught and 
became the language of education in the higher classes, 
were established in other parts of Indonesia and in due 
course produced local candidates for the civil service; this 
policy had its effect on Ambon's monopoly. 
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The first reaction to the "Awakening East ll after the 
Russo-Japanese war - the first war in which an Asian nation 
had proved itself superior to the white race which presumed 
superiority in the colonies - led to the foundation of the 
Javanese "Budi Utama" movement, followed by the inter-island 
"8arekat Islam". The Ambonese, as Christians, did not feel 
at home in either of these organisations, but they had 
their effect, especially on the expatriate Ambonese soldiers 
and civil servants. They in turn began to organise. Their 
first organisation "Wilhelmina", established in 1908, had 
an avowedly loyal character. The "8arekat Ambon", founded 
by the journalist Patty in 1920, was more nationalistic. 
Patty, a communist, travelled to Ambon in 1923, to promote 
his radical views, but the traditional, government-orientated 
population did not want any of and, at the request of the 
Ambon Council of 28 May, 1923, Patty was banished to 
Bencoolen, the same place to which 8ukarno was banished some 
years later. After 1930 "8arekat Ambon" was reorganised 
into a more moderate movement, but still did not get govern-
ment approval, nor did it receive a sympathetic reception 
from other Indonesian Nationalists, who dubbed its members 
IIBelanda Ambon" - Ambonese Dutch. 
By now another organisation, the "Moluks Politiek 
Verbond", M. P. V. (Moluccan Political League) made its 
appearance and due to its moderate conduct, and its statutes, 
was acceptable to officialdom. Their aim was self-rule, 
but under no condition would they relinquish the ties with 
the Netherlands. As regards Indonesian Independence they 
adopted a wait and see attitude, they were for IIPreedom for 
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Indonesia ll but not for IIIndonesia free from Holland ll2l . 
Much is made in Indonesian circles of Pattimura as 
the initiator of the fight against colonialism and for 
independence. The facts simply do not bear this out. 
Although it is true that Dutch intervention in Indonesia 
dates from the sixteenth century, it can hardly be argued 
that real colonialism existed at that time. Colonialism 
proper, in which the state rather than the V.O.C. took a 
major role, dates from the nineteenth century and a case 
can be made that it was then that the first step was taken 
in Indonesia. The Princely States in Java and elsewhere 
had over the centuries become synonymous with impoverished 
peasantry, and the colonial administration built a state 
which, although bureaucratic was nonetheless reasonably 
efficient and had interests which extended to social care. 
The beliefs of some of the modern descendants of the 
Orientalists that, but for the interference of western 
powers, the East would have evolved its own efficient 
states, is open to question. Such claims, as well as the 
theories of Van Leur, are often used to argue from the 
particular to the general. They ignore the historical 
fact that, although there were great kingdoms in Java and 
parts of Sumatra in the fourteenth to the sixteenth 
centuries, this was not the case in the outlying islands of 
Indonesia which made up the bulk of its territory. Here 
21 J.T . Petrus,-Blumberger , De' 
i'n Nederl'ands Tn'die. Amsterdam. 
305. 
Na't'i'on'a'lis'ti'sche Beweg ing 
(1931) pp. 46-48 and 302-
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small despotic statelets were more commonj the stagnation -
and that is not really too strong a word - which greeted the 
Western powers eventually enabled those powers to secure an 
easy victory. 
The Nationalism that eventually arose in Indonesia 
was not so much the product of oppressive rule as of deeper 
forces of social change that accompanied it. 
nIt was not entirely the harshness of Dutch policy 
that led to the rise of organised nationalismj on 
the contrary the foundation of activist societies 
dedicated to the struggle for independence coincided 
with attempts on the part of the Netherlands to 
remedy past wrongs and to earn herself a reputation 
for enlightened colonial rule. This is not an 
uIlcommon experience in the annals of colonial rule. 
Colonial welfare policies tend to produce the 
reverse of gratitude - only the colonial power 
itself would expect otherwise - and it might not 
seem too much to say that in Indonesia's case, its 
nationalistic movement was the product of the virtue 
rather than the vi;ce of Dutch rule lt 22. 
In the case of the South Moluccas, the present 
author would argue that the South Moluccas ultimately owe 
their sense of independence, their strong sense of personal 
rights and their sense of loyalty to the pledged word, to 
the centuries-old influence of protestant Christianity, 
which was initiated by the East India Company with rapidly 
lessening zeal. The shades of the first seventeenth Century 
ministers of religion rise behind the present South 
Moluccans from the remote past. 
The claim of the Dutch and the South l101uccans of 
Moluccan IlLoyalty through the Ages" has been denied by 
. db' 23 h today's Indonesla an y some western wrlters w 0 argue 
that this is merely the result of Dutch propaganda. Van 
J. D. Legge.· Indonesia Spectrum Books, New Jersey, 
(1964) pp. 114/5. 
23 e.g. B. Van Kaam, Ambon door· de EeUwen. (1977) . 
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Kaam argues that during the colonial period the Dutch 
robbed the Moluccan people of their history and, conse-
quently, of the means of expressing their own identity. 
It might well be suggested that he, in this instance, 
allows himself to get carried away by the same preoccupation 
with the more distant past that influenced some of the 
Orientalists of well over a century ago. One cannot brush 
aside 350 years of history, and the replacement of a 
relatively unsophisticated animistic society by a Christian 
westernised economy, as a mere interference ina people's 
history, as if it had no part in the shaping of their 
identity. Van Kaam also argues that the Dutch have a desire 
to represent their relationship with the Moluccans as being 
much more harmonious than it, in fact, was. "Thisll, he 
concludes, "is not difficult to explain, but is bad economic 
history"24. J.A.Manusama, President in Exile of the tlSouth 
Moluccan Republic" disagrees with him and makes this clear 
when he states in his book Om Recht en Vrijheid (For Justice 
and Freedom) 25: 
UDutch rule over the islands, which lasted more 
than 350 years, was never really seen as colonial 
oppression or colonial domination. But it did 
reduce these once so prosperous and rich spice-
islands to the economically poor South Moluccas of 
today. There is no point in reproaching the Dutch 
for this and it would be completely futile to do 
so, because as well as the impoverishment and 
economic neglect of the country, they gave its 
inhabitants the Christian religion and western 
culture and civilisation ll • 
In other words, the Moluccans identified with the Dutch 
even though not blirid to their faults and shortcomings, and 
24 Van Kaam, B. op.cit. p.8. 
25 Manusama, J.A. om: Rechteri Vrijheid. Leiden (1952). 
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it was this identification that engendered a sense of 
loyalty from which there was only one serious lapse, namely 
the 1817 revolt. 
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CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE 
"Liberal" historians of the nineteenth century, saw 
much of the history of the Moluccas from the sixteenth 
century onward as a fight of brave champions for free trade 
against the cruel East India Company out for profits only. 
Of course this opposition was present, but there were much 
deeper causes. It was not only a matter of trade in spices; 
it was much more a struggle between two religious ideologies, 
between Muslim and Christian, which can be taken much further 
back to old disagreements preceding the arrival of Europeans 
in the Far East. In addition there were the Portuguese who 
had to be driven out, and the Spaniards who had to be 
watched. There was the Sultan of Ternate who claimed 
sovereignty over the South Moluccas and the rivalry between 
the Uli-Lima and the Uli-Siwa. There were the British 
co~petitors and their suppliers, the spice smuggling 
Macassarese, who further complicated the situation. Add to 
this the many local tribal battles, and some idea of the 
Moluccan chaos in those days becomes clear. 
It is not easy to pronounce positively on particular 
aspects, but the general picture that seems to emerge is 
that the Dutch East India Company, with the aid of their 
Moluccan allies, created a degree of peace and even a 
measure of welfare, the result of which is still evident 
today. At the very least the Moluccans would appear to 
have been resigned to the situation. It is true that litt 
research in depth has been done on the eighteenth century 
history of the Moluccas. But printed literature on Java 
and the V.O.C. as a whole would certainly have made mention 
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of any serious uprising in the all important Spice Islands, 
had any occurred in that time. 
It is equally difficult to pronounce on the causes 
of the Pattimura Revolt which disturbed this apparent peace. 
As might be expected, differences arise between the Dutch and 
Indonesian views of this event. All the documents relating 
to this revolt, with the exception of the "Porto Report", 
are Dutch in origin, as are the personal and ship's Journals 
and the written accounts of eye witnesses. The reason for 
this, of course, is the fact that few documents, reports or 
journals of Moluccan origin have survived, if indeed they 
ever existed. 
During a visit to Indonesia the author had the 
pleasure of meeting a number of Indonesian historians who 
have specialized in aspects of Ambonese history and who 
brought him up to date with recent Indonesian literature on 
the subject of Pattimura. As a matter of fact very little 
was written in independent Indonesia on this subject and 
until 1969, when Pattimura was proclaimed an official 
"National Hero of Indonesia", he was virtually unknown 
outside Moluccan circles. In the Moluccas, however, his 
story and that of his co-fighters, remained popular and 
became part of Ambonese folklore. 
Since all the source material used for recent 
Indonesian accounts of the Pattimura Revolt has been 
included in the material used by the present author, any 
difference in opinions and conclusions must be a matter of 
interpretation. How widely this interpretation can vary 
is perhaps most clearly indicated by the fact that both the 
Republik Maluku Selatan and the Republic of Indonesia put 
forward Pattimura as "their" Freedom Hero. 
F.Hitipeuw starts his little booklet on National 
Hero pattimural with these stirring sentences: 
"Every year on 15 May, we commemorate the 
historic start of Pattimura's war in 1817, to 
liberate the Indonesian people of the Moluccas 
from Dutch imperialist colonialism. 
Just as the people of France, on 14 July 
1789 marched on, and took, the Bastille and by 
so doing put an end to Absolutism, so did the 
Indonesian people of the Moluccas, on 15 May 
1817, march against Fort Duurstede at Saparua 
and thus put an end to Dutch imperialism." 
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That, of course, putting matters rather simplis-
ticly. Dutch imperialism was to last another hundred and 
thirty four years, and, at the end of that period, the people 
of the independent Republic of the South Moluccas (R.M.S.) 
found themselves engaged in a freedom war against what many 
of them saw as an imperialistic Republic of Indonesia. 
By any western standards of today the Moluccans in 
the early nineteenth century were poor. But poverty is 
relative and, like the Russian peasants of almost a century 
later, they had to be made aware of the fact. This is not 
a rationalisation. The point has been made earlier that 
it required little effort of the Moluccans to satisfy their 
basic needs. Sago and fish were easily obtained and such 
payments as they received for their spices were, if required, 
made in the form of the cotton piecegoods they needed. There 
was evidence of a certain welfare which expressed itself in 
1 F • Hitipeuw. Keunikan Perjuangan Pahlawan Nasional 
Pattilnura da'lam Menen'tang Pehjajahan di I>1alu~3:!.' p. 5. 
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the building of beautiful churches which also served as 
schools. The Ambonese , especially the Burgers, identified 
with the Europeans through their common Christianity. 
Disillusionment came when the British twice took 
over the government without, as far as the Moluccans could 
see, much resistance by the Dutch. The brutal period of 
Daendels'rule, between the two British interregnums, 
brought this disappointment to a head, at least as far as 
the schoolmaster/pastors were concerned. Their influence 
and independence suffered badly because of the abolition of 
financial aid to school and church. 
When, during the second British interregnum, the 
prestige of the Regents was diminished by stricter control 
and accountability, a second important elite group was 
alienated from the government. Although the schoolmasters' 
influence was strengthened for a while - when Resident 
Martin reinstated financial assistance to school and church 
- they again became apprehensive when the return of the Dutch 
became imminent. 
The general picture that comes through from this is 
that an atmosphere was created in which general discontent 
would thrive. Although the underlying causes did not 
really affect the villagers to any great extent, what did 
affect them were the immediate grievances, real or 
fabricated, which were used by the disgruntled Regents, 
schoolmasters and ex-members of the disbanded Ambon Corps, 
to - as Buyskes put it - fan the smouldering fires of revolt. 
The leaders who inspired the revolt and the groups 
that supported them acted in response to these grievances and 
in accordance with a belief system that the Europeans did not 
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understand or refused to accept. The adherents of the 
movement believed their causes to be righteous, their means 
to be potent and their leaders' solutions effective. Their 
perception of events that gave rise to the revolt and the 
factors that determined their mode of expression provided 
very different explanations of the rebellion than those 
offered by the European co1onisers. We have argued that 
these grievances were rooted in discontent that arose from 
the participants' personal experiences affecting the 
conditions under which they lived their everyday lives, 
and not from conscious perceptions of culture clashes and 
socio-cu1tura1 transformation. 
In the Moluccas the re-introduction of Dutch rule 
was seen as a threat to the position of the established 
groups who felt that a gap was created between what they 
felt they deserved in terms of status and material reward 
and what they possessed or had the capacity to obtain. This 
perception of a discrepancy between expectations and 
capacities led to a sense of deprivation. Individuals and 
groups compared their status and abilities to those of 
others -for example, the inhabitants of Ceram - or those 
that existed, or were thought to have existed, in earlier 
times. In this type of process, the element of change is 
critical, for "change itself creates discrepancies between 
legitimate expectations and actualities, either by 
worsening the conditions of the group, or by exposing a 
2 group to new standards". Because the stress and frustration 
2 For a discussion of these concepts see P.Curtin 
"Nationalism in Africa" Review of PoTitics Vol. 28 (1966) 
pp. 143-153. 
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that accompanied these feelings of relative deprivation 
were sufficiently intense and shared, they produced a pro-
test movement in the Moluccas designed to close the gap 
between the participants' expectations and their capacities. 
The lack of success of the revolt, after the first 
brief flash of victory, was due, in large measure, to the 
fact that participation by the population was neither total 
nor, in many cases, full-hearted. Because of their "ha1f 
European" status, the bulk of the Burgers remained loyal 
to the Dutch government in 1817, while, as we saw, the 
entire population of Nusa Laut was coerced into partici-
pation by directthreats3 . 
Although the revolution was led by Burgers, these 
were, without exception, people with personal grievances, 
such as the schoolmasters who feared for their position, 
or the newly created Burgers, the ex-members of the Ambon 
Corps, who resented the fact that the new government had 
not re-engaged them on acceptable terms. The average 
villager did not stand to gain or lose all that much either 
way, which is probably the reason why, ln most instances, 
in the face of a determined attack by the Dutch, his 
resistance crumbled rapidly. 
The result of the revolt, paradoxically, was a 
strengthening of the bond between Ambonese and Dutch. It 
was probably the realization that little advance would be 
possible in Ambon's agriculture, that determined Ambon's 
role hereafter. In ever increasing numbers the Ambonese 
3 See p.102. 
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entered into Dutch military service, becoming, as it were, 
the Gurkhas of the Dutch colonial armYi they also joined 
the Dutch civil service in large numbers, becoming what 
even Sukarno called them, in several of his speeches: 
Be1anda Hitam - Black Dutchmen. 
History had gone full circle. The peaceful co-
existence of the hundred and fifty years before the revolt, 
from which it was an aberration, had been restored. But 
for one abortive attempt at change in 1829, that peaceful 
co-existence was to continue for almost another one hundred 
and fifty years. 
In this study the words of the poet Isaac da Costa 
could often have been quoted: !lIn the past lies the 
present, in the now that which shall be". Each nation is 
determined to a great extent by its past. 
The Dutch cannot be separated from their fight for 
freedom from the Spanish, when their Royal family and their 
national anthem were born; similarly the Indonesian 
Nationalists refer with greater or lesser justification to 
the great Javanese state of Madjapahit that thrived in the 
fifteenth century. So too, the history of the Ambonese 
people has its own character, an unmistakeab1e stamp that 
is hard to erase, namely a centuries-old alliance with the 
Dutch, which found strong expression in their high regard 
for the Royal House of Orange. Their.co-operation with the 
co10nisers even precedes the arrival of the Dutch in the 
East. It goes back to the Portuguese. 
The Ambonese felt called to a special task, a feeling 
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in which their acceptance of the Christian faith has played, 
and still plays, a very special role. Local protests, 
grumbling and the exceptional armed resistance are easily 
understood, given the strong self-assertiveness of the 
Ambonese but these were not typical of Ambonese/Dutch 
relationship. The Indonesian authorities who forcibly 
incorporated the Republic of the South Moluccas in 1951 
were well aware of this bond and tried to create, beside 
this tradition of loyalty to the Dutch, a legend of fierce 
opposition to the colonial rulers. For this purpose the 
figure of Matulesia, now by preference called Pattimura, 
has been pushed to the fore. Previously unknown outside the 
Moluccas, he was now given the image of a Nationalist 
Freedom Fighter and in the seventies proclaimed an tlOfficial 
Hero of Indonesia". No other ethnic group in Indonesia has 
been subjected to such a strong attempt to bend their past 
in a historical sense. This prompts the question: If there 
was such a strong pro-Indonesian movement in Ambon prior to 
1940, why should such an attempt be necessary? The other 
question that can also be asked is: Is this Ambonese 
loyalty still alive or did it disappear after the bloody 
demise of the Republik Ivlaluku Selatan? This latter question 
is hard to answer. The Ambonese who can protest vociferously 
can also be extremely tight-lipped about certain things. 
But the fact that the Indonesian authorities found 
necessary to create their "counter myth", complete with 
statues and commemorative postage stamps, gives food for 
thought. 
Those Ambonese who, in 1951, opted to go to the 
Netherlands, rather than become "Indonesians", must still 
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have been imbued with that age old bond of loyalty, or they 
would not have gone. Successive Dutch governments have, 
we would argue, failed to perceive this and limited them-
selves to accommodating them socially, while completely 
ignoring their political aspirations. The breach of the 
Sovereignty Transfer Agreement, signed by the Indonesian 
Repub1ic,hard1y raised any official Dutch protest at all. 
This Dutch attitude must have been a bitter 
disappointment to the Ambonese who, considering their 
past, would have at least expected sympathy and understanding 
for their political ideals. 
The more the Moluccans clung to the ideal of their 
independent Repub1ik, the deeper became the gulf that 
separated the erstwhile allies. They did not want to be 
assimilated into a Dutch society they did not fully under-
stand, nor did they want to become "Indonesians of Moluccan 
descent". And so a situation developed - surprisingly, 
especially among the younger generation, those who had left 
the Moluccas as small children or were born in Holland -
that led to the terrorist actions in the Netherlands in the 
late seventies. 
How little understanding the Dutch had for this 
"Ambonese Problem" was evident by the debates in the House 
of Parliament after the train hi-jacking in Drente Province, 
when discussion focussed on the question: "How do we keep 
the brutes at bay?" Only one voice was heard urging a look 
at Ambon's history. 
Mercator's Map of the Worlu (1569) in Atlas-form. 
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